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This dissertation demonstrates how the urgent condition of crisis is routine for 
many non-governmental (NGO) and non-profit organization (NPO) workers, 
activists, lawyers, social movement analysts, social designers and 
ethnographers.  The study makes a contribution to the increasing number of 
anthropological, legal, pedagogical, philosophical, political, and socio-legal 
studies concerned with pragmatism and hope by approaching crisis as ground, 
hope as figure, and pragmatism as transition or placeholder between them.  In 
effect this work makes evident the agency of the past in the apprehension of 
the present, whose complexity is conceptualized as scale, in order to hopefully 
refigure ethnography’s future role as an anticipatory process rather than a 
pragmatic response to crisis or an always already emergent world.  This 
dissertation is based on over two years of fieldwork inside NGOs, NPOs, and 
think tanks, hundreds of conversations, over a hundred interviews, and 
archival research in Seoul, South Korea.  The transformation of the “386 
generation” and Roh Moo Hyun’s presidency from 2003 to 2008 serve as both 
the contextual background and central figures of the study.  This work 
replicates the historical, contemporary, and anticipated transitions of my 
informants by responding to the problem of agency inherent in crisis with a 
sense of scale and a rescaling of agency.  I demonstrate this scale of 
  
agency—ideology, field, sacrifice, discourse, project, and agenda—along with 
its double bind entanglements. In so doing this dissertation shows the utopian 
and post-utopian hope in rescaling kinship from filiation to affiliation and 
rescaling agency from person to movement and from revolution to social 
design.  Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of scale and 
its shifts in the generation and sustainability of hope for NGO and NPO 
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Introduction: The Hope and Crisis of Pragmatic Transition: Politics, Law, 
Anthropology, and South Korea 
 
From Hope to Crisis 
In the summer of 2002, many environmental activists traded their green and 
brown clothes for bright red Team Korea fare.  When South Korea and Japan 
co-hosted the World Cup that year, 386 generation (sam pal yuk sedae)1 
activists came to the forefront as organizers of the “Red Devils” phenomenon.  
They appeared to use the same tactics of protest from the 1980s to organize 
World Cup events.  There was a half-joke about “Be the Reds,” the ubiquitous 
slogan on Red Devils paraphernalia, indicating a relaxation of Anti-
Communism in South Korea.  Just a few months later, many of the same 
                                                          
1
The term “386 generation” was coined in the early 1990s when two-thirds of South Korea‟s 
43 million people were under the age of 40, the GNP was rising steadily, and democratic 
reforms appeared to quicken with the election of Kim Young Sam (Dong 1993:1; Lee 2007).  
Conventionally, the 3 of 386 refers to people in their 30s, the 8 to the decade they attended 
university (1980s), and the 6 to the decade in which they were born (1960s).  When South 
Korea hosted the Olympics in 1988, the nation was said to have “what must be the world‟s 
fastest-growing college population” with around 1.3 million students (Dong 1988:B1).  At that 
time, South Korea‟s percentage of students attending a four-year university was second only 
to the U.S. (Dong 1988:B1). Cho Hae-joang (1992) describes the nation‟s first “socially stable” 
generation who came of age in the 80s as carrying “the weight of the country on their backs” 
(1994:146).  Namhee Lee describes it as “a collective pressure to succeed for one‟s own 
future, for family, and for the nation” (2007:149).  As witnesses and beneficiaries of the rapid 
changes and economic growth during Park‟s military dictatorship from the 1960s to the 80s, 
the 386 generation was expected to transform the nation not unlike the computer had done to 
the world economy.  The analogy is not coincidental since the other explanation I have 
encountered of 386 is that it referred to the common computer processor at the time, which 
preceded 486 and Pentium.  There is, in other words, a progression also evident in 
development discourses (e.g., Escobar 1995).  386 generation bundles together the “national 
utopian imagination” Laura Nelson (2000) describes in South Korea.  The nationalism of the 
Red Devils and of many South Korean civil society leaders is evident in their shared practice 
of spelling Korea as Corea (see Chapter 2). 
 
In this dissertation I follow the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism system of 
romanization except with the names of some public figures.  In cases where there is a pre-
existing published and/or preferred romanization, such as with Syngman Rhee, Cho Hae-
joang and Roh Moo Hyun, I follow it. 
 
 2 
people gathered in the same public squares to commemorate two Korean girls 
who had been run over and killed by an American military vehicle just outside 
of Seoul. 
  
The election of Roh Moo Hyun, whose success was widely linked to 386 
generation mobilization, was the culmination of these events in 2002.  People 
who had never attended political rallies enthusiastically joined Roh in the same 
public squares that had seen World Cup rallies and candlelight vigils for the 
two girls killed by an American military vehicle (Levine 2004a).  Roh was a 
former democracy activist and self-taught human rights lawyer who was not 
only the first South Korean president born after the colonial period, but also 
the first one not to graduate from an elite university.  He gained widespread 
support not only from the 386 generation, but also from people who had never 
engaged in political campaigns before (e.g., Kang 2006).  Roh made 
headlines shortly after taking office by telling the chair of Japan‟s Communist 
Party that South Korea would only become  a “true democracy” if a communist 
party were allowed to enter the country (Yonhap 2003).  The boldness and 
hope of these statements for many of my informants was later likened to 
Barack Obama‟s statements on the Iraq War and race in the United States.  
Both Roh‟s and Obama‟s statements were praised at the times they were 
spoken for their honest confrontation with painful histories, courage to openly 
share convictions despite negative consequences, and the hopeful move 
away from previous generational obsessions that both seemed to signal2.  
Korea‟s colonial and anti-communist inheritances from Japan and the United 
States are taken up later in the introduction and in the first chapter. 
                                                          
2
 Personal conversations on September 10, 2010. 
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Not unlike Obama‟s supporters, the distance between hope and crisis proved 
to be short for President Roh‟s supporters.  Before Roh even took office, some 
of his fiercest supporters began to worry about the closing distance between 
NGOs and Roh‟s administration, which was a feature of neoliberal governance 
that had intensified during and after the Kim Dae Jung administration (Song 
2009).  The government liaison for an environmental non-governmental 
organization (NGO), for example, worried about how NGOs could go about 
their work when the President-elect had successfully used “methods 
(bangbeop)” that were conventionally their own—demonstrations in public 
squares and online networks (Levine 2004a).  These methods were 
foundational to NGOs and their ongoing transition from student, labor, and 
democratization movements to increasingly expert (jeonmun) advocacy and 
governance organizations. The ongoing transition from minjung (mass people) 
to simin (citizen) which Nancy Abelmann (1996, 1997a) and Robert 
Oppenheim (2003, 2008) have described marked a turn away from violent 
activism to non-violent organization and administration. Similarly, the ongoing 
transition from liberal to neoliberal which Jesook Song (2009) has taken up, 
marks a turn from an oppositional and confrontational government-NGO 
relationship to a collaborative and co-opting one familiar to many neoliberal 
contexts (e.g. Paley 2001; Greenhouse 2009).  
 
The CAGE campaign, which I address in the fourth chapter, is an example of 
how an alliance of NGOs combined authoritarian and liberal methods to great 
political effect in 2000.  In the wake of this campaign, several prominent NGO 
and non-profit leaders expressed the need to be ahead of the government, “on 
 4 
the cutting edge,” and “setting the agenda3.” At the end of Roh‟s term and after 
Lee Myung Bak was elected president in 2007, NGO and non-profit 
organization (NPO4) workers at various levels said they needed to provide 
(practical) alternatives rather than just criticize if they wanted the ear and/or 
the funds of government ministries and commissions. The Hope Institute 
(Huimang Jejakso), the think tank which I focus on in the fourth chapter, was 
conceived in many ways to fulfill this role5.  The cross-instrumental borrowing 
of methods that I theorized between government and NGO at the start of 
Roh‟s term (Levine 2004a) came closer to an iron cage of instrumentalism at 
the end of his term (Riles 2006a).  On one level, the hope Roh and many 
NGOs workers had for transparency reforms turned to disappointment and 
defensiveness about transparency being little more than an instrument for 
political advantage.  On another level, Roh and many NGOs found it difficult to 
escape their familiar instruments of criticism, protest, and broad-yet-vague 
slogans of anti-dictatorship, pro-democracy and pro-unification, which are all 
taken to be legacies of the 386 generation.   
                                                          
3
 Interviews with author on July 21, 2004 and February 5, 2007. 
4
 The distinction between NGO and NPO at the time of my fieldwork in Seoul was one 
between advocacy and social welfare respectively.  This was also a distinction internal to 
NGO Studies and the Lawyer Park family of organizations: PSPD is exemplary of NGO, the 
Beautiful Foundation of NPO, and the Hope Institute of think tank.  However, there is a large 
and fast-growing segment of religious organizations in South Korea that obviates the 
advocacy and social welfare distinction.  None of the organizations I researched had any 
official religious affiliation or mission; however, many staffers at various levels cited Buddhist, 
Protestant, or Catholic influences on social movement history as well as their personal stories 
of involvement in that history.  South Korea is often recognized internally and externally as an 
exemplar of democracy and civil society, particularly in Asia.  The rapid proliferation of NGOs 
and NPOs during the 1990s and 2000s mirrors the nation‟s rapid economic development (e.g. 
Choi J.J. 2000).  Yet management and training inside NGOs and NPOs has not kept pace and, 
as I discuss in the second chapter, was pronounced a “crisis” by some during the mid-2000s.  
The CAGE movement discussed in the fourth chapter and the NGO Studies phenomenon 
discussed later in this introduction and in the second chapter have been solutions to these 
problems that keep reform inside South Korea.  This commitment to indigeneity or nationalism 
is foundational to the movement tradition for all of the NGOs and NPOs discussed in this 
dissertation. 
5
 Interview with author on January 11, 2008. 
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To give a sense of how quickly hope became crisis, the NGO government 
liaison that shared the above concern about Roh borrowing NGO methods had 
quit working for NGOs, studied for a short time in a NGO Studies program6, 
and was working for a presidential advisory commission just a couple years 
later.  However, he left civil service disillusioned not long after (see Chapter 3).  
Another mid-level NGO manager shared repeated concerns that NGOs could 
no longer attract the best college graduates because both the government and 
media organizations were producing better versions of what they did in terms 
of investigative journalism7. To highlight her concern, she became a part-time 
NGO worker as she pursued graduate degrees in public policy and 
environmental studies while advising political parties and government 
commissions. Another veteran staffer who worked for the same NGO in the 
same position for almost 10 years finally decided to pursue a graduate degree 
                                                          
6
 NGO Studies emerged in the late 1990s at Sungkonghoe University with Kyunghee 
University following in 2000.  Now there are undergraduate and graduate programs at several 
more universities around Seoul.  Cho Hee-Yeon, one of the field‟s founders, credited Korea‟s 
Confucian history of activist academicism, growth in the number and scope of NGOs and 
NPOs during the 1990s, and the success of the CAGE movement with the field‟s 
establishment.  Cho was also working to establish South Korea as the leader and hub of NGO 
Studies in Asia not unlike politicians and business leaders were imagining South Korea‟s 
position in Northeast Asian regional trade.  He and many of the graduates I spoke with likened 
it to a professionalizing experience for NGO and non-profit workers that was already available 
to government and company workers.  In this way, NGO Studies was part of neoliberal 
governance by training NGO and NPO workers to do work that had previously been done by 
the state (e.g. Song 2009).  Many of the NGO workers I knew treated NGO Studies as a 
sabbatical—a short and relatively luxurious study break during which to gain a broader 
perspective on their work.  This was particularly true for people who could not travel abroad for 
one reason or another.  NGO Studies was part of the growing infrastructure and support 
available to NGO and NPO workers who received relatively low pay compared to their 
government and private industry counterparts, but who faced similar demands to upgrade and 
professionalize.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I approach NGO Studies obliquely as 
an example of a neoliberal and pragmatic response to the bundle of crises some NGOs faced 
at the same time it demonstrates the connection between academic and advocacy institutions 
in South Korea. 
7
 Her first statement to this effect was in a personal conversation on June 15, 2004, which was 
just after the Democratic Labor Party picked up an unprecedented number of parliamentary 
seats in the general election. 
 6 
in the U.S. that had long been on hold soon after her secretary-general 
stepped down to work as a consultant to city government commissions.  
These stories of mid-level and veteran staff attrition became the subject of 
research studies and newspaper headlines of crisis during the time of my 
fieldwork from August 2005 to July 2007.  As I explore in the second chapter, 
NGOs were in a “crisis (wigi)” which variably referenced their changing role 
and relationship to government and business sectors, increasing staff turnover, 
decreasing dues-paying members, and waning media attention. 
  
Crisis was not only internal and institutional, but also external and moral. One 
386 generation leader, Secretary-General Choi, told me that the old activist 
methods of writing press releases, having press conferences, and organizing 
street demonstrations were not working as he and his colleagues prepared for 
the last push against the largest government-led land reclamation in Asia8. His 
NGO, Green Korea, joined several others around the country in closing down 
office operations to coordinate large protests ahead of the final court ruling on 
the lawsuit to stop the Saemangeum reclamation.  Not long after the court 
ordered the reclamation to continue, he wondered if doing nothing would have 
been better than all the work done over the past few years9. He told me 
several months before, that the real problem for NGOs was that they did not 
have the scale of theory (iron) necessary to challenge not only the increasing 
scale of reclamation projects, but also the more pervasive scale of capitalism 
and neoliberalism10.  Secretary-General Choi, whom I discuss in the second 
and third chapters, was constantly diverted from his larger theoretical and 
                                                          
8
 Interview on March 6, 2006. 
9
 Interview on May 8, 2006. 
10
 Interview on November 22, 2005. 
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ideological aspirations by one crisis or another—the Saemangeum 
reclamation, protests in Pyeongtaek over the expansion of U.S. military 
operations there, the negotiation of a South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 
or the latest eruption of North-South tensions—and his Green Life Theory 
project relegated to one of many items on the agenda that often got pushed 
aside temporarily or indefinitely.  As a volunteer activist, fieldworker, and 
teacher in the field, I empathized with this frustration, particularly when I had to 
carve out time and space for writing field reports and this dissertation.   
 
This dissertation is an effort to suspend anthropology‟s and law‟s pragmatic 
impulses, particularly in response to crisis, long enough to enable a lateral 
ethnography of pragmatism.  As Thomas Yarrow reflects in his study of 
activists, “it is imperative that anthropology resists answering the question 
„what is to be done?‟ on its own terms” because others, including many of my 
informants, are already doing so (2005:228-229).  I take a cue from informants 
such as Secretary-General Choi in reapproaching units of analysis such as 
ideology, field, discourse, project, and agenda in terms of scale and Lawyer 
Park in rescaling individual actions to larger social movements and designs; 
rather than asking what is to be done on its own terms, this dissertation 
attempts to rescale agency.  Here I am positing scale following Gregory 
Bateson (1958) and Marilyn Strathern (1991) as a means or method to 
apprehend, organize, and analyze complexity.  Scale was not only my 
analytical device, but a hopeful device I shared with my informants (e.g., Choy 
2003; Riles 2000; Yarrow 2005).  Following the work of Hiro Miyazaki (2004), 
this dissertation attempts to replicate past and present movements, both 
activist and analytical, in order to reorient in terms of scale, crisis, and 
 8 
pragmatism.  In the next section I make evident the vibrant tradition of 
movements—social, political, and analytical—that already exists in Korea and 
Korean Studies. 
 
Movements, Replications, and Compressions 
In her 1996 ethnography, Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent, Nancy 
Abelmann intermittently replicates the practices of her subjects—student 
activists, tenant farmers, and the like—who engaged Korean history and social 
life in terms of movements. As in many postcolonial contexts, there is a “pace, 
urgency, and passion of South Korean historical discourse, and, 
correspondingly, of South Korean political activity…” (1996:9). Consideration 
of social movements, Abelmann writes, “goes to the heart of debates over 
national legitimacy and political struggles” (1996:24).  Her informants‟ 
engagements with historical and contemporary movements partially framed 
her own analytical engagements with social and anthropological theories of 
movement, narrative, and discourse, which I take up in subsequent chapters.  
In other words, Abelmann extends and in some cases replicates the practices 
of her informants.  She takes up the mobility and movements of individual and 
collective subjectivities by discursively situating “the reigning social 
imaginaries on social movements and activisms, their vocabularies, their 
grammars, their aesthetics, and their historical consciousnesses” (Abelmann 
1996:6).  Abelmann implicates “the nature of the tasks and the horizons of the 
contexts that ethnographers should embrace” through her movement “across 
multiple sites and subjectivities and in concert with heterogeneous social 
discourses and narrative practices” (1996:6-7). 
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Movements have been an origin and return point in the divided and 
postcolonial space Korea occupies.  As Abelmann observes, both North and 
South Korea “claim to be the legitimate offspring of colonial period national 
movements; each presents itself as the legitimate state for the entire Korean 
nation” (1996:25).  In his study of the ongoing effects of national division in 
Korea, Roy Richard Grinker describes a range of activist practices as 
“movements, literally and figuratively, because they represent real and 
imaginary travel and return in both geographic and temporal terms” (original 
emphasis 1998:193).  In her historical study of the postcolonial minjung 
movement in South Korea, Namhee Lee (2007) defines its central commitment 
to treating the people, or minjung, as the rightful subjects of history by 
praxiologically joining them and/or studying them in historical sites of 
importance (hyeonjang).  Lee replicates this commitment and hope in her own 
study by “treating the minjung movement as the rightful subject of history…” 
(2007:303).  For Lee this means historicizing the conditions of the movement‟s 
emergence as well as generating a historical praxis “not to restore the fallen 
bygone hero but to give history the capacity to enable individuals and society 
to reconceptualize social relations in an empowering and participatory way” 
(2007:303).  In various levels of discourse in and about Korea, history has long 
been imbued with agency and subjectivity and the absence of such as crisis, 
which I take up later in the introduction (Abelmann 1996; Grinker 1998; Lee 
N.H. 2007; Oppenheim 2008).   
 
The movements of history, in particular their speed, have come to define 
modernity and postmodernity in South Korea.  In fact, Cho Hae-joang (2000) 
argues that South Korea skipped modernity and went to postmodernity while 
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Jesook Song (2009) makes a similar argument for liberalism and neoliberalism.  
Choong Soon Kim‟s personal recollection is exemplary of many in the field: 
 
I was still unable to comprehend Korean progress until I witnessed the 
scene myself in 1981, when I returned to Korea for the first time since 
leaving for graduate school in 1965.  Experiencing so suddenly the 
results of years of economic development and industrialization, I felt a 
case of „future shock.‟  The entire country seemed to vibrate with 
economic progress…I remember that near the end of World War 
II…most Korean schoolchildren were unable to wear decent shoes 
because material for shoes had been confiscated by the Japanese for 
war supplies.  Ironically, in 1986, Korea was the world‟s largest exporter 
of shoes (1992:xiv). 
 
John Lie (1998) asserts that it would be difficult to exaggerate the economic, 
political, and social changes South Koreans experienced in the last half of the 
twentieth century.  Hagen Koo writes of South Korea‟s modernization as “one 
of the swiftest and most compressed processes of proletarianization in the 
world…” (2001:24).  Chang Kyung-Sup describes it as the “most drastic and 
compressed process of national development in human history” (1999:51). 
Nancy Abelmann (2003) has called compression a consensus and condition 
about modernity that ethnographers and their informants share in South Korea, 
which I address more directly in the first chapter.  
 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s when South Korea 
received an unprecedented IMF bailout, many of the positive and “miraculous” 
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pronouncements of development in South Korea turned to sobering 
reassessments.  Bruce Cumings writes: 
 
I still do not understand why the immense sacrifice that the Korean 
people made to drag their country kicking and screaming into the late-
twentieth century rat race should merit such uncritical, well-nigh 
hysterical enthusiasm from academics who are presumably not paid for 
their views (1997:384). 
 
Chang Kyung-Sup described the late-1990s mood as “a sober awakening 
about [South Koreans‟] own miracle of achieving over a mere few decades 
what took Westerners two or three centuries” (1999:31).  He called it a “grave 
society-wide pessimism about renewed long-term economic and social 
development” in which “the very mechanisms and strategies for achieving 
rapid national development now function as fundamental obstacles to current 
and future development” (Chang 1999:31).  This collapse and continued 
blockage of development and progress—economic, political, and social—has 
constituted another sense of crisis in South Korea.  In this context, informants 
such as Team Leader Kim worried about the challenges South Korea faced as 
an “advanced (seonjin)” nation no longer able to rely on nineteenth century 
modernization theories from China of “Eastern body, Western technique 
(dongdoseogi)” nor on the 1970s and 80s view that “the West is good and we 
are bad11” (see Chapter 1).  For many informants, transparency was 
associated with the West, particularly during and after the late 1990s when its 
absence or lack was diagnosed as the main cause of the financial crisis (e.g. 
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 Quotes are from an interview with the author on May 10, 2006. 
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Woo-Cumings 1999).  Not long after an indigenous coalition of NGOs led by 
Lawyer Park, the aforementioned CAGE campaign, wielded transparency as a 
political reform tool for better and for worse (see Chapter 4).  When I was 
preparing to go to the field in 2004 and 2005, anti-corruption legislation was 
being championed by President Roh Moo Hyun and GO-NGO commissions 
were increasing as fast or faster than they had during Kim Dae Jung‟s 
administration (Song 2003, 2009).  The question I entered the field with was 
what role, if any, would transparency play for NGOs and non-profits in their 
increasingly professional and potentially collaborative governance role? 
 
From Transparency to Pragmatism 
What it took me some time to realize once in the field was that transparency 
had become, or perhaps had always been, a tool or a means to another end.  
Transparency was not only a (Western) technique, or means for financial 
reform and better governing (Song 2009), but also a means for self-promotion, 
NGO promotion, and social design.  A professor at the leading governmental 
economic think tank helped point me toward this realization when he matter-
of-factly dismissed transparency as an “after the fact rationalization12” of the 
financial crisis.  An activities director at one of the few NGOs still advocating 
transparency as a main campaign in the 2000s pushed this point even further 
by negatively defining transparency as “fundamental means (gibonjeok 
sudan)13” rather than any goal or end (mokjeok).   
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 Interview with author on July 21, 2004. 
13
 Interview with author on January 23, 2006. 
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Transparency can be re-fashioned as a blacklisting weapon and political 
reform tool, as with the 2000 CAGE campaign, and then it can boomerang 
back as someone else‟s weapon.  For example, the same NGO that led the 
CAGE campaign in 2000, PSPD, became the subject of a professor‟s study in 
2006 tracing the elite pedigree and network of its ties to government positions 
(Lee J.Y. 2006).  During my fieldwork, many inside NGOs and non-profits 
followed that case and treated it as a warning shot for potentially worse things 
to come.  It was a case of an outsider and rumored New Right14 professor 
turning transparency back on them.  Just a few years before insiders—
feminists who were former student movement activists and NGO workers—
publicly disclosed the names of NGO workers accused of sexual harassment 
and created a big controversy (Jones 2003).  NGO and non-profit staffers 
pointed out the practical difficulties that even the largest organizations had 
with paying their workers on time as reminders of how limited resources were 
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 New Right was a term that grew in prominence and power during Roh Moo Hyun‟s 
administration from 2003 to 2008.  Nicola Anne Jones (2003) writes of a relatively weak and 
disorganized Right in relation to the feminist legal reforms, including the establishment of the 
Ministry of Gender Equality, instituted during Kim Dae Jung‟s administration from 1998 to 
2003.  Jesook Song (2003, 2009) observes that Kim‟s administration effectively neutralized 
the Right by incorporating neoliberal (sinjayu) policies alongside its liberal (jayu) 
accomplishments.  Roh Moo Hyun, on the other hand, provoked, radicalized, and organized 
the Right particularly early in his term with his plan to abolish the National Security Laws and 
statements about a conservative media bias.  Shin Ji-ho, the president of Liberty Union (which 
was later described as the theory side of the New Right movement), said he established the 
group in reaction to a lecture Roh Moo Hyun gave at Yonsei University in 2004.  In that lecture, 
Roh said, “No matter what kind of conservative—even reasonable or mild—let‟s never change 
and become a conservative” (Noh 2008).  Pastor Kim Jin-hong, chairman of the New Right 
Union (practice side of the New Right movement), said that he started his organization in 2005 
because he felt Lee Myung Bak would be a great president (Noh 2008).  Just a few days after 
Lee was elected President in 2007, a senior editor for a major newspaper proclaimed “A Crisis 
for the New Right” because the movement cannot be content with just electing Lee (Noh 
2008).  This editor also worried that President-Elect Lee was showing signs of relying too 
much on New Right organizations such as the New Right Union for policy plans just as 
Presidents Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun had allegedly done with the 
Leftist NGO PSPD (Noh 2008). An in-depth study of the New Right, particularly its links to the 
religious right in South Korea and the U.S., is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it is 
part of the ongoing movement and reversals (see Chapter 2) that have occurred in political 
and civil societies in South Korea (e.g. Jones 2003).   
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and how much further they had to go before they could credibly demand 
transparency of themselves.  One accountant who supported and audited 
several NGOs dismissed many of them as “petty retail merchants15” who could 
be seriously threatened if they were ever held to the same standards as 
private companies.  Several NGO coordinators who did organizational or 
accounting work said activists were indifferent or overtly hostile toward them.  
Some activists were upfront about their indifference and contempt for the 
accounting work they had to do such as keeping track of receipts.  I take up 
this internal division between coordinators (gansa) and activists 
(hwaldongga/undongga) following Department Leader Lee and other workers 
who were conducting an ad hoc job title project in the third chapter.  The 
1990s and 2000s in South Korea are strewn with cases of high-level business, 
government, and NGO leaders disgraced by charges of personal corruption 
including Presidents Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, Roh Moo Hyun, and Lee 
Myung Bak.  
 
Transparency, in other words, was as much about self-promotion and self-
protection as it was about open (yeollin) decision-making, auditable 
accounting, and good governance (e.g. Strathern 2000, 2006).  Transparency 
was also “open” or available to anyone for any ends, much as law was (e.g. 
Riles 2004a).  Lawyer Park, the focus of the fourth chapter, explained to me 
that “under a dictatorship, law is a weapon of dictators but in a democratic 
society [law] is a weapon of activists16.”  He and the NGO he led during the 
1990s exhibited a “pragmatic disposition” (Rho 2007).  They used 
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 Interview with author on October 12, 2006. 
16
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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transparency and other things, according to Lawyer Park, as “concrete ways to 
change society based on legal means” to achieve “hundreds of legal changes 
in one decade during Korea‟s transition from a dictatorship to a diverse civil 
society17.”  Lawyer Park and other leftist legal activists approached the law as 
instrumentalists with culturalist ends (Riles 2005).  That is, they treated the law 
“in primarily pragmatic instrumental terms, as a tool to be judged by its 
successes and failures in achieving stated ends” when those ends were to 
redress authoritarian abuses of human rights, strengthen whistleblower 
protection, regulate financial practices in the private sector, and protect civil 
liberties (Riles 2005:973-974).  Lawyer Park, like many of his former law 
school and activist colleagues (Dezalay and Garth 2007; Kim 2007), treated 
the law as a tool or means toward social design18 (e.g. Riles 2005).  Law was 
self-consciously “politics by other means” (Latour 1988:229).   
 
What I learned in starting a study of transparency is that I had to finish with a 
study of pragmatism.  Nearly everyone I spoke with in the field harbored some 
claim or aspiration for pragmatism, either in its mundane or high theory forms 
(Desautels-Stein 2007; Riles 2003).  Even an activist who was bitingly critical 
of nearly every American policy in South Korea remarked upon first learning 
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 Beautiful Foundation 2006. 
18
 Jesook Song (2009) has recently drawn attention to the unintended complicity of some 
former student activists to neoliberal projects in South Korea during the Asian financial crisis.  
Song writes: “former student activists (including many of the informants in the book and 
myself) were not fully aware of their own roles as (neo)liberal social engineers during the 
crisis…” (2009:118). She provides a rich and reflexive account of many of the historical 
reasons and implications for this shared liberal and neoliberal social engineering ground in 
South Korea.  Following Annelise Riles (2004a, 2005), I locate the ongoing imagination and 
literalization of law as social engineering to the success of the mid-century legal realist 
movement not only in law (Desautels-Stein 2007), but also in anthropology (e.g. Levine 2004; 
Strathern 1985,1992).  Lawyer Park‟s social design discussed in the fourth chapter may also 
be taken up in this legal realism context, but I leave that for another project. 
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that I am American that “at least that means you‟re practical (siryongjeok)19.”  
She went on to say that unless NGOs and NPOs get more “practical” and 
“engaged” in the “site of historical importance (hyeonjang)” then they would be 
obsolete.  The valorization of hyeonjang (field, site of historical importance, 
praxis), a legacy of the postcolonial minjung movement, which I take up in the 
first chapter, was a universal aspiration of leftist NGOs and NPOs in Seoul 
during the time of my fieldwork.  Hyeonjang along with the practical study 
movement (sirhak undong) constituted the claimed historical inheritances of 
the Hope Institute (see Chapter 4).  These inheritances also pointed to the 
epistemological and methodological similarity I as an anthropologist working in 
Korea had with many of my informants, which I take up later in the introduction 
and in the first chapter. 
 
Grounding Crisis in Pragmatism 
Many informants advised me that there were more pressing things than 
transparency, particularly when the South Korea-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) negotiations heated up in 2007.  There was always a “crisis 
(wigi)” demanding urgent action (e.g. Fortun 2001; Song 2009).  For example, 
I briefly discuss the “citizen‟s movement reproduction crisis (simin undongui 
jaesaeng wigi)” along with the Saemangeum reclamation crisis in the second 
and third chapters respectively.  Yet I do so without drawing attention to them 
as special or exceptional.   
 
This dissertation is an attempt to resist or discipline my ethnographic focus 
away from the crisis as special or exceptional (Jean-Klein and Riles 2005).  It 
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 Personal conversation with the author on May 26, 2001. 
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is an effort to foreground the mundane movements, however inchoate as 
projects (Choy 2003; Tsing 1997), and background the mobilizing crises that 
often become the objects of activist mobilization and ethnographic concern in 
South Korea (e.g. Abelmann 1996; Choi 1993; Choi 2009; Lee 2007; 
Oppenheim 2008; Song 2009).    
 
Cho Hae-Joang, a prominent feminist and public intellectual, reflected amid 
the financial crisis in the late 1990s, “I/we live in a society where every week is 
critical, a society where crisis is chronic, a society that makes crisis chronic” 
(2000:67).  She goes on to add that her article was translated into English 
without any major changes because she has “been too busy taking action in 
the current „state of emergency‟ as a consultant to the government and as a 
project manager dealing with the sudden unemployment crisis” (2000:68).  
Many informants similarly shared and lamented how easily their attention was 
diverted from larger scale, long-term projects by endless emergencies.  Park 
Chung Hee‟s dictatorship during the 1970s has been called a “crisis‟ 
government” given the number of emergency decrees (ginjo) it issued to 
enforce strict anti-Communist and economic development policies (Lee N. 
2009; Oppenheim 2008).  Lawyer Park, as I discuss in the fourth chapter, 
situated himself as offspring to this period in South Korean history.  In this 
study, I take crisis as the state rather than the exception; it is the ground rather 
than the figure. 
 
One of the most pervasive descriptions I encountered in the field was that 
South Korean civil society and South Korea more generally were “in transition” 
(e.g. Chang 1999; Cho K.S. 2000).  This was an explanation for many of the 
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problems organizations faced in the shift from movement to organization (e.g. 
Alberoni 1984).  At the same time, transition has been a general trope of social 
science, particularly political science, discourses about liberal democracy and 
market institutions in post-dictatorship and post-socialist contexts.  Michael D. 
Shin (2005) has written about the “more general crisis” that South Korea has 
been facing since the 1990s.  He describes it the following way: 
 
Though the ideals of the democracy movement have been partially 
realized, democracy remains an incomplete project.  However, the 
configuration of social forces has changed so much that it is difficult to 
determine who can be effective agents of social change, despite the 
emergence of new forms of civic movements.  These developments 
suggest that the problematic of the 1980s has run its course and needs 
to be reworked to be relevant to the present. (Shin 2005:16). 
 
Shin‟s formulation summarizes a great deal of literature on “democratic 
transition” and “democratic consolidation” (e.g. Cohen and Arato 1992; 
Diamond et al. 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; O‟Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  
This dissertation attempts to situate this “general crisis” or transition in 
anthropological and socio-legal literatures interrogating the limits of liberalism, 
democracy, and pragmatism (e.g. Ballestero 2010; Coles 2004; Greenberg 
2006; Paley 2001; Povinelli 2002; Song 2009).  In particular, my own effort 
follows the experimentalism of Roberto Mangabiera Unger, who attempts to 
make legal and political change “less dependent on crisis” (2007:42). 
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At the same time, transition highlights the shift from developing to developed 
nation, which many informants were anticipating with development campaigns 
in East and Southeast Asia.  Many Korean scholars and activists imagined 
themselves at the vanguard of activist academicism in Asia.  “NGO Studies” 
was the institutionalization of this nexus between scholars and activists and 
the vehicle some South Korean universities were using to “lead” Asia.  This 
leadership and “advancement (seonjinhwa)” was part of the wider “Korean 
wave (hallyu)” phenomenon, which was an effort to re-position South Korea 
vis-à-vis the world and particularly Asia (e.g. Choi Y.S. 2009; Iwabuchi 2002).  
As a peripheral participant in this area, I was struck by how foundational the 
notion of being in transition was for many informants.  As one friend joked, 
“there has never been a time when [South Korea] has not been in transition20.”  
 
The international humanitarianism field, which historically and 
contemporaneously inflects Korea and specifically NGOs and NPOs, operates 
in continual transition and crisis.  This sustained crisis seems to necessitate 
pragmatic response.  In his study of the international NGO Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, Peter Redfield describes the “states of crisis” and “ethic of 
emergency” that humanitarians feed and necessitate and their “pragmatic 
focus on immediate action” (2008:197-205).  Redfield (2008) traces this 
pragmatic tradition of prioritization in crisis settings to military medical 
treatment in the field.  The U.S. military greatly improved its emergency 
medicine or triage practices along with its funding and scope of action—what 
later became known as the military-industrial complex—during the Korean War 
(e.g., Cumings 2010).  A wide range of NGOs and non-profits with 
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 Personal communication on November 9, 2006. 
 20 
humanitarian goals going back to the Korean War and continuing up to the 
present with aid to North Korea continue to inflect contemporary NGO and 
NPO practices.  The battlefield and emergency room, both historical sites of 
importance (hyeonjang) in modern Korea, were also pragmatic images and 
idioms of work for many informants (see Chapter 2 and 3).  The urgency and 
imperfection of action in extreme, yet routine situations of crisis are continuing 
pragmatist inheritances of the South Korea-United States relationship through 
colonization, World War II, national division, the Korean War, and military 
dictatorship.   
 
The past and its study still has tremendous agency in the present and the 
future, particularly in a postcolonial, partially post-socialist, and still divided 
Korea.  Roy Richard Grinker, an American anthropologist, writes: 
 
Colonialism is not a thing of the past, for the past is still happening.  
The same must be said about national division in Korea.  Although 
Korean and American history textbooks often objectify division as an 
event that once happened, in Korea division is an ongoing and creative 
process of remaking, remembering, and representing (1998:70). 
Han, as Koreanists have theorized, is a historical poesis of accumulated anger 
and resentment that relaxes conventional distinctions between active and 
passive as well as rational and affective (e.g., Abelmann 1996; Grinker 1998).  
Bruce Cumings, the preeminent modern historian of Korea, has long put a 
sharper point on this sentiment addressed to his fellow Americans in his effort 
to “uncover truths that most Americans do not know and perhaps do not want 
to know” about their role in shaping modern Korea (2010:xv).  Cumings and 
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many other Koreanists have long demonstrated the active presence and 
agency that history and historiography have in Korea (Abelmann 1996; Choi C. 
1993; Grinker 1998; Lee 2009; Oppenheim 2008).     
 
The division between affect and instrumentality is an example of the active 
inheritance of Korea‟s modern history.  Following indigenous scholars such as 
Kang Man-gil and Paik Nak-chung who have described the ongoing effects of 
the Cold War division between North and South Korea, Roy Richard Grinker 
(1998) draws attention to the division between “sentimentalism 
(gamjeongseong)” and “pragmatism (hyeonsilseong)” in various South Korean 
discourses.  This division parallels the stark division many feminists have 
identified between men‟s “affective” roles and women‟s “instrumental” roles 
(Cho 1988; Kendall 2002; Yi 1993).  Elements of pragmatism, in other words, 
have long served as one side of a division in indigenous conceptions of 
unification and gender.  The past and its study have long been central to 
studies of pragmatism and Korea.  
 
Grounding Pragmatism in Hope 
The population of crisis and transition in history, particularly modern Korean 
history, fits with the broader pragmatist philosophy of truth.  In his historical 
study of American pragmatism, Louis Menand wrote of the “continual state of 
upheaval that capitalism thrives on” while theorizing the pragmatic skepticism 
that enables people to cope and respond (2001:xii).  This sense of upheaval, 
which goes by crisis or transition, has become a unifying tradition for 
pragmatists.  Colin Koopman (2009) has attempted to reunify the split between 
classical pragmatists and neopragmatists around transition.  He goes back to 
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William James‟s statement that “life is in the transitions” to foreground the 
continuities between the classical pragmatism of James and Dewey and the 
neopragmatist linguistic turn of Quine, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Rorty, Putnam, 
and Habermas (Desautels-Stein 2007). Koopman theorizes transition as 
temporally-mediated and purposive development, or change in light of 
historical and temporal context; it is working toward a future and trying to 
achieve it with the resources and circumstances that are available in the 
present (2009:14-15).  Pragmatists have approached human thought and 
action as “an affair of traveling from hypotheses to their outcomes, of from 
conceptions to their effects…” wherein the success of such traveling, or 
transition, can only be worked out in practice (Koopman 2009:17).  Truth is 
reconstructive, which means it is worked out in the necessary transitions of 
practice (e.g. James 2000; Latour 1999a, 1999b).  The pragmatist orientation 
toward truth is to treat it as human artifact rather than metaphysical or 
transcendent manifestation of God or nature.   
 
Although transition is neutral in terms of progress, pragmatism is not.  Colin 
Koopman traces a hope for progress, or what he calls meliorism, running 
through pragmatism going back to Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and 
James Dewey.  Meliorism for Koopman is a “resolute hopefulness in the 
abilities of human effort to create better future realities” (2009:22).  Democracy 
has long been this better future reality for philosophers and scientists alike 
(Deneen 2003; Koopman 2009).  Democracy has also been located in the 
future rather than the present in South Korea‟s minjung movements and in its 
ongoing transition from procedural to practical consolidation.  Democracy, like 
unification and economic development, is often treated as a utopian 
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imagination—literally a “no place” of deferred achievement (Grinker 1998; 
Nelson 2000).  This hope for utopia perpetuates transition, which is evident in 
approaches to democracy, economic development, and unification.  This 
dissertation aims to show that the transition between the utopia of ideology, 
the ambivalence of discourse, and the pragmatism of agenda is often more 
recursive than linear despite and because of the recurrent (pragmatic) hope in 
linear progress.   
 
One of the most important legacies of pragmatism is its turn from truth, or what 
Richard Rorty calls knowledge, to hope.  Rorty advises “one should stop 
worrying about whether what one believes is well grounded and start worrying 
about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up interesting 
alternatives to one‟s present beliefs” (1994:34).  Rorty made this point more 
explicit when he wrote that “substituting hope for knowledge” means 
“substituting the idea that the ability to be citizens of the full-fledged 
democracy which is yet to come, rather than the ability to grasp truth, is what 
is important about being human” (2000:3). In Koopman‟s conception, hope is 
the characteristic attitude and mood of the pragmatist (2009:17).  Hope, in the 
pragmatist tradition, is faith that humans can make a better future.  Patrick 
Shade (2001) calls it a transformative hope of “acting as if our contribution can 
improve conditions—intelligently assessing means and ends, testing the 
success of our ends-in-view as guides by acting on them, and adapting ends 
when necessary…” (original emphasis 190).  The pragmatist, according to 
Koopman, is “at bottom” hopeful because s/he is “fully situated amid the 
transitions in which we find ourselves and rightly confident that we can, 
through our effort, see these transitions through to better futures” (2009:17-18).  
 24 
The hope of the pragmatist is based upon faith in human agency, which holds 
that people have the capacity to create better selves and better futures.  Rorty 
describes this hope as “only to think that there are some projects for which our 
tools are presently inadequate, and to hope that the future may be better than 
the past in this respect” (emphasis added1999:51-52).  The conception of 
problem as project and the pragmatic implications for scale (Choy 2003) and 
temporality (Riles 2010a) are taken up in the third chapter. 
 
Many of the informants and friends I have known in Seoul since 2001 and 
conducted formal fieldwork with from 2005 to 2007 conceived of their work in 
terms of projects.  In the second through fourth chapters, I discuss a range of 
formal and informal projects that these people engaged in to reassess job 
titles, reimagine what living a “green life” meant, propose a “grand theory” and 
“alternative” to sustainable development, and recapture the hope of economic 
nation-building without repeating its social costs.  Many fantasized about and 
sought reprieve from the administrative spaces they were increasingly called 
upon to occupy.  These informants had some affinity with what Wendy Brown 
and Janet Halley describe for left liberal socio-legal scholars as “a yearning for 
justice that exceeds the imagination of liberal legalism, a critical and self-
critical orientation, and a certain courage to open the door of political and legal 
thought as if the wolves were not there” (2002:36).  Jesook Song‟s (2009) 
ethnography of (neo)liberalism during the Asian financial crisis and Kim Dae 
Jung‟s presidency demonstrates many of these yearnings. 
 
Lawyer Park, discussed in the fourth chapter, embraced pragmatist faith in 
human agency and claimed it as a modern Korean inheritance.  The 
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compressed development that many lamented in the late 1990s around the 
Asian financial crisis (e.g., Chang 1999) was a source of hope for him.  Lawyer 
Park used the financial crisis and the infrastructure collapses at that time to 
put forward new regulations and monitoring of large business conglomerates 
(e.g. Rho 2007).  In contrast, several veteran Green Korea staffers, whom I 
discuss in the subsequent chapters, were engaged in an ongoing debate 
about the limits of human agency.  The debate was often framed as one 
between deep ecology, which conceives of pragmatist hope as hubris, and 
sustainable development, which is predicated on such hope.  Secretary-
General Choi sought a “grand theory” alternative to sustainable development, 
which was the impetus for the Green Life Theory project I discuss in the third 
chapter.  This was a hope in theory and its “grand” transcendence rather than 
a hope in God or humans.   
 
Hope has been a foundational disposition for pragmatists.  Annelise Riles 
(2003) is one of the first and only anthropologists to undertake an ethnography 
of pragmatism.  In a special symposium entitled “Ethnography in the Realm of 
the Pragmatic: Studying Pragmatism in Law and Politics” Riles writes of “the 
current theoretical moment” being “characterized by a renewed interest in 
pragmatism:” 
 
From law to anthropology, from science and technology studies to 
philosophy, the epistemological and political conflicts that characterized 
the academy in the 1980s seem to have given way to widespread 
agreement on pragmatic grounds (2003:1). 
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Justin Desautels-Stein (2007), Mariana Valverde (2003), and Annelise Riles 
(2003) make evident how a pragmatist orientation unites the political left and 
right of the legal academy.  Following Patrick Deneen (2003) and Hiro 
Miyazaki (2004), Riles (2003, 2004a) points out the pragmatist foundations 
and commitments of socio-legal scholars and anthropologists alike.  Roberto 
Unger (2007) describes pragmatism as “the reigning philosophy of the age.”  
What is remarkable about pragmatism at this theoretical moment is how 
foundational it has become despite its anti-foundationalist claims in a post-
foundational world.  Stanley Fish, another neopragmatist, seemed to anticipate 
this: 
Turning into just another would-be foundation—into another theory that 
would then have consequences—is always the danger pragmatism 
courts when it becomes too ambitious…[W]hatever form it takes, 
the[ambitious] project is an instance of what I call the critical self-
consciousness fallacy or antifoundationalist theory hope, the fallacy of 
thinking that there is a mental space you can occupy to the side of your 
convictions and commitments, and the hope that you can use the 
lesson that no transcendent standpoint is available as a way of 
bootstrapping yourself to transcendence… (emphasis added, 1999:305). 
 
In the precarious balance between meliorism, the moral ambition of people 
such as Dewey, and the post-Truth antifoundationalism of people such as 
Rorty, there is still an impulse to hope (for transcendence).  Ernst Bloch (1986) 
redefined this transcendence away from God and away from humans21; 
instead it was about temporality. In Hiro Miyazaki‟s (2004) analysis, Bloch and 
                                                          
21
 Bloch was a committed atheist who strongly disliked American culture and so did not share 
the faith in America that pragmatists such as Rorty did (Miyazaki 2004:144). 
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others generate hope through their attention to the temporal direction of 
knowledge and its reorientation.  Miyazaki demonstrates how the temporal 
incongruity between, for example, the retrospective contemplation of history 
and the prospective momentum of hope is an engine for knowledge.  In The 
Method of Hope, Miyazaki (2004) reconceptualizes hope away from being a 
pragmatic problem or resource and toward hope as a method or commitment.  
I place this move in a tradition of anthropological knowledge with and against 
utilitarianism, instrumentalism, and pragmatism later in the introduction. Before 
doing so, however, I turn to the engagement with history that is central to 
pragmatic study. 
 
The Agency and Scale of History 
A short newspaper editorial appeared in the Korean and English versions of 
the Joongang Ilbo, a high-circulating daily newspaper in South Korea, at the 
end of my fieldwork period in 2007.  The editorial captures a sense of history 
shaping the present.  The editorial distills the everyday pragmatism intimately 
associated with contemporary mainstream Americanism that had become 
common wisdom in the transition from Roh Moo Hyun to Lee Myung Bak in 
South Korea (Desautels-Stein 2007). This common sense, action-oriented 
pragmatism emphasizes consequences over ideals and was what the 
aforementioned activist was referencing when she said that my being 
American meant that at least I am practical.  It is worth quoting Yang Sung-
hee‟s editorial at length: 
 
[Pragmatism] is a philosophy that values action and practice above 
everything else. It uses utility as the sole yardstick for judgment of truth. 
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Knowledge is also regarded as a useful tool to promote the prosperity 
of humankind.  There is a close correlation between pragmatism and 
contemporary America. Pragmatism is nearly the only philosophy that 
the United States follows.  Pragmatism is deeply rooted in the 
utilitarianism that prevailed in Europe at the end of 19th century. At that 
time, European capitalism was faced with an extreme income gap 
between the haves and have-nots, as well as an intense labor 
movement. The bourgeoisie needed a new ideology to stand against 
the proletariat, which was moving toward socialism. The solution was 
the utilitarianism that advocated the famous phrase, „the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number.‟  Pragmatism is often called the 
evolution of utilitarianism from an American perspective (2007). 
 
After Yang briefly summarizes Louis Menand‟s The Metaphysical Club, he 
quotes Korean philosopher Tak Sok-san‟s lecture: 
 
„Pragmatism has been misunderstood as a political term that puts a 
priority on the people‟s prosperity and well-being, but it is the 
philosophy that Korean people have pursued during all of the last 
century.‟  He also said, „As the need arose, pragmatism has served as 
a useful ideological frame. It has helped Koreans decide what they 
needed most to be successful, in terms of resolving the impending 
tasks they faced as the nation experienced industrialization and 
democratization during the past six decades‟ (2007). 
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The argument put forward in the first chapter of this dissertation is that even 
the progressivism of pragmatism—both temporal and political—has a self-
critical and doubly-bound relationship with the ideological past.  Following 
feminist and postcolonial critiques, I do not approach pragmatism or liberal 
democracy in a vacuum; rather, these must be examined alongside other 
indigenous, quasi-indigenous, quasi-transplanted, and transplanted ideologies 
defining South Korea‟s discursive space.  Like Kim Fortun (2001), I take up the 
double bind as a method for keeping constraint and scale proximate in a time 
of transition.  It also enables a sense of scale both in terms of space, agency, 
and social relations (e.g. Choy 2003; Yarrow 2005).  As such, it enables me to 
make some sense of the contradiction Koreanists have long posited between 
liberal democratic “ideals” and military authoritarian “reality” (e.g. Grinker 
1998; Hwang 2009; Kwon 2000; Lee N.H. 2002; Paik 1994).   
 
Following Timothy Choy (2003) and Thomas Yarrow (2005), I draw attention to 
how distinctions, particularly in units of analysis and agency, are enacted as 
imaginations of realities and experiences of scale without taking as self-
evident relationships between people and ideas.  Yarrow writes, “In a post-
modern world, dualisms and dichotomies have been much maligned, yet all 
thought requires distinctions” (2005:12).  Distinctions between ideology and 
discourse, for example, do work for those who use and believe in them (e.g. 
Jean-Klein 2002).  Imagining colonialism as a discourse rather than an 
ideology has had profound effects in a divided Korea (Choi C.1993).  At the 
same time, imagining liberal democracy and pragmatism as ideology—
American or otherwise—is having effects in South Korea.  Ideology often 
allows national commitments to the state and international commitments to 
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liberalism and democracy to supersede filial, local, and regional commitments 
(Yarrow 2005).  Shifts in scale enable different translations and articulations 
(Tsing 1997) between the ethnographer and her field (Strathern 1991), the 
global and the local (Tsing 2005), and the universal and the particular (Choy 
2003).  Jae Chung has written of this approach as “opening up” the 
“connectivity of heterogeneous things…in which their „countability‟ is left open 
rather than closed” (2009:65).  
 
Robert Oppenheim (2008) has already put forward an Actor Network Theory-
inflected approach to scalar politics and scholarship within and beyond Korean 
Studies: 
 
‟Kyongju,‟ „South Korea,‟ and „the global,‟ do not nest according to 
some prior order of generality.  A task for anthropology is rather to trace 
these scaling processes that make the orders of these and other terms 
in different situations.  Likewise, the field of Korean Studies might be at 
its best when it places the scale and hierarchy inherent to its name 
under erasure (2008:226). 
 
This dissertation takes this “erasure” and exploration of scale as its starting 
point.  A moment in the field when an activist confronted the failure of his 
project, described in the third chapter, made scale salient for me (e.g. 
Miyazaki and Riles 2005).  He matter-of-factly described discourse (damnon), 
which his project was invested in changing, as “less than theory, smaller than 
ideology.”  This statement underscored how discourse, ideology, and theory 
constituted a scale for some informants. 
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Ideology was presented by some former minjung activists as a unifying system 
while many coordinators (gansa) and staffers associated it with a dogmatic 
and regressive past.  Discourse was often presented as a middle ground or 
placeholder until something better came along (Riles 2010a).  Positing a 
“social design agenda,” as discussed in the fourth chapter, was a movement 
away from the grand ideologies and discourses of the activist past to 
something future-oriented, hopeful, and practical.  Yet at the same time it was 
an appeal to the past, or what one informant called people‟s “hunger for hope,” 
going back to South Korea‟s rapid nation-building during Park Chung Hee‟s 
military dictatorship from 1961 to 1979. 
 
One of the findings of this dissertation is how that dictatorship continues to not 
only be active in people‟s memories, but in their humor and hope (Chapter 4).  
This has been a recurrent finding in cognate post-socialist contexts (e.g. 
Greenberg 2006; Tanuma 2007; Yurchak 2005).  Even former minjung 
activists and staunch critics of Park‟s authoritarianism, such as Lawyer Park in 
the fourth chapter, conceded an “inheritance of optimism” from what they 
otherwise characterized as a “development first (gaebaljisangjuui)” period of 
harsh human rights abuses.  The “near past” of Dictator Park‟s “nation design” 
comports with the “near future” of Lawyer Park‟s “social design” (Guyer 2007).  
The likeness is not so unsettling or unflattering at a time when many South 
Koreans ambivalently recall Park Chung Hee as the only president who did not 
just promise, but actually delivered hope.  Lawyer Park and the Hope Institute 
are attempting to thread a difficult needle; they are attempting to undo what 
Jae Chung has called “the Faustian Korean bargain between economic 
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progress and political freedom” (2009:53).  Park and other social analysts and 
designers are trying to recapture the scale of the “national utopian 
imagination” (Nelson 2000) without repeating its human rights and social 
development costs.  They are attempting to avoid the historical precedent of 
failure, a powerful trope in postcolonial contexts.   
   
Nancy Abelmann points out a resonance between minjung, the activist 
heritage of many of my informants, and Indian historiography (1996:261).  She 
cites Ranajit Guha: 
 
It is the study of this historic failure of the nation to come into its own, a 
failure due to the inadequacy of the bourgeoisie as well as of the 
working class to lead it into a decisive victory over colonialism and a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution of either the classic nineteenth century 
type under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie or a more modern type 
under the hegemony of workers and peasants, that is, a „new 
democracy‟—it is the study of failure which constitutes the central 
problematic of the historiography of colonial India (1987:7). 
 
Abelmann writes, “Because Korea‟s liberation was imposed and because 
there are two Korean states that claim to be the legitimate offspring of colonial 
struggles, many historians endeavor to explain or explain away „failure” 
(1996:261).  Namhee Lee has extended this footnote into a theory of the 
“crisis of historical subjectivity,” which she argues “gave rise to the discourse 
of minjung, which constituted the intellectual basis of the minjung movement” 
(2007:2).  Lee describes the minjung movement as a characteristically 
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postcolonial phenomenon with resonances in South Asian, Latin American, 
and Eastern European contexts.  This postcolonial sense of “failure” and 
“crisis” is also evident in the “democratic transition and consolidation” literature 
(e.g. Choi J.J. 2000; Cohen and Arato 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 
1999).  As I take up in the fourth chapter, democracy is conceived in terms of 
“levels” of scale.  There are transitions, for example, between procedural and 
practical democracy.  South Korea is widely perceived to be transitioning 
between these procedural and practical levels, which renders democracy an 
“incomplete project” (Shin 2005) and pragmatism an object worthy of 
ethnographic attention. 
 
As Jesook Song‟s (2009) ethnography makes clear, liberalism is also an 
incomplete project superseded by neoliberalism in South Korea.  For many 
minjung activists, liberal democracy is a “site of intense longing for a „utopian 
horizon‟… and of contestation with the state” (Lee N.H. 2007:6).  In this 
dissertation I couple Roy Richard Grinker‟s (1998) historical and ethnographic 
study of utopian impulses in unification contexts with Namhee Lee‟s (2007) 
historical exploration of the utopian liberal-democratic impulses in the minjung 
movement.  I place these insights alongside Laura Nelson‟s (2000) 
ethnographic exploration of the more widespread “national utopian 
imagination” of Park‟s dictatorship to make some sense of a few utopian and 
post-utopian pragmatic projects taking place inside NGOs and non-profits in 
Seoul.   
 
Lateral Ethnography and Social Design 
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This dissertation is an ethnography of theory after many of the distinctions 
between academics and activists have become difficult to sustain (Ballestero 
2010; Choy 2003; Riles 2000, 2006a; Yarrow 2005).  The movements in my 
informants‟ conceptual tools are familiar to our own.  In fact, it is precisely the 
movement between activist tool and academic representation that makes 
things real (Riles 2000, 2002).  Annelise Riles‟ (2000) ethnography, The 
Network Inside Out, offers an account of how and why this collapsed distance 
between ethnographer and subject as well as theory and data has exhausted 
many theoretical frameworks.  
 
Riles likens her networking subjects to social movement analysts rather than 
social movement participants for a couple reasons.  First, her subjects view 
“themselves as sympathetic facilitators of others‟ activism rather than activists 
themselves” (2000:66).  This shift from participant to participant-analyst was 
part of what Lawyer Park was and the Hope Institute were positing with social 
design, which I take up in the fourth chapter.  Second, they “are fascinated by 
the way in which language convinces, and they devote considerable time to 
the close analysis of language and design…” (Riles 2000:66).  My discussion 
of discourse, particularly the questions I often fielded from informants about 
choosing the most efficacious translation of terms, is evident in the third and 
fourth chapters.   
 
Riles draws an analogy to the study of social movement rhetoric inspired by 
Kenneth Burke‟s (1969, 1984) work which sought to reveal how and why 
movements elicited commitment (Riles 2000:66).  Riles juxtaposes 
commitment to means and ends.  She describes networking as “a full-time 
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commitment, not a means to some greater end” (2000:57).  This commitment 
was to form or aesthetics, which is “outside” and “in a different register than, 
strategic action, in the conception of the analyst (social scientist or networker)” 
(Riles 2000:68).  Hope operates in the much the same way as commitment in 
Miyazaki‟s (2004) analysis.  Amanda Snellinger (2007) similarly conceives of 
the commitment and hope of the Nepali activists she worked with in the 
register of “devotion” and “sacrifice” rather than strategy or means and ends.  
The activists I worked with in Korea enacted a similar commitment to and hope 
for sacrifice, which I take up in the second chapter.  Iris Jean-Klein (2003) and 
Annelise Riles (2006a) subsequently reflected on form and aesthetics as a 
way to achieve some analytical distance from the hegemony of pragmatism 
and instrumentalism.   
 
Anthropologists have explicitly engaged this tension with instrumentalism 
going back to Mauss, who conceived of his canonical work The Gift as the 
revelation of an already flourishing alternative to “natural economy” and 
“utilitarianism” (e.g. Strathern 1988:19).  Mauss ostensibly redirected scholarly 
attention from the 19th century European struggles between utilitarianism and 
socialism.  He revealed a shared pattern and practice of both—gift-giving—
which has continuously shaped modern anthropology.  I read Gregory 
Bateson‟s work and Ruth Benedict‟s Patterns of Culture as very much in this 
tradition, particularly when read through the work of Marilyn Strathern (1991), 
Annelise Riles (2000), Hiro Miyazaki (2000, 2004), and others who have taken 
up the aesthetics of information, knowledge, and theory.  This trajectory of 
anthropological work, according to Riles (2000:185), resists Kantian notions of 
aesthetics on one hand and Foucauldian notions of knowledge on the other 
 36 
while finding kinship with some linguistic anthropology (e.g. Brenneis 1996).  
Attention to the “pattern which connects” in Bateson‟s (1979) words and the 
“persuasiveness of form” in Strathern‟s (1991) words has sustained 
ethnographic attention to and resistance of “knowledge which is invariably and 
merographically defined as useful for or relevant to some other purpose 
beyond itself” (original emphasis Strathern 1992:132).  Subsequent 
anthropologists have taken up this tradition, organized loosely as an 
anthropology of knowledge, and have sought to highlight both ethnography 
and hope in terms of means rather than ends (e.g., Miyazaki 2004; Riles 
2004a). 
 
This trajectory of work is the inheritance of this dissertation, particularly in its 
refiguring of anthropological knowledge and the ethnographer-informant 
relationship.  Debbora Battaglia (1997) and Alfred Gell‟s (1998) work has been 
critical in this respect given his reworking of person-thing agency.  
 
In Korean Studies, Robert Oppenheim (2008) has recently taken up Gell‟s 
(1998) collaborations in terms of the “”vicinity of objects” while Jesook Song 
(2009) has written of her informants as “social engineers” and “crisis 
knowledge brokers.”  Following this, the work of Annelise Riles among others 
(e.g. Maurer 2005; Miyazaki 2004), and Lawyer Park (see chapter four), I 
conceive of my informants as social movement analysts and social designers 
(sosyeol dijaineo) whom I laterally approach and collaborate with in a study of 
pragmatic and aesthetic commitments to liberal democracy and pragmatism.  
In Lawyer Park‟s terms, we are all “social designers” trying to “set the agenda.”   
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The agenda, I argue in the fourth chapter, is an artifact of pragmatism.  It is 
both an object of the most mundane practical concerns and a practice of the 
highest theoretical aspirations (Riles 2000).  The agenda often moves from 
items up for discussion in a meeting, to scheduled actions yet to be taken, to 
the strategic vision for a person, movement, organization, or discipline.     
 
George Marcus has been at the forefront of anthropological theory and 
pedagogy in resetting the research agenda over the last thirty years.  He has 
done so with pragmatic consideration and rhetorical effect going back to 
Writing Culture and through his 1999 re-assessment, Critical Anthropology 
Now: Unexpected Contexts, Shifting Constituencies, Changing Agendas.  
Marcus (2009) has most recently rearticulated anthropological fieldwork as a 
“design process” borrowing from studio fields such as art, graphic and 
industrial product design, and architecture.  He finds the constant feedback, 
built-in research from conception to reception (e.g. Riles 2006b), and 
consideration of ethical issues to be “good to think” in reconceiving 
anthropology‟s research process (2009:26-27).  Marcus seeks “full expression 
as a framework of practices rather than remaining just a professional ethos 
and set of regulating aesthetics” (2009:27).  Marcus‟s “research design” is an 
effort to make explicit and formalize the informal and implicit aesthetics that 
have long shaped anthropological knowledge.  In many ways, he is attempting 
to recapture the “profound rupture and reorganization of the research agenda 
of socio/cultural anthropology” that he helped define (Marcus 2008:1).  Marcus 
reflects in a piece tellingly titled “The End(s) of Ethnography: Social/Cultural 
Anthropology‟s Signature Form of Producing Knowledge in Transition”,  that 
he and his colleagues are trying to do for fieldwork with Fieldwork is Not What 
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It Used to Be what he and Clifford did for writing with Writing Culture (2008:5-
6).  However, they are attempting to do so without repeating the relative 
weakness of the discipline‟s center compared to its interdisciplinary 
engagements (Marcus 2008:1).  Marcus writes, “After Writing Culture, the 
interdisciplinary movements concerned with culture defined anthropology‟s 
research agenda, and it has never had its own questions within a theoretical 
fashion of its own design or making since then” (2008:8).  In other words, 
Marcus is trying to recapture and rearticulate the discipline‟s methodological 
and theoretical imagination with and against the pervasive pragmatist 
apprehension of being in crisis or in transition (e.g. Koopman 2009).  He 
approaches anthropology‟s method as “in transition.” 
 
I approach this laterally as an analog from my field, which has been in 
sustained crisis and transition.  Lawyer Park sought to recapture the scale and 
therefore the hope of the “national utopian imagination” (Nelson 2000), which 
he and many other civil leaders in South Korea vigorously critiqued, without 
repeating its human or social costs.  This movement of selective recapturing is 
progressive and hopeful (e.g. Greenberg 2006; Miyazaki 2004; Tanuma 2007). 
Many social movement analysts and social designers in my field fantasize 
about the utopian theory they first imagined as student activists, yet do not 
wish to go back to ideology.  There is a pragmatic acceptance of the inability 
to return to the utopia of ideology; yet at the same time there is a hope to put 
ideas in motion so as to reimagine the scale of agency and design.  Ultimately, 
I return to anthropology‟s transitional moment in the conclusion with a 




In the first chapter, I return to the foundational debates that have animated 
social movement analysts.  This chapter provides an ethnographic account of 
the recent movement past and its implications for NGOs and NPOs in the near 
future (Guyer 2007).  I take Cho Hae-joang‟s series of books, Reading Texts, 
Reading Lives (Geul Ilkgiwa, Salm Ilkgi), as both an artifact of my field and a 
methodological challenge.  Her diagnosis of the crisis that the student 
movement confronted in the early 1990s—namely that it “turned away from or 
even oppressed those contradictions that emerged from people‟s daily lives”—
is my theoretical starting point (Cho 1994:151).  I inflect contradictions through 
the rich anthropological literature on double binds and scale to articulate what I 
take to be not only a characteristic feminist and postcolonial phenomenon, but 
what I hope emerges as the setting for an account of pragmatism.  Ideology is 
this setting, which following Thomas Yarrow (2005) I approach as a scalar 
imagination of reality.  Ideology is both the possibility to supersede existing 
divisions and the entrenchment of new divisions.  It is the double bind and 
ground for the progressivism—both political and temporal—of pragmatism.  I 
argue that to understand any future design or agenda, which appear in later 
chapters, requires an understanding of this ideological past.  In many accounts 
of the movement from the field, a hopeful and pragmatic future only appears 
as the progression from an ideological and utopian past.   
 
In the second chapter, I approach sacrifice as a demonstration of commitment 
which keeps both human resource limits and transcendent alternative 
imaginaries proximate. Many NGO and NPO workers treated sacrifice as a 
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necessary commitment to solidarity or kinship by other means and as a means 
to live a more humane and green life. Yet with past entanglements to military 
authoritarianism, sacrifice is “a medium that connects activities far apart on the 
ideological spectrum” (Han 2004:84). “One working as one hundred 
(ildangbaek)” is an activist idiom of sacrifice that captures the superhuman 
aspiration to act despite the physical, financial, organizational, and expertise 
limits regularly confronted.  Sacrifice is an inheritance from the past across the 
ideological spectrum and for many informants it is crucial to any hope for the 
future.  Sacrifice, in particular Chon Tae-il‟s suicide in 1970, is an example of 
the hope for agency on a larger scale, which I also address in the fourth 
chapter. 
 
In the third chapter, I enact a recursive movement by ethnographically re-
encountering discourse (damnon).  Department Leader Lee directed my 
ethnographic attention to discourse when she reflected on it as an object of 
activist obsession.  For her, it referenced the pragmatic failure of activists 
trying to be scholars.  Yet for other activists, such as Secretary-General Choi, 
discourse was a middle ground placeholder for activists who had to try to be 
more like scholars to offer a “grand theory” alternative to sustainable 
development.  In his own words, discourse is “less than theory, smaller than 
ideology.”  I approach discourse in process by conceiving of it as project.  
Following Timothy Choy, I take as a “unit of analysis smaller than discourse” 
which specifies “relatively coherent bundles of practices, rhetoric, and 
expressive forms in everyday life that in concert can become discourse” 
(2003:107).  I juxtapose two projects—Department Leader Lee‟s job title and 
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Secretary-General Choi‟s Green Life Theory projects respectively—against the 
backdrop of the broader NGO failure to stop the government-led 
Saemangeum reclamation project.  The ubiquity of project as both a unit of 
work and analysis points up the hegemony of pragmatism in high theory and 
mundane practices (Riles 2003).  
 
In the fourth chapter, I continue the movement from discourse to agenda, 
which I encountered with Lawyer Park and his leadership of the Hope Institute 
(Huimang Jejakso). Lawyer Park and many of his colleagues treated his 
career as if it were the history of civil society in South Korea.  In so doing, the 
progressive temporality of both Park‟s career and the nation are reinforced as 
if agendas (Greenhouse 1996; Yarrow 2005).  Lawyer Park was not just a 
person; rather, he was a movement.  In particular, I juxtapose Bruno Latour 
and Lawyer Park as self-consciously dynamic and pragmatic analysts in my 
own attempt to suspend such pragmatic impulses to instead refigure the scale 
of analysis.  Given that pragmatism is the ground for Latour, Lawyer Park, and 
many others, I reverse the process to posit pragmatism as figure, which 
renders crisis into ground. 
 
In the conclusion, I directly address the figure-ground reversals (Strathern 
1991; Wagner 1978) I have performed in order to make more evident the 
hopeful role for ethnography.  The discipline (Jean-Klein and Riles 2005) of 
this role has been theorized by feminist and queer theorists (Brown 1999; 
Butler 2004; Grosz 1998, 2000; Wiegman 2000) and as well as 
anthropologists (Miyazaki 2004, 2005; Riles 2010a).  My own work is 
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particularly inspired by that of Hiro Miyazaki (2004), who predicates hope on 
an open future while anticipating how a hopeful role for ethnography might 
appear.  
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  Chapter 1: Ideology as Double Bind 
 
“…the general difficulty of attaining unity over means, let alone ends, among 
people who have been robbed of political power.” 
--- Kenneth M. Wells, New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-
Reconstruction Nationalism in Korea 1897-1937 
 
Scale and Ethnography 
In the 1980s and 90s, biography and life history came to the fore in 
anthropology (e.g. Crapanzano 1980; Herzfeld 1997; Holland and Lave 2000).  
These engagements have foregrounded agency after its apparent 
backgrounding to social structure and totality in structuralist, structural-
functionalist, systems, and Marxist approaches.  Nancy Abelmann (1997a, 
1997b, 2003) has been at the forefront of this anthropological turn within 
Korean Studies articulating a social mobility and narrative-driven life history 
approach.  Following Lisa Rofel‟s (1999) work on generational cohorts of 
women in China, Abelmann seeks discursive articulations of generational 
positions of dissent.  Activists, as Abelmann reflects: 
 
…are neither self-styled free agents nor are they cultural dopes 
executing social codes; they are negotiating subject positions fashioned 
by South Korea‟s changed political-economic and ideological climate 
and by the contingencies of their own life trajectories (1997a:273). 
 
Abelmann has carved out a discursive space for her and her informants—
student activists and a post-war generational cohort of women—as “betwixt 
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and between” structure and agency (2003:1).  She ambivalently oscillates 
between bold assertions about one woman‟s story standing in for the larger 
national history of division, patriarchy, and status and later reducing such “talk” 
to a generation of South Korean women (2003:1,10).  As backdrop and 
necessary cause for this approach, Abelmann has continuously asserted the 
mind-boggling and profound compression of change that people in South 
Korea have experienced.  “Change,” she writes, “seems somehow 
understated” when talking about South Korea (Abelmann 2003:60).  In a 
bolder moment, Abelmann writes: 
 
Change in South Korea is not of the step-by-step variety; rather, it races, 
leaving behind perhaps only the likes of plodding ethnographers to dare 
to author some pages, just as so many blank ones unfurl ahead… 
South Korea is simply not a place for very long-lived interests or 
projects.  Of the ethnographer of South Korea who resides outside of 
the country, South Korea makes an anachronism (2003:60). 
 
In the terms of this dissertation, Abelmann is making an argument about 
change and scale.  Rapid change and the ambivalent oscillation between bold 
generalities and humble particularities is a shared condition for informants and 
ethnographers alike.  While at one level there are generations or what she 
terms “step-by-step” change, at another level, there are compressions that 
race ahead leaving people behind (2003:60).  In the latter sense of change, 
one person can stand in for the movement (see Chapter 4), as the term for 
student activist, undonggwon, collapses the distinction between individual 
activist and movement (Lee N.H. 2002, 2007). 
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The life histories scattered throughout this work, which are set off from the text, 
are an attempt to treat neither people nor reality in any self-evident relation 
(Yarrow 2005).  They often shift between career movements and personal 
reflections to serve as compressed examples of the scale changes and 
attendant double binds encountered in the field.   
 
The Double Bind 
A situation set up or perceived to be a double bind is one in which a person 
must choose between two or more equally valued, yet incompatible options.  
They are often incompatible because they condense different logical types, or 
levels of scale, into one experiential field (Fortun 2001:12).  Bateson was 
interested in how family interactions produce these binds, such as when a 
parent tells a child “I want you to disobey me.”  In this case, to obey the 
message is to disobey the parent-child relationship while to disobey the 
message is to obey the relationship.  In a different context, Sharon Traweek 
(1988) demonstrates how double binds animate interactions among work 
colleagues such as when high-energy physicists-in-training receive official 
messages of cooperative group work, yet are rewarded for individual 
competition and careful insubordination.  Following Bateson, Traweek 
describes how the mismatch between rules and experiences of social relations 
often induces “severe pain and maladjustment” yet “if this pathology can be 
warded off or resisted, the total experience may promote creativity” (Bateson 
1958:278 quoted in Traweek 1998:89).  Kim Fortun (2001) makes explicit this 
dual potential for pathology and creativity in her analysis of advocacy after the 
Bhopal disaster.  The double bind not only positions advocates, corporations, 
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and governments to the disaster, but operates as the prevailing idiom for 
reckoning with environmental crisis in a globalized world.  The complications 
of scale among local residents, national sovereignty, and international trade 
are particularly emblematic of the generative yet difficult paradoxes of 
postcolonial life.  Following Anna Tsing‟s work, Timothy Choy (2003) renders 
shifts between local and global as articulated knowledges wherein universality 
and particularity are in a post-foundational double bind.  Stacey Langwick 
(2008) describes how nurses and their aides negotiate the double bind of 
urgent, yet undersupported care in a Tanzanian hospital.  The double bind 
becomes an idiom for reckoning with biomedical crisis in a postcolonial world.  
More generally, the double bind is an entry point for order and method in times 
of transition and crisis (e.g. Marcus and Faubion 2009). 
 
As an analytical tool to come to grips with great change, or what is often 
glossed as crisis, the double bind enacts a tension with what can be treated as 
static.  Bateson‟s (1958) work on the problems of recognizing, classifying, and 
theorizing change modeled this tension in the process of revisiting his previous 
work.  Following Kim Fortun, I read his 1958 epilogue to Naven as an 
analytical demonstration of the double bind, which entails “the problems posed 
for an ethnographer when confronted by messages of different logical types” 
(2001:363).  Bateson visibly struggles to weave together different levels of 
scale without imparting “objective reality” to those levels; rather, he treats them 
as “processes of knowing” or “ways of putting the jigsaw puzzle together” 
(1958:281). The question, Annmarie Mol writes, “of how objects, subjects, 
situations, and events are differentiated into separate elements and how they 
are coordinated together is opened up for study” (2002:83).   
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Robert Oppenheim (2008) has begun to rearticulate the field in terms of scale 
and double binds. He explores the multiple and often conflicting demands to 
speak credibly as both a local, indigenous organization as well a national 
Korean NGO mobilizing national and international experts.  The difficult fusion 
that many movement activists must achieve between blood relations (filiation) 
and social relations (affiliation) is analogous to the difficult fusion many NGOs 
must achieve between being local and grassroots while networking and 
expanding.  Oppenheim has extended these insights to Koreanist scholarship.  
Oppenheim attempts to set a new agenda for Koreanists, particularly 
anthropologists, by placing the “scale and hierarchy inherent to [Korean 
Studies] under erasure” and instead tracing scaling processes (2008:226).  In 
this chapter, I attempt to analyze the scale of commitment to ideas (ideology) 
and to people (solidarity) and how these two commitments sometimes 
constitute double binds.   
 
In so doing, the double bind appears as an activist relation with the past in 
terms of socialist and liberal democratic aspirations alongside Confucian, 
colonialist, anti-communist, and military authoritarian realities.  Several 
scholars have pointed out the historical distance between the liberal-
democratic Constitution and military authoritarian reality in South Korea 
(Hwang 2009; Lee S.H. 2002).  There is a persistent self-critique about the 
colonialist, authoritarian and nationalist inheritance of ideology. Over the 
course of the chapter, ideology moves from being a source of struggle to a 
source of systemic solidarity, division, regressive colonialism, and progressive 
movement.  The central argument of this chapter is that ideology is a double 
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bind between these inherited and imagined realities.  Insook Kwon, a student 
activist who became a generational and feminist hero for her landmark sexual 
harassment lawsuit, provides a window into the double bind of liberal 
democratic aspirations and military authoritarian reality. Finally, I recast the 
reception of Cho Hae-joang‟s series of books—Reading Texts, Reading 
Lives—as an expression of the ambivalent impulses to reject some ideologies 
as colonialist while embracing others as liberating.  In the final section of this 
chapter, I begin to address the compressed distance between myself as 
ethnographer and many of my informants.  I begin, however, with some 
context. 
     
Ideology 
“Even if there are only two people in a room,” one non-profit executive director 
joked about Korean activists, “there are three opinions1.” This joke made light 
of activists‟ commitment to ideology and the resulting factionalism that many 
criticized as plaguing historical and contemporary movements in Korea 
(Robinson 1988; Shin 1995; Lee N.H. 2007).  The 1987 presidential election 
was cited on several occasions as proof of this tendency toward destructive 
ideological factionalism.  In that election, military-backed Roh Tae Woo won 
after former activists Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam split the vote.  At the 
same time, it was also seen as a failure of ideology insofar as it provided a 
textbook example of regionalism2, or commitment to filial region above and 
beyond any commitment to ideas or policies. 
                                                          
1
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
2
 Roh Tae Woo, from the political and military establishment centering in the city of Daegu in 
North Gyeongsang province, easily carried this area and narrowly carried some other regions.  
Kim Young Sam carried his home city of Busan in South Gyeongsang province and narrowly 
edged out Kim Dae Jung in many other regions.  Kim Dae Jung made a strong showing in his 
home Jeolla region while Kim Jong Pil carried his home region, South Chungcheong.  In the 
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The 1987 election was the first formal democratic election in the Republic of 
Korea since 1971.  Yet many of the former student activists and civil leaders I 
knew retrospectively treated the 1997 election as the first “real (silje)” post-
dictatorship election because Kim Dae Jung, veteran activist and opposition 
leader from the historically underprivileged Jeolla region (please refer to 
Chapter 3 for additional background), was elected.  The peaceful transfer of 
power between political parties coupled with the success of Kim Dae Jung 
after narrowly losing the presidential election in 1971, 1987, and 1992 led 
many activists to treat the 1997 election as democratically and ideologically 
redemptive.  One former student activist and long-time NGO supporter 
reflected on Kim Dae Jung‟s election as “a rare proud moment in Korean 
politics3,” which he saw as crippled by regionalist divisions and patronage.  
Another long-time NGO supporter reflected on Korean political parties as a 
“charade” with “strong regional ties and little or no ideological differences4.”  
Ideology was an aspiration for many former democracy activists (Kang 2008); 
they struggled for a politics based on ideas against a politics based on lineage 
or money. 
 
Roh Moo Hyun‟s election in 2002, especially following that of Kim Dae Jung, 
marked a  major advancement in ideological politics for many former activists.  
Roh broke the mold of all previous presidents in terms of his age and 
educational background.  He pushed ideological differences between 
generations and political parties into stark relief (e.g. Kang 2008). Roh‟s 
                                                                                                                                                                       
end, Roh won 36.6 percent, Kim Young Sam 28 percent, Kim Dae Jung 27 percent, and Kim 
Jong Pil 8.1 percent of the nationwide vote. 
3
 Personal conversation with author on June 9, 2001. 
4
 Personal conversation with author on June 30, 2001. 
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election coincided with the departure of the “Three Kims”—Kim Jong Pil, Kim 
Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung—from political life.  Just as the authoritarian 
legacy was fading with the departure of the “Three Kims,” President Roh was 
asserting a pragmatic5 choice between legacies when he described South 
Korea “as being at the crossroads of either going back to the dictatorial past of 
the Yusin era, or revitalizing the reforms era6, or moving forward to the future” 
(Roh 2004 quoted in Kang 2008).  At the same time, Roh convened several 
truth and reconciliation-style commissions to investigate controversial 
historical events such as Korean collaboration with the Japanese colonial 
government, the uprising on Jeju Island in 1948, and suspicious civilian deaths 
during Park Chung Hee‟s rule.  These investigations coupled with his 
progressive ideological stands, particularly in taking on the media 
establishment and seeking to repeal the Anti-Communist National Security 
Laws, polarized people along ideological lines and mobilized the “New Right.”  
One history professor, Huh Dong Hyun, wrote in an English editorial about the 
“moral politics” that Roh‟s administration prescribed.  At the end of Roh‟s term, 
Huh reflected: 
 
                                                          
5
 Roh began calling himself a “pragmatist (siryongja)” immediately after the election to perhaps 
soften his image as an ideologue.  While many dismissed this as only rhetoric at the time, it 
later became a disappointment and failure for many activists, particularly when Roh sent 
Korean combat troops to Iraq and championed a free trade agreement with the U.S.  After 
Roh left office, and particularly after his suicide, some Leftists revisited his pragmatic 
compromises as proof of the power of old military, university, and regionalist networks in 
politics.  Lee Myung Bak‟s election in 2007 and his subsequent “New Right” and “pragmatic 
(siryong) government” confirmed many Leftist fears about the resurgence of authoritarian and 
corrupt politics.   
6
 “Yusin” literally means revitalization and refers to military dictator Park Chung Hee‟s harshest 
period of rule while “reform” refers to the globalizing, (neo)liberal reforms of Kim Young Sam 
and Kim Dae Jung.  Kim Jong Pil links them both as a former high-level advisor to Park Chung 
Hee and as a political ally to Kim Dae Jung. 
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The age of ideologies has ended and the world is moving forward to an 
era of creative integration, such as the Third Way or neo-moderates.  
So, the Korean administration‟s interpretation of history is a product of 
old times, when ideologies dominated everything and leaders wrote 
history on their own for the purpose of justifying their utopia (Huh 2008). 
 
At the end of his term, Roh‟s administration was widely seen as ideologically 
polarizing, unrealistically utopian, and practically incompetent7.  In the long-
standing division between affect and instrumentality or sentiment and 
practicality (e.g. Grinker 1998; Kendall 2002; Yi 1993), Roh was associated 
with the former and critiqued on the basis of the latter.   
 
Many student activists-turned-NGO and NPO pioneers faced similar 
critiques—at times from each other and from younger staffers in their own 
organizations.  As mentioned in the introduction, Roh and former democracy 
movement-turned NGO leaders were bundled together as members of the 386 
generation.  This generation, as I explore in this chapter, are perceived to be 
idealist, ideological, utopian, and self-righteous such that they fashioned 
movements and organizations with the same qualities.  In the words of one 
former student activist-turned- NGO accountant, “[NGOs] are all brains with no 
one to work on the bottom8.”  A common observation about 386 generation 
activists, often from others, was that they were too busy protesting on the 
                                                          
7
 Roh‟s advisors and activist supporters were often his most vicious critics.  I heard disdainful 
stories from professed insiders in 2006 and 2007 of Roh‟s appointment of an inexperienced 
liaison between the Blue House, the President‟s residence and office, and the National 
Assembly in an effort to be “transparent” as well as some of his foreign policy advisors relying 
on simple internet searches for key policy briefings ahead of major diplomatic trips.  
8
 Interview with author on October 17, 2006. 
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streets to study and learn what they needed to in order to govern effectively9. 
At the same time some veteran movement activists accused new NGO hires 
of being “selfish” and “career-driven” (Chapter 3).  What I often found, however, 
were many staffers working between, or in the middle of these views.  Team 
Leader Yoon is exemplary: 
 
Team Leader Yoon (Yoon Timjangnim) had worked for the same 
NGO for six years.  He was one of the first people to work on NGO 
public finance (jaejeong), but had since switched jobs to start a 
campaign modeled on Morgan Spurlock‟s Supersize Me to draw 
attention to fast food consumption, misleading advertising, and 
childhood obesity in South Korea.  Like Spurlock, Yoon made a film 
documenting the personal effects of eating fast food, which helped 
persuade the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to regulate 
advertising aimed at children and require fast food companies to 
provide more information about ingredients.  He considered it a 
“practical success10” and example to other NGOs as well as to 
companies in his ongoing partnership work between NGOs and 
businesses.  Several others, particularly seniors, were suspicious or 
openly disapproved of partnering with big businesses.  He joked that he 
often had to endure more hostility and critical questioning from his own 
NGO colleagues than from anyone else.  Yoon regarded some of his 
colleagues as “relying more on ideology (idieollogi) than on expertise 
(jeonmunseong) or practical experience (siryongjeok gyeongheom).”  
                                                          
9
 Paraphrased quote from different interviews with author on February 9, 2007 and March 20, 
2007. 
10
 All statements are from an interview with the author on February 9, 2006. 
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He maintained, “Some people joined NGOs with political aims, but most 
did not” and so he sensed a shift in NGOs away from ideology and 
toward culture.  He reflected that his earlier efforts to improve internal 
administration and finances were far more frustrating and draining 
because he could not “get things done.”  Yoon explained that “most 
NGOs were established in only the last 15 years so they are in the 
process of changing” organizational styles and strategies.  He went on 
to say that because of their short history, “NGOs depend on a few 
people who initiated the movement, but time will solve this problem.”  
Yoon was hopeful that he and others like him working for NGOs and 
NPOs “can improve the work situation” for junior colleagues by 
minimizing patronage practices.  Yoon recognized the difficulties of 
changing old organization and bookkeeping practices inside his NGO 
and so redirected his energy to being a mentor for junior colleagues 
and to taking on a fast food campaign aimed at children.  Yoon, like 
many other mid-level NGO and NPO workers I will discuss, had to be 
practical in order to be effective in an ideologically divisive and 
transitional work environment. 
 
In the Middle 
Mid-level NGO and NPO workers, or those who held the title of “team leader 
(timjang)” or “department leader (gukjang),” were often the ones working “on 
the bottom (miteso).”  They were also the ones most often interested in 
reflecting on double binds because they had to move between their seniors, 
who were student activists and NGO or NPO pioneers, and their juniors, who 
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were often fresh college graduates who not only had no memory of the 1970s 
and 80s student movement, but also were critical of its legacies. 
   
Department Leader Yoon (Yoon Gukjangnim), a seven-year staffer 
at the same NGO, had worked on both environmental campaigns and 
general organizational management and accounting.  Before this he 
had studied physics and engineering in university, but had little social 
experience.  Yoon had family pressure to become an engineer or 
scientist, but felt he needed more diverse social experiences before 
doing so.  A newspaper advertisement and push from a friend led him 
to apply for work at an environmental NGO.  Yoon had a reputation for 
shyness and kindness when I first started volunteering at his NGO in 
2001.  However, he had developed a reputation among his colleagues 
for his “quiet” but “sharp” style by the time I returned in 2005.  He never 
lost his kindness, according to a couple close friends, but he developed 
the kind of backbone and confidence (jasingam) that was needed to 
lead.  According to many juniors, Yoon led by “example (mobeom)” 
rather than by force.  His long-term relationship and eventual marriage 
to a NGO colleague was often whimsically described and credited with 
cementing his own work commitment.  According to many seniors, he 
had blossomed into a leader by complementing his already strong work 
ethic with stronger social skills.  He credited experience (gyeongheom), 
belief (sinnyeom), and human relationships (ingan gwangye) with much 
of his success and had grown suspicious of book-based knowledge 
(jisik) and expertise (jeonmunseong).  Yoon also shared over a series 
of drinks and chats that the symbolism of his seniors‟ past struggles 
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was losing its meaning as they got more rigid and ideological while the 
apparent lack of commitment and loyalty from his juniors was also 
troubling. 
 
Department Leader Yoon shared some reflections on what kinds of changes 
he thought “the movement” needed to undertake in 2007.  I quote him below 
because he is emblematic of a viewpoint that most mid-level NGO workers 
espoused while I was in the field from 2005 to 2007, which contained a familiar 
division between ideals (isang) and practical reality (hyeonsil): 
 
While change is necessary, it must begin from a clear role distinction 
between the simin movement and the minjung11 movement.  The simin 
movement must find methods for solving social contradictions in 
practical reality (hyeonsil).  While the minjung movement worries about 
putting emphasis on ideals (isang), the simin movement must worry 
about putting emphasis on practical reality (hyeonsil).  Accordingly, the 
simin movement must concentrate its power on practical problems 
where they can work together with citizens to fix actual contradictions, 
and on this basis they must begin to forge solidarity with the minjung 
movement12. 
 
                                                          
11
 Minjung, particularly in the 1980s, indexed a revolutionary non-elite and often village-based 
communitarian movement, critical historiography, and some kinds of religious practice that 
conceived of “common, mass people (minjung)” as the central historical and political subject in 
Korea.  Simin (citizen), on the other hand, indexed an often urban, diverse, non-violent, 
capitalist and middle-class-focused set of environmental, feminist, human rights, labor, and 
quality of life concerns (Abelmann 1996; Lee N.H. 2007; Oppenheim 2008).    
12
 Excerpt from written survey response received February 14, 2007. 
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In this chapter, I will discuss the importance of Yoon‟s distinction between 
ideals and reality and how national and movement history informs it.  Before 
doing this, however, I turn to the importance of ideals and ideology in the 
minjung movement and how these constituted struggle and division.   
 
Ideology as Struggle 
The NL-PD division is an active legacy of the postcolonial, labor, and student-
led minjung movements of the 1980s.  Namhee Lee characterizes the two 
factions—PD (People‟s Democracy) and NL (National Liberation)—as 
agreeing that South Korea is “a state-monopoly capitalist dependent on 
foreign powers” (2007:133).  For Lee, the division turned on how the factions 
saw national autonomy:   
 
PD recognized that South Korean society had produced a capitalist 
system with a unique logic of its own, while the NL, denying any 
autonomy to Korean capitalism, saw South Korean capitalism as a U.S. 
imperialist attempt at domination, and saw the class contradiction (i.e. 
the contradiction between capital and labor) as taking the form of the 
contradiction between imperialism and the South Korean people 
(2007:133-134). 
 
The NL faction took up North Korea‟s self-reliance ideology (juche sasang) 
and in so doing heightened resistance to U.S. imperialism (Grinker 1998:184; 
Shin 1995:523-524).  Somewhat simplistically, NL was for nationalist 
revolution against U.S. imperialism while PD was for an international Marxist-
Leninist class struggle (Lee N.H. 2007:134).   
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A department leader put it to me a different way one day.  She said that NL 
and PD disagreed over “Korea‟s first problem13.”  For NL it was reunification 
and so they advocated “reunification first, democracy later (seon tongil, hu 
minju)” while it was democracy for PD and so they called for “democracy first, 
reunification later (seon minju, hu tongil)” (Grinker 1998:192).  So while the 
movement shared resistance to Confucianism, military authoritarianism, anti-
communism, capitalism, and imperialism broadly conceived and imagined a 
socialist alternative (whether indigenous and/or North Korea-based), they split 
over agenda, or pragmatic priorities.   
 
This split constituted a major ideological struggle (inyeom tujaeng), which 
came to define the movement during the 1980s.   Namhee Lee describes 
these struggles as “comprehensive debates on political theories, 
organizational theories, strategies, and tactics” inspired by and modeled on 
Lenin‟s What is to Be Done? (2007:254). A great deal of intellectual and 
emotional energy went into ideological struggles and occasionally movement 
activists (undonggwon) came “to fight each other violently with wood poles in 
public and disrupt each other‟s public gatherings” (Lee N.H. 2007:134).  She 
sees “some of the most regrettable aspects of the student movement” in this 
ideological division which included sabotage, physical assaults, and the 
labeling of student suicides as an “easy way out of the ideological struggle” 
(Lee N.H. 2007:180).  A foreign text such as Lenin‟s circulated in underground 
student movement circles and were “absorbed” as an “absolute science” which 
“defined reality” (Lee N.H. 2007:164).   
                                                          
13
 Personal conversation with several people on July 5, 2006. 
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One civil leader described teaching himself Japanese while pouring over 
translations of these major texts in jail14.  Another said he learned Russian and 
German so that he could read the original texts15. Lawyer Park, a civil leader I 
discuss in the third and fourth chapter, recalled reading a German legal text 
titled “Struggle for Rights” while in jail as a student activist, which set his future 
course16. Many student movement activists (undonggwon) read translated 
pamphlets and described a self-transformational and utopian horizon when 
engaging foreign works as ideologies.  Pouring over difficult political, legal, 
and philosophical texts in foreign languages often created an imaginary 
ideological world not unlike the “imaginary West” Alexei Yurchak (2005) 
describes in the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 80s.  Yet what some 
activists realized during the course of their real encounters with former 
imaginations was a disorienting inability to stay committed to any idea or 
ideology. 
 
Team Leader Kim (Kim Timjangnim) did not like to discuss his 
student activist past; instead he preferred to talk about the challenges 
policy makers faced. I learned from Kim‟s colleagues that he was exiled 
for his attempted trip to North Korea in the 1970s.  As a result, he lived 
in Germany for over eight years, where he met his wife (another student 
activist exiled for traveling to North Korea), and that experience 
reshaped him.  Kim traveled for long periods of time in Europe and the 
U.S. to conduct research into the governmental and semi-governmental 
                                                          
14
 Interview with author on April 22, 2006. 
15
 Interview with author on September 13, 2006. 
16
 Interview with the author on February 5, 2007. 
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anti-corruption systems that already existed in order to design and 
refine Korea‟s Pact for Anti-Corruption and Transparency (KPACT), a 
semi-governmental advisory council to Roh Moo Hyun‟s administration.  
Kim was reflective about the challenges Korea faced as an “advanced 
(seonjin)” nation no longer able to rely on nineteenth century 
modernization theories from China of “Eastern body, Western technique 
(dongdoseogi)” nor on the 1970s and 80s view that “the West is good 
and we are bad17.” He reflected that since the 1990s, there are fewer 
benchmarks to be taken from other places because no other place has 
quite the same history of economic development and democratic 
reforms as Korea.  Kim said, “I cannot concretize what is other,” but 
said that Koreans had to find a “different” and “better” way than other 
countries to advance.  He went on to say that “theories are thrown into 
the dustbin” and gave the example of sustainable development.  He 
said that the idea that the Earth will collapse in 30-40 years was being 
challenged and so the whole premise of sustainable development was 
being questioned.  Kim asserted, “Unfortunately, there is no panacea.”  
He recalled his many trips overseas as unsettling rather than affirming 
any ideology he had as a student activist about North Korea, Germany, 
Japan, or the United States.  Kim was interested in the “practical work” 
of benchmarking and “experimentation” of “deliberative democracy.” 
 
Ideology as Solidarity 
386 generation movement activists were often doubly bound to their blood 
families and movement families.  They were raised on what Laura Nelson 
                                                          
17
 All quotes are from an interview with the author on May 10, 2006. 
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(2000) calls the “national utopian imagination,” which was predicated on the 
belief that personal work and sacrifice would enable a better personal, familial, 
and national future.  Yet what many of them reported realizing in the course of 
becoming minjung movement activists (undonggwon) was how unseamless 
these levels of relations could become, particularly in the face of minjung 
suffering.  Insook Kwon, an undonggwon in the mid-1980s, wrote the following 
about her first experience working alongside minjung one summer in 
university: 
 
A sense of injustice began to present itself to me when I compared their 
conditions to the privilege of my family and myself.  In my growing years 
poverty was not alien to me but it was other to me.  My father and 
mother came from rural areas.  So I had many relatives living there.  
They always visited my father to ask for help or money.  My mother 
gave my cousins my old clothes.  However, I had not been sympathetic 
to them at all.  I simply thought that I was different from them 
(2000:154). 
 
Kwon goes on to describe her transformation: 
 
After ten days of working hard and staying with peasants, an increasing 
class-consciousness resulted, as well as a desire to struggle for 
equality.  Also, I felt I emotionally became aware that somehow my 
privilege was connected to their conditions of poverty.  On the way back 
home, I cried a lot on the bus.  I cried from shame about my attitude 
toward life.  There was always only me.  I was only concerned with my 
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welfare and well-being.  It was the first time I looked back on my life 
from a different angle.  At that moment, I gave up the idea of becoming 
a fashion designer and pursuing study abroad (2000:154-155). 
 
Like many others in the movement during the mid-1980s, she dropped out of 
university to work in a factory, the “historical site of importance (hyeonjang)” 
for the movement (Kim S.K.1997; Koo 1993; Lee N.H. 2007).  Students, 
particularly from elite backgrounds, felt great pressure to sacrifice their elite 
privileges as Kwon did and join the non-elite workers in factories to educate 
and organize them (Kim S.K. 1997; Lee N.H. 2007).  Both Nancy Abelmann 
(1997a) and Namhee Lee (2007) provide personal stories of how activists 
struggled with their movement obligation to forego a university diploma, 
studying abroad, enrolling in graduate studies, or any aspiration to become a 
doctor, lawyer, or artist.  Student activists also frequently chose marriage 
partners according to their prospective partner‟s commitment to the same 
obligations.  Insook Kwon chose a different path when she was arrested in 
1986 for illegal labor organizing and made headlines for bringing an 
unprecedented sexual harassment lawsuit against a police detective.  Kwon 
ultimately became a feminist critic of the minjung movement, which I will 
discuss later in this chapter.  The same year Kwon brought her suit another 
student reportedly threw herself in the river over the “dilemma” between her 
own dreams and the responsibility she felt to forego such dreams for the sake 
of the movement (Lee N.H. 2005:917).  Movement activists often felt conflicted 
about the upwardly mobile class dreams they were raised on and that their 
families sacrificed for and supported on one hand and the communitarian and 
egalitarian dreams they came to learn as part of the minjung movement on the 
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other.  The movement commitment often negated the filial commitment and 
vice versa, which constituted a double bind. 
 
Movement families consisted of senior-junior (seonbae-hubae) relations along 
with ideological circles and seminars.  Seonbae-hubae relations are age-
based and hierarchical.  However, they are not “strictly hierarchical or 
unilateral” (Lee 2007:161).  Namhee Lee analogizes them to sibling relations, 
which are based on “mutual respect and reciprocal obligations” (2007:161).  
Seniors (seonbae) are expected to act as responsible moral guides, 
counselors, and models to be emulated while juniors (hubae) are to act as 
appreciative and enthusiastic followers.  Hubae often compel seonbae to act 
just as the reverse is expected.  The stakes in protest were often raised 
through these reciprocal obligations; each demonstrated their commitment to 
the other through increasingly dangerous and difficult actions (Lee N.H. 2007). 
   
The moral necessity, age-based hierarchy, and reciprocity of these relations 
reflected Confucian teachings, but the basis of the relations constituted a 
major shift (Lee N.H. 2007:161).  Seonbae-hubae relations grew out of 
“circles” and “seminars,” which is how students came together to study texts 
and form ideologies.  These “circles” were at times referred to as jip (Kwon 
2000; Lee N.H. 2007), which Eunhee Kim Yi defines as “not necessarily… 
„family‟ or „household” (1993:97).  Jip has been remarkably flexible from the 
Joseon dynasty through the colonial period which has been defined not only 
by blood (Yi 1993).  Admittance to undonggwon jip hinged on school, major, 
friends, family background, school records, and ideological orientation (Han 
1974; Lee N.H. 2007:165).  Once in the jip, seonbae  
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were the critical and in some cases determining factor in an 
undonggwon individual‟s ideological orientation, so much so that in the 
mid-1980s, it was said that, „If the seonbae belonged to NL [National 
Liberation], then the hubae would also be a member of NL (Lee 
2007:161).   
 
Within a given jip, seonbae would sometimes train a select group of hubae 
and call them “songgol,” the term denoting true-bone rank during the Silla 
dynasty (Kwon 2000:201).  In Silla‟s strictly hierarchical system, only those of 
the true-bone rank could head a government ministry because they were of 
the highest hereditary rank (Eckert 1990:32).   
 
Despite the anti-Confucian rhetoric, there was frequently a mixing of filial and 
affiliational metaphors, such as “the bloodlines of activism” evident in minjung 
literature, which trace unresolved struggles through generations (Abelmann 
1996:35).  Han, Abelmann defines, as a “historical poesis” of accumulated 
anger and resentment (Abelmann 1996:37).  Sometimes characterized as the 
essence of Koreanness (e.g., Grinker 1998), han “relaxes the temporal and 
geographic patchwork of passive and active, resistance and non-resistance” 
because “it assumes that historical experience does not need to be individually 
or consciously part of the rationale by which people explain their actions or 
motivations, particularly when protest or struggle are involved” (Abelmann 
1996:37).  Han can latently accumulate and then dramatically blow-up as it is 
passed from generation-to-generation (e.g., Grinker 1998; Kendall 1988).  In 
some ways, han constituted minjung activist “belief in the existence of 
 64 
undiscovered or suppressed radicalism that took quotidian form” (Abelmann 
1997a:252).  Han is a popular and academic way of accounting for the agency 
of the past in the present and future. 
 
One former student activist who became the executive director of a NPO 
reflected on how student activists during the 70s and 80s shared the “three 
mins”—minjok (single ethnic nation), minju (democracy), and minjung (mass 
people).  She fondly recalled reading Marx and Lenin in university while 
seeking “systems” (siseutem) rather than “theories” (iron).  She worried that 
her younger colleagues did not have a similar “system,” or ideology, of thought 
and solidarity (yeondae).  After returning from a weekend retreat with her 
former student movement activist (undonggwon) friends, she remarked:  
 
[Undonggwon from the 70s and 80s] share a common heritage from the 
student movement so there are no communication problems between 
us…We look for systems while [younger staff that did not experience 
the student movement] search for particular theories to match particular 
issues18. 
 
Secretary-General Choi‟s Greenism compared to the more specific policy 
reforms many of his younger staff pursued is one example of this difference 
(Chapter 3).  Another undonggwon from the 1980s said that the minjung and 
simin movements depended on systemic-thinking solidarity as it grew to work 
on many different issues in its “department store style” (baekhwajeomsik).  
“Even if we don‟t agree on every issue,” she said, “we know we agree on the 
                                                          
18
 Interview with author on January 13, 2007. 
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big things because we were together in the student movement (hakbeon)19.”  
She reasoned that the informal networks through which activists know each 
other was changing and was unsure, like many other former undonggwon, 
about how solidarity (yeondae) would continue.  Like many other 386 
generation NGO and NPO leaders, she lamented the disinterest of new staff in 
meeting for alcoholic drinks most nights. 
 
During my fieldwork in the mid-2000s, most people working for and with NGOs 
and NPOs professed the kind of post-ideological pragmatism that Roh Moo 
Hyun‟s administration appeared to necessitate.  On a number of occasions, 
people went out of their way to proclaim how passé 1980s ideological 
struggles were in the current moment.  One coordinator (gansa), said that 
iconic NGOs such as PSPD used to attract members because of a “shared 
ideology,” but that NPOs such as the Beautiful Foundation attracted donors 
because of a “shared culture20.”  A frequent refrain among people of all ages 
working in NGOs and NPOs during the 2000s—even those who were 
undonggwon or identified as 386 generation—was that ideology not only kept 
the movement back, but also threatened the nation.  One research director 
claimed that undonggwon from the 80s “stick to ideology” and so “do not 
prepare for the future.”  A professor and NGO supporter matter-of-factly stated 
that Koreans had moved past ideology and that to return to it would be 
tantamount to regression21.  Pragmatism and its linear progression will be 
taken up further in the fourth chapter. 
 
                                                          
19
 Interview with author on March 31, 2007. 
20
 Interview with author on September 16, 2006. 
21
 Interview with author on March 17, 2007. 
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The minjung imaginary aspired to mobilize a non-Confucian, non-lineage-
oriented, non-hierarchical, non- patriarchal, and non- authoritarian kinship and 
nation through ideology.  This ideology co-existed with, fed off of, and pushed 
off against other ideologies such as Confucianism, socialism, Marxism, 
Leninism, North Korea‟s self-reliance ideology, South American liberation 
theology, and American style liberal democracy.  Yet these ideologies existed 
at different logical and experiential levels in South Korea, which is what 
constitutes the double bind.  For example, liberal democracy was an 
“academic subject” taught in schools and mandated in the South Korean 
Constitution, while military authoritarianism was the “reality” during the 1970s 
and 80s (Dong 1987; Lee S.H. 2002).  “The discourse of liberal democracy 
was the meta-narrative of the Republic of Korea,” writes Hwang Byeong-ju, 
“but the lived experience of the common people offered very little freedom” 
(2009:14).  The undonggwon who grew up during this time and so 
experienced liberal democracy and military authoritarianism as a double bind 
went on to become members of the 386 generation. 
 
Insook Kwon and the Double Bind of Democracy and Militarism 
I take Insook Kwon‟s story to be emblematic of the 386 generation double bind.  
Kwon is the aforementioned student activist I quoted at length who brought a 
sexual harassment lawsuit against a police detective in 1986.  This action 
elevated her, along with her subsequent published reflections, to a symbol of 
self-critique within the movement (e.g., Lee N.H. 2007).  In particular, Kwon 
critiqued the movement‟s implicit militarism.  With her lawsuit, Kwon effectively 
used liberal democratic laws as a means to redress some of the painful effects 
of militarism.  Kwon (2000) reflected on these experiences in the context of a 
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dissertation she completed in the U.S.  The dissertation, entitled Militarism in 
My Heart: Militarization of Women’s Consciousness and Culture in South 
Korea, is an examination and self-reflection on the insidious social effects of 
militarization in South Korea.   
 
Kwon describes how militarized even the anti-military dictatorship and pro-
democracy undonggwon were in their actions.  “Student activists,” Kwon 
reflects, “always pursued and dreamed of democracy but did not experience 
what democracy was in reality” (2000:306).  As a result, democracy was 
viewed as “anything but military dictatorship” rather than a system of equality 
and decision-making (Kwon 2000:94).  Kwon reasoned that this reality of 
democracy would have challenged the prevailing militaristic reality among 
undonggwon (2000:306).  I read her dissertation as an account of the double 
bind between military authoritarian reality and democratic dreams. 
 
Kwon opens the dissertation recounting a conversation she had with two 
Korean graduate students studying in the U.S.  When Kwon explained that she 
was studying militarism (gunsajuui) both women asked what that meant.  After 
Kwon translated it into English and said she was looking at the relationship 
between women and militarism both women thought she meant women in the 
military.  Kwon said this type of response was very common when she spoke 
with Korean friends: 
  
Their responses suggest two things: first, [the two students] had not 
needed to look for a comparable word in Korean for militarism until then.  
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Second, the only possible relationship they could recall regarding 
women‟s relation to militarism was women in the military (2000:1). 
 
Kwon goes on to say she had a similar response when she was first 
confronted with the concept of militarism.  She recounts taking Cynthia Enloe‟s 
course “Women and Militarization” in 1997 and being asked how militarism 
had affected her own life or those around her and being “embarrassed 
because I did not know anyone who had been militarized” (Kwon 2000:1).  In 
trying to complete an assignment for the course, she contacted a friend whose 
father had been a colonel in the South Korean marines figuring she could 
shed some light on being militarized.  When Kwon explained the assignment 
her friend responded, “Aren‟t you the representative one whose life has been 
militarized in South Korea” (2000:2)?  Kwon explains: 
 
She was referring to the incident in which I was tortured by the military 
regime in 1986.  I did not know what to say at that moment.  In fact, her 
response took me by surprise.  To be honest, I was offended because, 
for me, the military was a bad thing.  Therefore, being related to it 
seemed insulting (2000:2). 
 
Kwon‟s response to her friend‟s question reveals how unaware she was of her 
relation to militarism.  This realization became the starting point for her 
dissertation: 
 
I, who grew up in a representative military city in South Korea, who was 
subject to military training from elementary school on, who held the flag 
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for anti-communism rallies, who was ashamed of my own physical 
weakness when male student activists threw stones and fire bottles at 
riot police during demonstrations in the 1980s, had never thought of any 
kind of personal or group relation to the military or militarism.  Above all, 
during much of my childhood I feared another Korean War, raised 
enmity to North Korean Communists, and agreed with the strong 
military build-up under military regimes.  After a conversation with a 
friend, I kept asking myself, „How could I not be aware of militarism‟s 
relationship to my life and to South Korean society (2000:2)?‟ 
 
The answer, she argues, is “hegemonic domination.”  Kwon describes 
militarism as a pervasive yet invisible part of South Korean culture such that 
even those trying to overthrow the military regime, the undonggwon, “never 
seriously thought of and discussed the military as an institution” (2000:2-3).  
Militarism not only dominated through naked force, but through the 
“spontaneous consent hidden or embedded in values, norms, perceptions, 
beliefs, sentiments, and prejudices…” (Kwon 2000:25).  Kwon likened 
hegemonic domination to the process of forming a habit, which “resides in the 
inarticulation and hidden homogenization of thoughts, morals, and values” 
(2000:25).  
 
The hegemonic domination of militarism was evident in the minjung 
movement‟s privileging of violent struggle, or what Kwon calls the 
“masculinized activist model” (2000:3).  This model was manifest in how 
women undonggwon dressed and behaved:  
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tall with deep voice, no make-up, no hair-do, no skirt…smoking 
cigarettes, drinking alcohol, wearing only jeans and using tough 
language…were evidence of whether any female activist had overcome 
her conventional femininity and, thus, her petty-bourgeois upbringing… 
(Kwon 2000:117-119). 
 
Women undonggwon reported measuring their activist commitment against 
men‟s violent activities such as throwing rocks and fire bombs on the frontlines 
of demonstrations.  Women reported feelings of weakness and guilt when not 
doing such activities (Kwon 2000:122-127).  Kwon casts the idea of even 
wearing a skirt as threatening to movement strength and solidarity.  The 
militarized uniformity undonggwon displayed, particularly during their 
demonstrations, was a source of strength.  Kwon quotes a former woman 
undonggwon: 
 
My friend had said that we were almost into the movement like heroin 
addicts.  The greatest fantasy, we then imagined, was human 
relationships.  I was proud that I would die for my comrades (2000:126-
127). 
 
Kwon argues that this self-sacrificing uniform solidarity was an expression of 
militarism‟s hegemonic domination.  Most forms of movement solidarity appear 
militaristic in her account.  For example, she describes senior-junior (seonbae-
hubae) relationships as following Confucian and militaristic practices.  Kwon 
writes of undonggwon as: 
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desirable warriors who grew up accustomed to enmity culture and 
valuing and practicing the prioritization of national interests over 
personal interests.  They knew how to sacrifice themselves for larger 
causes.  They were already trained warriors who had been organized 
as para-military forces in high school.  Military culture and information 
was always available because of male universal conscription and 
strong military influences in society (2000:306-307). 
 
Kwon‟s dissertation ostensibly demonizes solidarity as militarization.  
Militarism rather than ideology appears as the culprit of twisted solidarity.  
Kwon, in fact, casts solidarity as a militarized reality which democratic reality 
would combat (2000:306).  After writing about the gap between the dream and 
reality of democracy, Kwon concludes that: 
 
[student activists] did not have a strong desire for democratic realities, 
such as a democratic structure for decision-making, taking action and 
engendering equal culture, a structure that could work against solidarity, 
combat readiness, and effective fast actions (2000:306). 
 
Kwon‟s description captures the double bind of liberal-democracy and 
militarism.  Her self-critique was neither the first nor the last of its kind. 
 
Self-Critique of Ideology as Colonialism  
Kim Chi-ha (1978), a poet, novelist, and activist who was deeply influential in 
the minjung movement, also spoke out against the militarism in the movement 
during the 1980s.  After a string of undonggwon suicides, Kim publicly 
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critiqued the movement‟s glorification of death and militaristic style of meetings 
and demonstrations.  Some activist and literary organizations dismissed Kim 
from their member rolls in response to his comments, but just a couple years 
later more insidious critiques began to appear.   
 
Chungmoo Choi‟s (1993) critique opened the movement to postcolonial and 
feminist perspectives.  Choi celebrated the possibility of the movement to be a 
decolonizing force, particularly after the Gwangju uprising in 1980, yet 
critiqued the movement‟s reality of colonialist militarism.  Choi defined the 
American military government‟s education policy in South Korea after World 
War II as based “not on liberalism but on the structure of the Japanese-style 
educational system, which was originally designated to implement obedience 
and complacency toward the colonial rulers” (1993:82).  Cho Hae-joang 
presented a similarly ambivalent, yet more intimate portrait of the movement. 
 
Cho‟s series of books, Reading Texts, Reading Lives (Geul Ilkgiwa Salm Ilkgi), 
appeared in the early to mid-90s and began a conversation about not only 
how to “read” texts, but how to “read” social change and relationships through 
generations.  She effectively shifted the movement field (hyeonjang)—or site 
of praxis (Lee N.H. 2005)—for intellectuals and undonggwon from the farm 
and factory back into the classroom (see also chapters 3 and 4).  The books 
were another form of activism in which she extensively quoted students from 
her social theory classes at Yonsei University.  One student wrote the 
following sarcastic poem: 
 
 Teacher, don‟t ask us questions that are not in the book. 
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 Teacher, we are happy to memorize the canon. 
 Afflicted high-schoolers? No, afflicted universities. 
 Give us an order in an authoritative voice. 
 Tell us what the problems are, and give us the solutions too. 
 We don‟t want to see reality (Cho 1992:125). 
 
Cho laments the militaristic and authoritarian education students received, 
which continued to inform the movement.  Students righteously sought “the 
right answer” with a militaristic temperament learned over many years in order 
to promote “historical progress” for the movement and the nation (Cho 
1994:145-147).  Following Fanon and other postcolonial theorists, Cho 
equates the passive and uncritical reading many students learned in school 
with being “colonial” and attempted to demonstrate an active, critical, and self-
reflective way of reading and living in order to decolonize the mind.    
 
The “fury of ideology” in which “no one was free from either juche sasang 
[North Korean self-reliance ideology] or Marxism-Leninism” came to be seen 
as a manifestation of colonialist and militaristic excess (Lee 2007:140-141).  
The NL-PD split was exemplary of these excesses.  The “ideological 
struggles” many undonggwon agonized over during the 1980s came to look 
“colonial,” which was precisely what they sought to resist.  The “single-minded 
obsessions, exclusions, and righteous self-sacrifice” undonggwon evinced in 
these struggles came to appear regressive and destructive—things commonly 
disdained as “colonial”—and so a “movement void” followed (Cho 1994:149-
150).  Cho writes, “[These movements] turned away from or even oppressed 
those contradictions that emerged from people‟s daily lives—so instead of 
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readying people for the next era of social movements, they‟ve silenced them” 
(1994:151).   
 
Reading Texts, Reading Lives contains the ambivalent reflections of the 
would-be next generation of student activists.  There was a mixture of 
liberation and oppression in the “ideological struggles” of the 1980s, yet 
students were “fairly united in expressing the need to unlearn the canons of 
political ideology drummed into them during their primary and secondary 
school years” (Grinker 1998:203).  Activists of varying ages expressed this 
sentiment to me during the 2000s as a wish to “get their childhood back22.”  
The “colonial” and “authoritarian” continuity Cho‟s books instantiated between 
the militaristic anti-communist ideology students learned in primary school and 
the Leninist ideology students poured over in movement circles configured a 
dialogue about generations.  In particular, Cho‟s work revealed the alienating 
effects of ideology on the would-be next generation of the student movement.  
Her books appeared at the same time the student movement foundered in the 
early to mid-1990s and so attracted a particularly large audience.  I 
encountered very few people in NGOs and NPOs during the early to mid-
2000s who had not read or at least heard about these books.    
 
Self-Critique of Ideology as Division 
Cho Hae-joang‟s language and diagnoses about the minjung movement in the 
1990s came through in some activists‟ reflections on the citizens‟ (simin) 
movement in the 2000s.  One human rights lawyer matter-of-factly asserted 
that most NGOs have an “authoritarian culture” closer to military dictator Park 
                                                          
22
 Personal conversation with author on August 4, 2001. 
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Chung Hee‟s administration than to their overseas NGO counterparts23.  
Scholar (Hakja) Lee, an environmentalist who recalled taking classes with Cho 
Hae-joang in the 1980s, wrote the following about his generation, 386, in 
response to a written survey I conducted in 2007: 
 
They planned…to sacrifice themselves for their values and beliefs 
(sinnyeom).  However, their weak side is that they have a self-righteous 
attitude (dokseonjeogin taedo) about their self-sacrifice (jagi huisaeng) 
and this belief in only what is right and wrong cannot breakthrough the 
complex real world (hyeonsil segye) and present concrete alternatives 
(guchejeogin daean)24.   
 
Scholar Lee had been a student activist during the 1980s yet often 
pointed out the excesses and failures of what had become of his 
generation later.  He recalled learning how to write “personal narratives” 
in Cho‟s classes at Yonsei University, but wished he had learned more 
“theory (iron).”  Discussing theory (damnon), is what he often enjoyed 
doing over drinks and coffee.  Like many other former undonggwon, 
theory discussions seemed to transport him back to his university days.  
He told me in 2007 that Korea had suffered one “legitimacy crisis” after 
another and that activists and NGOs had become “exhausted” and 
“overly disciplined” in their work. Like many other civil leaders at the 
time, he said that activists needed to “slow down” and suggested the 
slow fermentation process of gimchi as an analogy.  During long 
discussions in 2006 and 2007 at a junior‟s coffee shop, he reflected on 
                                                          
23
 Interview with author on January 10, 2006. 
24
 Excerpt from written survey response received March 2, 2007. 
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the similarities between Christianity and Socialism in South Korea.  He 
recalled his devout mother and strict Christian upbringing and then his 
rebellion as an activist until he joined a group of Christian Socialists.  
Both Socialists and Christians demand self-sacrifice, he said, and both 
know how to network.  He said that Lee Myung-bak demonstrated how 
well Christians network with his successful 2007 presidential campaign.  
Yet in the next breath he praised the film Secret Sunshine (Miryang) for 
its portrayal of the “bad side” of Christianity.  
 
Department Leader Yoon, the person I opened the chapter with, wrote the 
following about what kinds of changes he thought the citizens‟ (simin) 
movement needed to undertake in 2007: 
 
While change is necessary, it must begin from a clear role distinction 
between the simin movement and the minjung movement.  The simin 
movement must find methods for solving social contradictions in 
practical reality (hyeonsil).  While the minjung movement worries about 
putting emphasis on ideals (isang), the simin movement must worry 
about putting emphasis on practical reality (hyeonsil).  Accordingly, the 
simin movement must concentrate its power on practical problems 
where they can work together with citizens to fix actual contradictions, 
and on this basis they must begin to forge solidarity with the minjung 
movement. 
 
These reflections criticize the simin movement for doing much of what the 
minjung movement did—according to Cho, the latter “turned away from or 
 77 
even oppressed those contradictions that emerged from people‟s daily lives” 
(1994:151).  The self-reflexive work of feminists such as Chungmoo Choi, 
Insook Kwon, and Cho Hae-joang locate this persistence in colonialist and 
neo-colonialist inheritances, particularly from the U.S. military.  Other 
prominent intellectuals similarly located the shortcomings of the minjung 
movement in its colonialist and Anti-Communist inheritances.  Choi Jang Jip 
(1989) wrote that Korean nationalism “became transformed into a statism that 
privileged Anti-Communism over unification” immediately after the country was 
divided.  Hyokbom Kwon wrote: 
 
The difference between Anti-Communism in South Korea and Anti-
Communism in other Third World countries and in the U.S. is that in 
South Korea every form of Leftist thinking is considered taboo and the 
expressions of that thinking have become the target of legal and social 
oppression.  Thus, North Korean Communism has been defined as an 
evil, and its overthrow has been a foremost task.  It justifies the 
existence of South Korea—no matter how much it has negative 
characteristics—as far as it opposes North Korea and deters and 
prevents North Korea from invading (1999:50). 
 
Anti-Communism became increasingly blunt as policy and law under Park 
Chung Hee‟s military dictatorship from 1961 to 1979 (Kwon 2000; Lee N.H. 
2007). The National Security Laws, the legal legacy of South Korea‟s anti-
communist ideology, was what Roh Moo Hyun sought to repeal while in office.  
Park‟s Yusin (revitalization) ideology during the 1970s inextricably linked 
national security and anti-Communism as the war in Vietnam escalated. His 
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regime began propagating this ideology, as activists came to see it in the 
1990s, as “morality” and “ethics” (dodeokseong) in school textbooks (Grinker 
1998; Kwon 2000).  Chungmoo Choi wrote, “For more than two decades after 
the national partition, South Korean schoolchildren visually depicted North 
Koreans literally to be red-bodied demons with horns and long fingernails on 
their hairy, grabbing hands” (1993:81).  This was the ideology students wished 
to unlearn and the childhoods they wished to get back.  Namhee Lee 
described the division and its enabling anti-communist ideology as “deeply 
internalized and pervasive, „bewitching [people‟s] psyche and warping their 
perspective‟ to such an extent that Koreans became „self-divisional” (2007:3).   
 
In the late 1970s, prominent historian Kang Man-gil began to use the term 
“division consciousness (bundan uisik)” to bundle together critical efforts to 
engage with post-1945 Korean history (Lee 2007:42).  “Division 
consciousness” questioned South Korean autonomy vis-à-vis the United 
States.  In particular, it questioned the U.S.‟s decision to divide Korea, which 
eventually led to the Korean War, while reigning in anticommunism as the 
state ideology and suppressing pro-democratic post-1945 social movements.  
Paik Nak-chung, another prominent public intellectual, put forward an all-
encompassing system (cheje) to account for this internalized division.    
 
Paik articulates a broad, deep, and indigenous system of what I take to be 
double binds.  He calls Korea a “division system (bundan cheje)” following 
Wallerstein‟s world system.  Paik Nak-chung describes this system as a sui 
generis subsystem of the world system with considerable powers of self-
reproduction (Grinker 1998:37-38).  Roy Richard Grinker, an anthropologist 
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who worked for a long time in Africa and for a short time in Korea, has 
rearticulated Paik‟s system as “a form of deep structure” evident in identity 
politics where North and South Korea “are united not only in the division 
system, but also as a subsystem of a larger global political and economic 
system, of which the Unites States is the clear leader” (1998:37).   
 
The U.S. aided liberation from Japanese colonialism at the same time it 
divided Korea into a Cold War artifact.  This division created a system of 
paradoxes between unification and stability as well as democracy and national 
security.  “There seems to be no way out,” as Grinker writes, “Without 
unification there can be no democracy; without democracy there can be no 
unification” (1998:38).  Paik criticized both NL and PD factions for 
oversimplifying Korea‟s problems into discrete, consecutive steps—
“democracy first, unification later” or vice versa—rather than acknowledging 
their systemic nature (1994:127).  The NL-PD ideological struggle, in other 
words, can be read as an artifact of the division system, which is predicated on 
the double bind relation between Korea and the U.S. 
 
Using Paik‟s system as an analytical resource, Roy Richard Grinker brought to 
light another expression of the division system: the ideological struggle 
between “pragmatic (hyeonsiljeok)” and “sentimental (gamsangjeok)” 
approaches to unification.  Grinker outlines some key moments of this struggle 
in governmental, academic, and artistic discourses over the last half century.  
For example, South Korea‟s first president, Syngman Rhee, advocated an 
aggressive “pragmatic” policy whereby the south would use military force to 
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ensure the north held democratic elections.  Conversely, Chang Myon‟s brief 
administration installed after student protests in 1960 followed a “sentimental” 
policy of appealing to people‟s hearts through family reunification rather than 
any military threat (Grinker 1998:218-219).  Grinker demonstrates how this 
split between pragmatic and sentimental approaches turns on differing notions 
of “reality.”  For sentimentalists, the reality is the sentiment of divided families 
longing to reunite and in so doing return home and reunify the homogenous 
nation.  For pragmatists, on the other hand, the reality is the political, 
economic, militaristic, and cultural divisions that have grown over the last half 
century.  Pragmatists often treat sentimentalist reality (silje) as fantasy, dream, 
or ideal (isang) by querying, “How can we achieve homogeneity when the 
reality of our situation is war” (Grinker 1998:219,286)?  There are two words 
often interchangeably used for reality: silje and hyeonsil (Grinker 1998:219).  
While in many contexts both words refer to concrete facts, details, and 
circumstances opposed to abstract ideals (isang), in the unification context, 
the abstract and concrete mix and at times reverse in such a way that realities 
often appear suspended or unattainable.  Grinker points out that both hyeonsil 
and silje: 
can refer to north Korea‟s „true‟ intentions, the privileged position of the 
truth of diplomacy over sentiment,  the reality of Korea as a unified 
nation, the actual conditions of democracy or communism, or the 
realities of the world that the north Korean government hides from its 
citizens (1998:219). 
 
With this in mind, Grinker offers the following distinction: “Although it is true 
(silje) that Korea is one nation, the reality (hyeonsil) is that Korea has two 
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states” (1998:219).  “Sentimental” passion for one nation is a “reality (silje)” 
while “pragmatic” consideration of two states is another “reality (hyeonsil).”   
 
The aforementioned critiques of activists contain the pragmatic (hyeonsil) 
sense of reality.  Department Leader Yoon asserted: “While the minjung 
movement worries about putting emphasis on ideals (isang), the simin 
movement must worry about putting emphasis on practical reality (hyeonsil).”  
This response was provided in the context of a written survey which asked him 
an open-ended question about the necessity of changes in the simin 
movement; there was no mention of the minjung movement.  Yet like many 
activists, Department Leader Yoon addressed the simin movement only 
against the backdrop of the minjung movement.  In particular, the simin 
movement had to be “practical” against the “idealistic” minjung movement just 
as pragmatists had to be against sentimentalists in unification contexts. This 
extreme division between sentimental and pragmatic reality, or ideological and 
practical, continues to define contemporary political, unification, and gender 
discourses (Cho 2000; Grinker 1998; Kendall 2002; Yi 1993).  However, this 
imperative to be “practical” was difficult for many former undonggwon, who in 
the words of Dr. Lee were constrained by their “self-righteous attitude” and 
“belief in only what is right and wrong.”  Ideology bundled together these 
constraints, which were often taken to be a legacy of the past  
 
Ideology as Base 
Ideology emerged as a fruitful ground, or “base” in the words of one activist, 
from which to create movements.  In the conversation I recount below, Cho 
Hae-joang‟s books, Reading Texts, Reading Lives, worked as a ground for 
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generational similarities and differences.  The conversation occurred during 
weekly “English classes” I conducted with staff at an environmental citizens‟ 
group, Green Korea United (GKU, Noksaegyeonhap).  These classes often 
contained a mix of Korean and English and occasionally happened outside the 
office.  This particular conversation was hosted over dinner at Department 
Leader Jeong‟s home.  Before getting to the relevant part of the conversation, 
it is helpful to briefly introduce the three activists who participated. 
 
Department Leader Kim (Kim Gungjangnim) was a sharp-witted 
activist who did not bristle at debate and often enjoyed needling her 
colleagues.  She was an undonggwon in the 80s who read Marx and 
Lenin and got a good laugh out of telling me how she refused to buy 
Levi‟s or drink Coke at that time.  In the next breath, however, she was 
deadly serious in praising how “strict” she and her friends were as 
undonggwon.  She referenced the NL/PD split in terms of the “North 
Korea juche (self-reliance)” group and the “South Korea democracy” 
group yet was quick to point out how that “ideological division” had 
been smoothed over.  Department Leader Kim was one of the founders 
of Green Korea and a senior leader in the “environmental movement 
(hwangyeong undong).”  One of the goals of this movement, as she 
stated, was to smooth over the ideological divisions in the student 
movement.   
 
Department Leader Jeong (Jeong Gungjangnim) shifted effortlessly 
from being a no-nonsense activist to being a kind, consoling “senior” 
(seonbae) and friend.  She was a university student in the early to mid-
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90s who recalled studying the “cultural theory” (munhwa theory) of 
Foucault and Derrida while enjoying pop songs and foreign films to 
“appreciate cultural differences.”  It was she who reframed the NL/PD 
division for me “as different answers and movements to the question of 
what is Korea‟s first problem.”  Like Department Leader Kim, 
Department Leader Jeong saw the “environmental movement” as a 
solution to the ideological problems of the 1980s.  For her, the citizen 
movement (simin undong)—the movement environmental, economic 
justice, human rights, feminist and other citizens‟ groups in Seoul saw 
themselves as part of—needed to get “beyond ideology” and connect 
with people. She had been working in this capacity for several years as 
Green Korea United‟s leader of the citizen participation department.  
 
Activist Choi (Choi Hwaldongganim) had earned the respect and 
praise of her seniors and juniors in short order.  She was a university 
student in the late 90s and early 2000s during which time she studied 
postmodern theory in the U.K.  She was visibly grappling with the 
contradictions of being a postmodernist and an activist since returning 
to Seoul.  Activist Choi rejected the certainties of ideology, grand theory, 
and even what she called “meta-discourses” in an effort to “listen to 
alternatives from the people.”  She rarely spoke of movements or 
ideologies, but she did see citizens‟ groups as promising a space “free 
from capital.”  Activism for her did not necessarily mean action, as she 
stated on several occasions; rather, activism required being “as critical 
of yourself as you are of society.”  Her self-deprecating humor was an 
expression of this commitment.  At the same time, colleagues took her 
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long hours and hard work as an expression of her activist commitment. 
In the couple years I knew her at Green Korea United, Activist Choi was 
the only new hire who regularly worked late nights and weekends.   
 
Department Leader Kim had spent some time in the Philippines studying at the 
Korean NGOs‟ Asian Center while she pursued a master‟s degree in NGO 
Studies.  A couple years later, Department Leader Jeong also went to the 
Philippines to work at the NGO center and improve her English.  It was there 
that both women became friends with a local activist, Myrla, who worked on 
U.S. military base issues.  Green Korea invited Myrla to Seoul to participate in 
an international conference on U.S. bases in 2005.  We started the class 
discussing the conference and Myrla‟s visit.  At one point Department Leader 
Jeong re-posed a question Myrla had asked her: is there a uniquely Korean 
kind of socialism? 
 
Department Leader Jeong said she was not sure.  Department Leader Kim 
emphatically declared there is while Activist Choi stayed quiet and smiled.  
Then they all turned to me, seemingly at once, and asked if I knew about the 
“generation gap.”  I queried if they meant in terms of 386 generation and 
mentioned Cho Hae-joang‟s Reading Texts, Reading Lives.  Department 
Leader Jeong finished saying the book title before I did.  Mention of these 
books appeared to transport all of them back to their university experiences.  
They shared parts of what I recount above.  At one point, Department Leader 
Jeong called herself a “sandwich generation (saendwichi sedae)” between 
Department Leader Kim and Activist Choi.  She viewed the “cultural theory” 
that she had studied in the 90s as the “superstructure” to the 80s “base” of 
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Marxist-Leninist ideology.  She contended that “387 generation (sam pal chil 
sedae)” better captured her than 297 because she was in her 30s, could 
identify with undonggwon in the 80s, and was born in the 70s.  Activist Choi 
echoed this sentiment by saying she felt closer to Department Leaders Kim 
and Jeong than to many people her own age.  During those couple hours 
around the table in Department Leader Jeong‟s living room, ideology was a 
movement “base” rather than a sullied and divisive legacy. 
   
All three women agreed that they were part of the “June generation (yuweol 
sedae),” an epithet that had appeared in a newspaper a few years before to 
highlight the connection between large actions going on around the 2002 
World Cup to the history of student and minjung  protests from the 1960s 
through the 80s (Cho 2004).  June referred to the common month of landmark 
events from the 1960s through the 2000s and effectively transcended activist 
generation divisions.  June effectively dis-aggregated generational differences 
by year and re-aggregated them in terms of month.  This scale shift unified 
often disparate activist generations and pointed up a transcendental hope 
among movement activists: a reclamation of the past for the future, which 
constituted movement as a shared foundation or ground for solidarity. 
 
Hyeonjang (Historical Site of Importance, Fieldsite, Praxis) 
While ideology was widely imagined as the past for NGO and NPO workers, a 
pragmatic approach to “the complex real world (hyeonsil segye)” and “actual 
contradictions (hyeonsil mosun)” constituted the present and the future.  
Nancy Abelmann (1996, 1997a) and Robert Oppenheim (2003, 2008) have 
articulated this as an “aesthetic” and  “moral” shift from minjung to simin 
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activism in terms of class, scope, and organizing strategies.  Both Abelmann 
(1996, 1997a) and Oppenheim (2003, 2008) articulate this shift in terms of 
ideology and pragmatism.  Abelmann (1996) documents the valorization of 
activist perspectives “free from ideology” and the widespread post-80s fatigue 
and distance not only from the “military authoritarianism of the recent past, but 
also from the righteousness and drama of dissent—from the totalizing projects 
of both the left and the right” (1997a:250).  Oppenheim similarly concludes that 
simin activism achieves moral privilege “not in ideological (or „interested‟) 
commitment but in post-ideological pragmatic semi-detachment…” (2003:482).  
The “post-ideological pragmatic” activism I encountered inside movement 
organizations during the mid-2000s was not only an apparent break from the 
ideological past, but also a continuation of it.  In particular, hyeonjang was a 
continuation of the ideological commitment to match belief and action going 
back at least as far as the minjung movement (Lee N.H. 2007). 
 
Hyeonjang, as Namhee Lee writes, in the context of 1980s minjung movement 
 
literally means „site or „field‟, but its import depends on the context and 
the word with which it is paired: it can be a place where something 
happens, such as a construction site or an accident scene, or a place of 
historical importance.  It was used among the activists to denote a work 
that one pursued with the democratization movement‟s goals in mind 




Like Insook Kwon, an unprecedented number of student activists left university 
in the 1980s to work as laborers in factories25.  This move constituted “going to 
hyeonjang” for activists who prioritized factory work as “the barometer of one‟s 
commitment to the movement” (Lee 2002:915,920). Hyeonjang was the 
source and measure of commitment; it was the privileged site of learning and 
praxis for activists as well as a measure of the class privileges they were 
willing to sacrifice for the sake of the movement.  Namhee Lee describes how 
student activists in the 1980s derived “moral authority” from “the fact that one 
practiced what one knew (chihaeng ilchi)” and called out others in the 
movement who fell short in this regard (2007:159).  This relationship between 
belief and action, in particular the correspondence of the two (praxis), is often 
how activists imagined their distinctiveness from non-activists (e.g., Yarrow 
2005). However, activists and academics often mingled in NGOs and non-
profits.    
  
There was a revolving door between academia and many NGOs and NPOs in 
South Korea.  As Robert Oppenheim (2003) observes, sophisticated social 
movement theorists self-consciously shape discourses through a kind of 
“historicity before the fact.”  They frequently advise organizations on a formal 
and informal basis.  For example, they often participate in informal leadership 
and staff meetings and conventionally serve as the public faces or 
“representatives (daepyo)” of NGOs and NPOs by performing ceremonial 
duties and advising on public relations issues.  Cho Hae-joang, for example, 
                                                          
25
 Namhee Lee says that Insook Kwon was one of an estimated 3,000 undonggwon working in 
factories in the mid-1980s.  However, both the government and labor activists have claimed 
that the actual number was higher (Lee 2007:213-214). 
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had just agreed to serve as “representative” for the largest environmental 
NGO in South Korea at the end of my fieldwork period in 2007.   
 
At the end of my fieldwork period in 2007, a group of colleagues at an 
environmental NGO became curious about conventional academic 
terminology as I discussed my recent schedule.  They wondered: “What is the 
difference between a seminar (semina) and a lecture (gangui)?... OK, what 
about a conference (hoeui)?  Symposium (simpojieom)? And workshop 
(woksyap)?” These queries were not unlike those several other NGO staffers 
had posed over the years as we went between Korean, Konglish, and English.  
Just an hour before this conversation, a staffer had to interrupt an interview I 
was doing with Green Korea‟s secretary-general to ask him about the remarks 
he was preparing for an upcoming discussion panel.  After a brief exchange 
about his trip itinerary, secretary-general turned to me before returning to the 
interview question to say, “I am always preparing remarks for some discussion 
panel (toronhoe) or another.  By the way, how would you translate 
toronhoe26?” There was an earnest study and insatiable curiosity for these 
kinds of academic and quasi-academic translations and the clever turns of 
phrase that could sometimes result in efficacious uses of Korean, Konglish, 
and English27.  On another occasion, Secretary-General Choi insisted on 
finding an appropriate translation for ansingnyeon as he explained why a few 
veteran activists would not be working in the coming months.  He dismissed 
“temporary break” and “vacation” in favor of “sabbatical.” 
                                                          
26
 Interview with author on June 12, 2007. 
27
 During the same time a Korean-American friend living in Seoul who had worked for non-
profits around the world launched a project to print T-shirts with clever romanizations of 
Korean words. She explained it as the inverse of what many Koreans had done in adapting 
English words to Korean.  Her favorite example at the time was “moonpup”—a playful 
Romanization of 문법 (grammar). 
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What was the basis for this fascination with academic terminology and 
translations? Several professors and activists cited Confucianism as the basis 
for the intimacy between activists and scholars.  Cho Hee-Yeon, one of the 
most prominent social movement analysts in South Korea and leader of the 
NGO Studies field, told me that Korea has a strong and proud history of 
“activist academicism” by virtue of its continued commitment to Confucian 
philosophy and practices.   Another prominent sociologist and NGO 
representative reiterated this view and then noted the “irony” of this 
considering the strong anti-Confucian orientation of the minjung movement 
(e.g., Abelmann 1996; Oppenheim 2003).  Scholars have been held in high 
repute since at least the Joseon dynasty while being some of the most visible 
critics of modern authoritarian regimes (e.g., Lee 2007; Song 2003).  
Movement organizations have associated themselves with the critical yet 
respected status scholars frequently enjoy and the protection it affords their 
activities (Oppenheim 2008) while many scholars have associated themselves 
with movement organizations for the more engaged, praxical dimension it 
affords their scholarship.  There has been an exchange, in other words, 
between scholars and activists vis-a-vis social movements whereby both lay 
claim to hyeonjang.  
 
Professor Kim (Kim Gyosunim) had been a student activist who went 
on to study American politics in the U.S.  When I met him he was the 
newest hire and chair in an international relations department at a 
national public university outside of Seoul.  He was very critical of fellow 
“progressives (jinbojeokin)”, particularly President Roh Moo Hyun, 
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whom he saw as “narrow-minded” once in power. Like other self-
identified progressives, Kim often complained about the “conservative” 
and “bourgeois” values of some of his colleagues at the university. He 
told me matter-of-factly one day that “being a professor is only a means 
to being an activist28.”  He often got quiet and excited, like he was about 
to share a big secret, whenever he talked about his activism with NGOs.  
One day he advised me to study one NGO instead of another because 
it was “humbler” and “more engaged with people.”  He dismissed many 
of his senior academic colleagues as detached from research and 
activism, both of which he said were about being “in the field 
(hyeonjang).” 
 
On several occasions, activists would emphasize similarities between their 
methodology and my own.  The first time I mentioned my fieldwork as hyeonji 
josa, for example, a couple activist colleagues corrected me by saying 
hyeonjang29.  Several activists pointed out that they did similar work when they 
went to Saemangeum (a wetlands area undergoing large-scale reclamation 
discussed in the third chapter), interviewed people, documented changes in 
flora and fauna, took pictures, and generally took in the mood of a place.  Yet 
what was important for activists about places like Saemangeum was that an 
emergency, or crisis, was occurring there.  Like the humanitarian in the field 
(Redfield 2008) or the nurse in an emergency room (Langwick 2008), activists 
                                                          
28
 Interview with author on April 3, 2006. 
29
 Hyeonjang has a wide range of reference to sites of crimes, disasters, events, or as 
Namhee Lee says “sites of historical importance” (2005:915).  Hyeonji josa, on the other hand, 
often refers to field research investigation and is conventionally used by anthropologists to 
refer to fieldwork.  Hyeonjang implies exception as a site of importance or urgency whereas 
hyeonji josa is mundane in empirical research settings. 
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were fieldworkers with big hopes and limited resources (Fortun 2001; see also 
next chapter). 
 
During my fieldwork in the mid 2000s, many inside NGOs treated hyeonjang 
as a material place opposed to abstract theory such that new think tanks 
ostensibly bringing activists and academics together announced themselves 
as research institutes “where field and theory meet (hyeonjanggwa ironi 
mannaneun).”  The Hope Institute, a think tank I will discuss in the fourth 
chapter, posited “the actual place (hyeonjang)” as a major organizational 
principle: “The actual place (hyeonjang) is important. When you go to the 
place, you will know the problem as well as the alternative (daean)30.”  For 
them, hyeonjang highlighted a practical study (silhak) inheritance as well as a 
minjung one.  
 
Hyeonjang did not just migrate to academic and activist practices; rather, it 
crossed over into popular cultural practices as well.  Robert Oppenheim (2008) 
has written about tapsa, a widely popular cultural heritage practice in South 
Korea during the 1990s. He describes it as a “common middle-class weekend 
leisure activity conducted singularly or in groups, informally or on trips 
organized by various clubs or associations” (2008:83).  Accounts of it can be 
found in weekend, travel or culture sections of major newspapers and on 
websites and blogs.  Oppenheim writes: 
                                                          
30
 Quotation from August 11, 2008 INews article, “When We Dream of Hope and Put it into 
Practice, there will be Hope‟…Lawyer Park Won Soon (Huimangeil ggumggugo silcheonhae 
nagal ddae, huimangeun saengginda’…Pak Wonsoon byeonhosa).” 
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The word tapsa literally means „survey‟ of „field investigation,‟ as in the 
sort taken beyond the classroom by university history or art history 
departments or by engineers going to a site where a bridge will be built, 
but it has come to designate the specific practice of „leaving the road to 
find places with a history‟ (Yu 1993:95): seeking out, viewing, studying, 
and sometimes documenting  artifacts, relics, and historical sites within 
the national realm, a sort of serious fun that shades into mountain 
climbing on one end and museumgoing on the other (2008:83).  
 
Yu Hong-jun, the person quoted in the above description, has often been 
linked with the popular boon in tapsa because of his publications, Naui 
Munhwa Yusan Tapsagi (The Chronicle of My Field Investigation of Cultural 
Remains).  Yu was an art history professor in the 1990s, but was named head 
of the government‟s Cultural Properties Administration under Roh Moo Hyun in 
the 2000s as a result of the popularity of his writings.  Yu, who previously 
wrote about minjung art, “traced a 1980s expansion of tapsa culture from 
university departments to „normal‟ (nonuniversity) people, all of whom have 
sought to investigate the „scene of culture‟ (munhwaui hyeonjang)” 
(Oppenheim 2008:97).  Yu‟s off the beaten path ambulatory practice of 
encountering cultural objects in situ has a distinctively 1980s minjung 
praxiological sensibility (Abelmann 1996; Lee 2005, 2007; Oppenheim 
2008:88-95). 
 
Many academics were directly or indirectly engaged in the extension and 
critique of minjung historiographic and methodological practices during the 
1990s.  Seung-Kyung Kim, an anthropologist who worked with and studied 
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activists and laborers in a Masan factory during the late 1980s, began to 
reflect upon the methodological kinship between activist and academic 
subjectivities in a short reflective essay published in Anthropology Today in 
1995.  She drew upon the growing literature on native anthropology during the 
so-called reflexive turn in anthropology (e.g. Kondo 1990; Narayan 1993; 
Ohnuki-Tierney 1984) to rethink the relationship between herself and an 
informant that she largely wrote out of her dissertation—“a woman who was 
variously my friend, my key informant and an alter ego to an extent that is 
unusual in anthropological research” (original emphasis;1995:6).  She goes on 
to juxtapose two types of fieldwork: “that of the ethnographer and that of the 
political activist, who were drawn together by related interests and social 
concerns” (1995:6).  Jesook Song (2009) extended this insight in her study of 
how activists, underemployed intellectuals, and government bureaucrats 
became “crisis knowledge brokers” and “social engineers” in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis during the late 1990s.  Robert Oppenheim (2008) furthers 
these Foucauldian-inflected subjective negotiations into Latourian-inflected 
assemblies between not only activists, academics, and bureaucrats, but also 
persons and things in his provocative study of Gyeongju.  Whether through 
networks, methodology, or commitment, the distance between activism and 
anthropology has seemed to close since Seung-Kyung Kim‟s reflections in 
1995.   
 
Jesook Song‟s aforementioned ethnography, South Koreans in the Debt 
Crisis: The Creation of a Neoliberal Welfare Society, offers a recent example 
of how activism continues to inflect anthropological practice.  In the preface to 
the book, Song explains why she shifted from her original interest in sexuality 
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politics to the financial crisis (2009:xiii). She writes, “Although I tried to protect 
my research from being overwhelmed by the crisis, I could not resist the 
growing concern of women‟s and other groups marginalized in the labor 
market; I was compelled to look at unemployment policies” (2009:xv-xvi).  The 
footnote at the end of this sentence reads: 
 
It was not a coincidence that I was motivated to extend beyond my 
original research population.  I had attended college in Seoul in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and was part of the so-called last generation of 
student activists—against the military dictatorship, U.S. military and 
economic imperialism, cold-war ideology, and the capitalist exploitation 
of cheap laborers and peasants.  Wanting to keep alive the memory of 
colleagues and activists who were injured, jailed, traumatized, or dead, 
I was driven to action when I perceived the resurgence of conservative 
nationalism and the escalation of neoliberal economic and welfare 
policies during the crisis (2009:142).  
 
Song‟s change in research topics was not only intentional, but self-consciously 
activist.  She was “compelled” and “driven to action” to examine neoliberal 
employment and welfare policies amid the resurgence of familiar enemies—
conservative nationalism and in particular the Confucian-inflected “family 
breakdown” discourse (Song 2009:xvi,142). 
  
In one case, she describes her informant and her as “in somewhat similar 
positions” (Song 2009:129).  Song elaborates: 
 
 95 
We were both Ph.D. students who had reluctantly, but nevertheless 
seriously undertaken government-related work—work that we had 
hardly imagined ourselves doing because of our antifascist views.  
Despite the recent democratization, the collective memory of a three-
decades-long era of fascism remains strong.  We were both attempting 
to carry out the militant leftist guerilla tactics of the 1980s, working in 
quasi-governmental agencies as an activist strategy (2009:129-130). 
 
Her work as team leader of a quasi-governmental public works program 
undertaking public policy through research collapses the “activist strategy” with 
ethnography. The “militant leftist guerilla tactics of the 1980s” are hyeonjang-
inspired.  Song describes her and her colleagues doing research by 
conducting interviews and doing participant-observation as they “shared, 
empathized with, and represented the struggling young people” (Song 
2009:107). Song and her team tried to debunk dominant government and 
media-supported discourses of “idle and spoiled young adults” by making 
strategic reference to these same discourses‟ promotion of “creative capital” 
and “new intellectuals.”  She gives examples of the team‟s appropriation of 
dominant neoliberal discourses to describe the “multiple and fragmented 
subjectivities” of her and her informants (Song 2009:108).  As “semiexperts,” 
Song and her team did “the actual labor of translating youth into investable 
human capital within a neoliberal market paradigm” (emphasis added 
2009:108).  As a result, they become unwitting and complicit “social 
engineers” and “crisis knowledge brokers” during the compressed 
liberalization and neoliberalization taking place in many areas of South Korea 
during the late-90s debt crisis (Song 2009:xiv,130).  This Foucauldian 
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articulation of Marxist contradiction is exemplary of the self-reflective critiques 
many former 1980s minjung activists and 386 generation people have put 
forward (e.g. Kwon 2000; Lee N.H. 2007). 
 
Jesook Song reflects on her policy research and report-writing for the city 
government as “field research” and “the meta-ethnography of what was itself 
an ethnographic process” (2009:xx-xxi). She visibly wrestles with her 
complicity in (neo)liberal social engineering by admitting to using the tactic of 
naturalizing women‟s physical weakness, which she rejects in her theoretical 
work, in an effort to attract funding for homeless women.  She concludes, “If 
these were the strategic decisions I made as an activist at work in the 
government, this book is the choice I made as a reflective scholar—to 
problematize the very process of constructing the „proper‟ welfare subject” 
(Song 2009:xxi). 
 
Song‟s visible struggle to reconcile her activist and scholarly work is similar to 
many activists‟ self-critical struggles in the 1980s to match action and belief.  
As Namhee Lee writes, “For those in the movement, one‟s moral authority 
came from the fact that one practiced what one knew...” (2007:159).  In the 
1980s, the privileged site of praxis was labor organizing and factory 
employment (hyeonjang).  An Chaeseong, a student labor activist, reflected in 
his autobiographical novel, “every activist prioritized the labor movement, [and] 
factory work became the barometer of one‟s commitment to the movement” 
(quoted in Lee 2007:259).  In a similar way, work for NGOs and governmental 
or semi-governmental organizations was the hyeonjang for committed activists 
in the late 1990s and 2000s, as I will examine in subsequent chapters.  This 
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work is rife with double binds both for activists and ethnographers as both 
approach their work with a heavy dose of apprehension and self-critique.  At 
the same time, both activist and ethnographic fieldwork demand commitment 
even and especially when ideology is cast aside.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reapproached ideology as a historical site of importance 
(hyeonjang) for self-critical engagements with the past, present, and future.  At 
one moment, ideology transcends conventional blood, regional, and political 
divisions and constitutes a liberating and utopian horizon.  Yet this possibility 
for liberation carries its own obligations and constraints.  Ideologies shift from 
being explanatory, efficacious, and liberating to imperialist and colonialist 
cages holding people and progress back.  This double bind constitutes the 
setting for the temporal and political progressivism of pragmatism, which I take 
up in subsequent chapters.   
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Chapter 2: Green is Life 
 
Commitment and Sacrifice  
Sacrifice is one of the oldest topics for anthropology.  So old, Peter Redfield 
writes, “that it rarely features in contemporary debates” (2008:199).  At the 
same time, sacrifice has been a prominent topic for contemporary studies of 
activism.  Sacrifice is a demonstration of endurance through personal hardship, 
risk of life and limb, and perseverance in movements (e.g., Hirsch 1990; Lee 
N.H. 2007).  In other words, sacrifice is the demonstration of commitment 
(Burke 1969, 1984; Hirsch 1990; Snellinger 2010; Yarrow 2005). 
 
Just as social scientists and theorists have sought an empirical or material 
way to know people’s ideas, beliefs and commitments, activists have sought 
the same. Amanda Snellinger writes, “Hardship reconfirms the nature of 
selflessness and devotion to the country that people exercise through political 
struggle” (2007:354).  Thomas Yarrow theorizes sacrifice as a kind of 
“currency” among activists to demonstrate morality and commitment (2005:55).  
Beyond college and lucrative jobs, activists in South Korea have sacrificed 
filial well-being, normative social connections, physical and mental health, and 
at times their lives for solidarity, ideology, and hope (Abelmann 1996, 1997a; 
Lee N.H. 2007; Song 2009).   
 
Just as social scientists and theorists have sought an alternative or outside to 
reigning ideological frameworks and social orders—from rational choice to 
strategic action—activists have sought the same (e.g., Hirsch 1990; Riles 
2000).  Sacrifice, the demonstration of commitment, has recursively served as 
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hope for alternatives both for academics and activists (e.g. Nelson 2000; Song 
2009).  In this chapter, it appears as an imagined alternative to economic 
development, capitalism, and neoliberalism even as it comports to a similar 
progressive temporality.  Like other inheritances of both the military 
dictatorship and student movements, Koreanists are ambivalently re-
approaching sacrifice as “a medium to link activities far apart on the 
ideological spectrum” (Han 2004:84).  In a sustained state of crisis, this means 
many staffers—particularly those sandwiched between the founders and 
recently-hired juniors of NGOs and NPOs—are facing the “conundrum of 
designating their own sacrifice, even while opposing the sacrifice of others” 
(Redfield 2008:197).  Not unlike doctors undertaking triage in the field, or 
nurses in an emergency room, this chapter shows many mid-level NGO and 
non-profit workers expressing and confronting double binds with humor and 
strength (Langwick 2008; Redfield 2008).  Many of them take on the super-
human demand to multi-task and multi-specialize in order to act one as if one 
hundred (ildangbaek) amid the resource limits of their organizations.  During 
the “citizens’ movement without the citizens” and the “reproduction crisis” of 
the mid-2000s, NGO and NPO workers find solutions in NGO Studies 
programs and in consultation with government and political party organizations.  
In the process, they also foreground a kinship by other means—relationships 
built on commitment to ideas, or ideology, rather than conventional filial, 
school or regional ties (e.g., Song 2003; Yarrow 2005).  Many NGO and NPO 
workers necessarily and deliberately sacrifice, some for a short time and some 
for a long time, to render themselves human resources on a larger scale. 
 
Entangled Inheritances of Sacrifice 
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One of the most pervasive statements I encountered in the field went 
something like this:  
 
Korea is a small country without many natural resources (jawon) 
surrounded by large countries.  People are Korea’s best resource 
(jawon) and hope (huimang). That is why Koreans work so hard1. 
 
I heard versions of it from activists and businessman, progressives and 
conservatives alike.  Many attributed it, sometimes positively and sometimes 
negatively, to the Park Chung Hee regime.  Park’s legacy is complicated and 
people’s views of it often revealed their politics.  Many remember Park’s 
mobilization of people’s hope (huimang) and confidence (jasingam) through 
sacrifice (huisaeng) to build an egalitarian and prosperous national future (Han 
2004; Jager 2003; Lee N.H. 2009; Nelson 2000; Oppenheim 2008).  He 
rendered people into human resources for the purposes of nation and 
economy-building (Han 2004; Nelson 2000).  Many of my informants, however, 
remembered Park’s militaristic, fascist, and authoritarian abuses of human 
rights and social development2.   Team Leader Kim, for example, lamented 
how so many Koreans “sacrificed” human and social development for 
economic development3. Another staffer described the problem as a cultural 
preference for “results (seonggwa)” over “process (gwajeong)4.” In this view, 
sacrificing political freedom or basic human rights for economic progress was 
                                                          
1
 Personal conversation with the author on July 30, 2007. 
2
 See Lawyer Park’s ambiguous and ambivalent thoughts on Park Chung Hee and his legacy 
in the fourth chapter. 
3
 Interview with author on May 10, 2006. 
4
 Personal conversation with author on September 15, 2005. 
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unacceptable.  This view came into sharp relief around the Hwang Woo Suk 
scandal when I began my fieldwork in the fall of 2005.   
 
Hwang was a highly funded and publicized Korean scientist who announced 
the creation of human embryonic stem cells in a 2004 issue of Science 
magazine.  He enjoyed hero status with around-the-clock bodyguards, news 
reports, fan websites, and campaigns to award him the Nobel Prize (Choi Y.S. 
2009).  However, it abruptly came to an end when an investigative news 
program in South Korea aired allegations that Hwang had coerced his female 
researchers into donating their eggs for his research.  This spurred Seoul 
National University, his research base, to investigate and led Science to re-
evaluate Hwang’s findings.  Several informants told me that they wished they 
had been surprised, but that sadly it was just another case of Koreans valuing 
“results over process” or ends over means5.  Yoon S. Choi places the fraud in 
the context of the “lengths Koreans will go to achieve global success” 
(2009:25).  One of the leading scholarly journals in South Korea, for example, 
Changjakkwa Bipyeong, devoted an entire issue in 2005 to the Hwang 
scandal “as an outcome of the Korean state’s rush-to-development mentality 
which began in the 1960s during Korea’s modernization period under former 
President Park Chung Hee” (Choi 2009:198).  Choi summarizes, “All that had 
seemed to matter to Koreans was the glory Hwang could deliver. It did not 
matter what means he used to attain it” (2009:205).  The Hwang scandal 
exemplified the ongoing liberal and progressive critique of the Park regime—in 
particular its valuation of “results over process.”   
                                                          
5
 Personal conversation with author on October 1, 2005. 
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Many scholars have taken up the active and entangled legacy (Thomas 1991) 
of Park Chung Hee in South Korea.  Rob Oppenheim (2008), whose work I 
take up more in later chapters, reapproaches Park’s legacy through one of his 
crowning achievements, cultural preservation in Gyeongju.  Oppenheim shows 
how Park instilled confidence in South Koreans about their “glorious cultural 
past” and how that past compelled a fulfillment of the future (2008:28).   Laura 
Nelson writes about how “the carrot of a better, more equitable, wealthier, 
democratic (and unified) Korea was dangled before the population by the 
government and its media and institutions” (2000:20).  In particular, “the hope 
that their children would live to see a prosperous, unified Korea was a complex 
and powerful motivation for many South Koreans” to hope through sacrifice 
and participate in the “national utopian imagination” (Nelson 2000:21).  
Sacrifice, as Seung-Mi Han writes, “emerges as a medium to link activities far 
apart on the ideological spectrum” (2004:84). 
 
Sacrifice was also a key part of the student and labor movements that 
struggled against Park’s dictatorship.  Seung-Mi Han has called it a 
“synergism” between Park’s egalitarian populism and the minjung  
movement’s Freirean-inflected conscientization (2004:71).  Nancy Abelmann 
(1996, 1997a) and Namhee Lee (2007) have written extensively of the 
marriage, job, and travel aspirations many student activists sacrificed for the 
sake of the movement.  As discussed in the previous chapter, activists felt 
tremendous pressure to practice what they knew, or correspond knowledge 
and conduct (chihaeng ilchi), by foregoing personal dreams like Insook Kwon 
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did with fashion design and choosing spouses based on class background and 
commitment to the movement (Abelmann 1997a; Kwon 2000; Lee N.H. 2007).   
 
There is one person, in particular one sacrifice (huisaeng), whose importance 
for the minjung movements and many of my informants was seminal.  South 
Korean high school students learn about his life and its legacy has extended 
far beyond the social movements that originally embraced him (Lee N.H. 
2007). That person is Chon Tae-il, a poor factory worker who had been forced 
to work since age thirteen and whose efforts to change the dangerous factory 
conditions that enabled South Korea’s rapid economic development during the 
1960s largely went unnoticed.  All of that changed on November 13, 1970 
when Chon dramatically lit himself on fire in the downtown factory area of 
Seoul.  His words that day as he burned, “we workers are human beings too” 
and “do not let my death be in vain,” have been immortalized (Lee N.H. 
2007:218).   Namhee Lee writes: 
 
Every activist came to know the intimate details of Chon Taeil’s life: his 
dreams, disappointments, struggles, sufferings, and death.  Many were 
inspired by and hoped to emulate, his devotion to fellow workers, and a 
few came to conclude their lives as Chon had.  If Che Guevara stirred 
the souls of middle-class European and American college students in 
the 1960s, Chon Taeil and his death stirred the souls of thousands of 
Korean students and workers, eventually pushing them into the streets 
and factories (2007:218).   
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Chon’s poor background and struggle alongside other factory workers, mostly 
women, combined with his attempts at fact-finding research into labor 
conditions, petitions to government and media, and efforts to mobilize protests 
were a “signpost and invitation” to intellectuals “making it no longer possible 
for [them] to pay lip service to labor” (Lee N.H. 2007:222).  Chon’s efforts to 
reach out to university students to help him understand labor laws left many 
“with a tremendous sense of shame and guilt” (Lee N.H. 2007:219).  His 
protest suicide along with his words, carried through in his journal and the 
various books and films that followed, catalyzed the modern labor movement, 
minjung alliance between students and laborers, and many contemporary 
forms of activism particularly by the urban poor (Koo 1993; Lee N.H. 2007).  
 
Chon’s sacrifice was intentional, significant, generative of social bonds, and 
suggestive of both the past and the future just as sacrifice has conventionally 
been theorized in social science and religion literatures going back to Mauss 
and Hubert’s classic work, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions.  Chon’s 
sacrifice has been understood as a “single spark” generating and sustaining 










Illustration 2.1: Still photo from 1995 film, Single Spark, dramatizing Chon’s 
self-immolation. 
 
Vice President Im (Im Huiksiljangnim) recalled majoring in Russian at 
university in the 1990s not because of interest or aptitude, but because 
of test scores6.  She proudly recounted learning about Chon’s suicide, 
socialism, and citizen uprisings in Gwangju and Masan from teachers in 
high school that belonged to the union.  She followed her seniors 
(seonbae) in university by joining demonstrations against the Uruguay 
Round.  Like many of her seniors, she stayed an extra year in university 
to train her juniors in the student movement.  The violence of both the 
freely-elected government and her fellow activists left her wandering 
(banghwanghagi) for six months about how to think and reform in a free, 
but divided country.  While her friends hung around the university 
working in factories, she heard about NGO work from a senior in jail.  At 
first she thought going from the student movement to the citizens’ 
movement7 was a betrayal, but one of her seniors convinced her to try it.  
She was critical of the movement then for resorting to violence and 
remained critical of current labor leaders for just shouting slogans and 
demonstrating.  She thought the movement needed to be more “cultural 
(munhwajeok)” and “emotional (gamjeongjeok)” and managed her staff 
and volunteers that way.  Im referred to volunteers as “natural treasures 
                                                          
6
 All statements from interview with author on November 22, 2006. 
7
 The student movement employed Marxist, Leninist, and Freirean-inflected approaches to 
class and labor and often undertook violent, street-based demonstrations similar to minjung 
movements well into the 1990s (e.g., Cho 1992, 1994; Grinker 1998; Lee N.H. 2007).  The 
citizens’ (simin) movement, on the other hand, employed liberal, democratic, and non-violent 
approaches to appeal to as many people as possible and to enable the transition from 
movement to organization (e.g., Abelmann 1996, 1997a; Oppenheim 2008; Song 2009). 
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(cheonyeon ginyeom)” while “serving (seomgihagi)” donors by 
maintaining “intimate (chinhan)” email or phone conversations with 
them.  She had a long-distance partner that she rarely saw and put off 
taking a sabbatical for many months in order to minimize its effects on 
her colleagues.  She did everything for the organization—from daily 
calls to donors, emceeing large events, organizing daily office tasks, 
and conceiving of NGO campaigns.  She was exemplary of the “one 
working as one hundred (ildangbaek)” approach I discuss in this 
chapter.  Every person that I spoke with who knew Im thought that the 
NGO would stop running without her. 
 
Vice President Im captured the significance of Chon’s legacy for me one day 
over coffee.  She named sacrifice rather than economic development as the 
“progress of people (saramui jinboreul).”  She said: 
 
…our country does not have many natural resources (cheonyeon 
jawon) and is surrounded by powerful nations so we must rely on 
people for progress (jinbo).  People like Chon Tae-il who gave the 
ultimate sacrifice are our greatest resource (jawon) because they made 
progress8. 
 
This statement reveals the shared progressive foundation of state 
authoritarianism and anti-state activism, which became a hopeful building 
block for social and national design in the 2000s (see Chapter 4).  However, 
the entangled traditions of sacrifice on both ends of the ideological spectrum 
                                                          
8
 Interview with author on November 22, 2006. 
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looked different in the recent past.  Nancy Abelmann describes the 
pathological view from the 1990s: 
 
Many people distance themselves not only from the military 
authoritarianism of the recent past, but also from the righteousness of 
drama and dissent—from the totalizing projects of both the left and the 
right…People remember when urban spaces were consumed by the 
violence of demonstrations and their suppression; when the 
government demanded sacrifice and restraint in the name of political 
stability, economic development, and nationalisms; and when the moral 
prerogatives of the left made those with progressive inclinations feel 
guilty that they couldn’t do more.  Thus, the culture of 1980s dissent is 
portrayed not for its progressive teleology but rather as a window on the 
pathological political and social character of the times (original 
emphasis1997a:250-251). 
 
Laura Nelson (2000) similarly argues that the hope and anticipation which past 
practices of personal and national sacrifice entailed were confronted after the 
1990s with a great deal more ambivalence.  Subsequent studies of military 
authoritarianism and minjung activism similarly foregrounded ambivalence 
(e,g., Lee N.H. 2007, 2009).   
 
In the wake of Roh Moo Hyun-led governmental inquiries into previous 
governmental abuses, some historians and social scientists more openly took 
up the ambivalent and complicit support citizens gave to Park Chung Hee 
under the banner of “mass dictatorship” studies (e.g. Lee N.H. 2009).  This 
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school, undertaken by scholars of European history—particularly fascism and 
post-1956 authoritarianism in Eastern Europe—have sparked debates by 
“asking questions that are politically and morally uncomfortable to many—and 
difficult to answer—such as whether ordinary Koreans supported or resisted 
the Park Chung Hee regime” (Lee N.H. 2009:42).  These studies complicate 
coercion and consent to reveal uncomfortable complicity just as Jesook Song 
(2009) does in her discussion of liberal activists’ unwitting support for 
neoliberal welfare policies in the wake of the 1990s financial crisis.   
 
The NGO and non-profit workers that are the subjects of this dissertation 
faced a variety of double binds.  Many were wrestling with the entanglements 
of sacrifice in dictatorship and anti-dictatorship movement contexts.  After the 
pathological reckonings of the 1990s (e.g., Abelmann 1997a; Chang 1999; 
Cho 2000), many former student activists and committed NGO and NPO 
workers were “designating their own sacrifice, even while opposing the 
sacrifice of others” (Redfield 2008:197).  Many informants, as I discuss in the 
chapter, approached sacrifice with a great deal of post-utopian humor 
(Tanuma 2007).  Sacrifice was a necessary demonstration of commitment, 
which contained ambivalence with the past, at the same time it was hope for a 
better future. 
 
Human Resources  
In the 2000s, NGOs and non-profits faced were accused of being part of the 
“citizens’ movement without citizens9 (simin eomneun simin undong)” as their 
                                                          
9
 While simin is conventionally understood and translated as citizen, its Chinese root literally 
means “city person.”  There is a long history and large discourse on city-countryside 
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membership numbers dropped and organizations had trouble retaining staff.  
Professor Lim, a long-time NGO supporter working at a government think tank, 
concisely summarized over tea the four main problems NGOs and NPOs 
faced in the mid-2000s: 1) shrinking support among the general population 
and media, 2) lack of long-term strategy, 3) lack of long-term staff and 
declining interest among young people to work for NGOs, and 4) the conflict of 
interest that comes from accepting government and business funds due to 
declining numbers of dues-paying members.  Professor Lim sat on the boards 
of two major NGOs and used examples from each organization to support 
these points.  One of the largest environmental NGOs in the country, for 
example, had lost over 10 percent of its members over the last five years and 
just a couple years later had to delay paying staff salaries due to lack of 
funds10.  
 
By 2006, these “inside problems” were part of the “citizen movement 
reproduction crisis (simin undong jaesaengsan wigi)” announced on the front 
page of the The Corean11 NGO Times (Siminui Sinmun), a weekly newspaper 
with wide circulation and readership inside NGOs.  In particular, a study 
conducted by the Korea Green Foundation (Hwangyeong Jaedan) that year 
found a wide gap between what NGO staffers wanted and what their group 
was providing in terms of training (yeonsu), education (gyoyuk), and support 
                                                                                                                                                                       
distinctions (e.g. Abelmann 1996) and within NGOs a focus on “decentralization (jiyeokjuui)” 
away from Seoul (e.g. Cho 2005; Oppenheim 2008). 
10
 Interview with author on July 20, 2004. 
11
 This Romanization signals an ongoing movement to change the spelling from Korea to 
Corea, which is closer to how it appears in other languages (e.g. French).  Many Koreans over 
the years have told me that Corea is 1) closer to Hangeul and/or 2) was the more common 
Romanization before the Japanese colonized. One persistent story is that Japanese officials 
changed the Romanization from Corea to Korea so that it would follow rather than precede 
Japan alphabetically.    
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(jiwon).  The study concluded that staff desire for education and the 
organizational support for such education were two very separate things (ttaro 
ttaro).  For example, the majority of the 246 respondents preferred on- the-job 
training, foreign travel, language study, and non-degree intensive education 
on legal, budgetary, and policy-making processes while NGOs prioritized 
leadership, general movement history, and theory training (Jeong 2006).  This 
gap between staff and management preferences presents another reason for 
the growth of university-based NGO Studies programs. 
 
Many staffers used stark terms and dark humor to capture the demands of 
NGO and non-profit work.  I approach these statements as an example of the 
kind of “post-utopian” ironic humor Sachiko Tanuma (2007) describes in Cuba.  
One self-described activist who had worked for many years inside NGOs 
matter-of-factly stated, “[we] leave our human rights (in-gwon) at the door12.”  I 
heard many staffers joke about their health and morbidity being worse than 
that of the much-pitied salarymen (saelleorimaen) of the 1990s (Lee J.J.H. 
2002).  One organization manager surmised, “[We] work longer, drink more, 
and smoke more than [salarymen].”  He went on to speculate that “[activists] 
have a lower life expectancy than just about anyone else13.”  Like many 
veteran activists, he smoked and drank most nights after work.  After the birth 
of his son, he resolved to quit smoking along with several of his colleagues, 
but I observed many such pacts break down for one work-related reason or 
another.  One staffer enthusiastically shared her new year’s resolution to go 
swimming everyday during her lunch break.  She had calculated that this 
would allow for slightly more sleep time because she would shower at the pool 
                                                          
12
 Interview with author on January 5, 2007. 
13
 Personal conversation with author on October 27, 2005.  
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rather than at home before coming to work.  Yet just a month later, she 
reflected that she had only been to the pool once or twice in the past two 
weeks because they had an urgent deadline to meet.  Another staffer 
reasoned that he could quit smoking for good by joining a scuba-diving club.  
The club instructor, a member of his NGO, offered a big discount to any 
staffers who wanted to learn.  Yet after the first dive many staffers said they 
doubted they would return because it required a commute and long weekends 
were rare.   
 
While vacation days were available, they had to be negotiated ahead of time 
and were often discouraged during particularly busy times of the year, which 
was when many staffers said they most needed days off.  The staffer who 
wanted to scuba dive, for example, asked the secretary-general for a couple 
days off and was told to either take them at the end of the summer or during 
the winter, which were the least busy times of year.  The implication was that 
other times may not be approved.  The secretary-general rarely took vacation 
time; in fact, he was looking forward to a rare camping trip with his son late 
that summer. 
 
The larger NGOs and NPOs I worked with had vacation policies on par with or 
better than company policies. In fact, many staffers said that was a major part 
of why they had decided to work for these organizations.  One to two flex days 
per month adding up to between 15 and 20 days per year (7 days at a time) 
were standard for new hires in the better funded organizations.  After three 
years, these groups typically offered paid breaks (hyusik) for one to two 
months, up to 6 months after 5 years, and up to a year after 7 years.  While 
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these options were officially available, younger staffers often only took 
advantage of the policy if the secretary-general and mid-level leaders took 
advantage of it.  One chastened staffer explained how the group he had 
previously worked for had a great vacation policy, but hardly anyone took 
advantage of it because senior staffers did not.  He recalled how one leader 
was held up as a model for sleeping in his car many nights after long days of 
work and long nights of drinking.  Another mid-level staffer matter-of-factly said 
that even if NGOs and NPOs dramatically increased the number of vacation 
days available and tried to strictly adhere to a five-day work week, the “best 
activists” would still come in on weekends and rarely take days off.  Time in 
the office, both during regular business hours and otherwise, was often taken 
as a measure of commitment.   
 
While senior staff often put implicit and explicit pressure on juniors to 
demonstrate commitment and sacrifice, they proudly praised their staff on the 
same counts to me. An activist from the 1970s who was leading a non-profit 
called the student movement the “reserve army14” of contemporary NGOs and 
NPOs.  Where else, he wondered, could groups find “committed activists 
(undongga) willing to sacrifice (huisaeng) wealth and other things for the sake 
of the movement15 and the nation?”  He had just finished recounting with pride 
how his staff refused a salary increase so as not to cheapen their 
“commitment to social welfare.”  Another secretary-general called activists “the 
three percent salt” (sampeuro sogeum) of society, which he described as “the 
                                                          
14
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
15
 Movement in this statement was a broad term encompassing the citizens (simin), mass 
people (minjung) movements as well as other historical movements such as Eastern Learning 
(Donghak) and Practical Study (Sirhak). 
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few who worked hard and sacrificed for the sake of preserving the whole16.”  
He said this just before telling me how much he enjoyed speaking at 
universities so as to encourage the next generation of activists.  
 
The view was different among mid-level managers, who addressed the same 
set of problems within a more pragmatic, organizational view (e.g. Yarrow 
2005).  One mid-level policy director who took a break from work to write a 
master’s thesis on NGO human resource challenges confided during a long 
interview that there was a “health crisis (geon-gang wigi).”  He claimed to have 
done the first comprehensive human resource (injeok jawon)-focused study of 
citizens’ movement organizations with a survey of almost 1,500 employees 
from over 120 organizations.  Yun Sun-chul (2003) found glaring deficiencies 
in human resource investment.  NGOs and NPOs, for example, invest on 
average one-fifth of the amount their private sector counterparts do in 
education and training for their employees (Yun 2003:119).  They also pay on 
average 40 percent less than their corporate counterparts—about 896,000 
won per month when the average family of four in Seoul required about 
2,900,000 won per month (Rho 2007; Yun 2003:73).  In contrast to other 
places where NGOs have flourished (Riles 2000; Yarrow 2005), the salary, 
benefits, and general status of NGO and non-profit work is low in South Korea. 
 
Yun also found that only about 55 percent of NGOs or NPOs provide health 
insurance while the average staffer works 49 hours per week (2003:93,101).  
He cited these as reasons for the increasing turnover rate among workers in 
NGOs and non-profits: it was 18 percent in 2001 and jumped up to 24 percent 
                                                          
16
 Interview with the author on October 13, 2006. 
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in 2002 at a time when the national rate was 2.4 percent (Yun 2003:89).  One 
secretary-general lamented a 30 percent turnover among his staff in 2006.   
 
Many veteran staffers were troubled by this trend, particularly in a post-
financial crisis competitive labor market.  One staffer pointed out that he could 
not sustain an informal network among organization and planning leaders—
those in charge of human resources for NGOs—because even those people 
switched around too much17.  Yun concluded that NGOs and NPOs ignore 
these “inside problems” at their own peril and that “human resource 
development” is the most important factor for their future survival 
(2003:71,129).  Several other mid-level leaders shared similar concerns and 
new hires openly criticized inadequate or non-existent organizational training 
and support.  A group of new hires at one non-profit said that it was their first 
job out of university and that they were going to request training after receiving 
none until they met colleagues at other organizations and realized that no one 
was happy with their training18. 
 
Many occupying department and team leader (gukjang, timjang) positions 
quietly sacrificed.  These mid-level workers described themselves as 
Department Leader Jeong did in the previous chapter: as a “sandwich 
generation.”  They had to meet the often times uncompromising directives and 
deadlines they received from above while buffering their inexperienced juniors 
from much of the stress.  One department leader regularly socialized with and 
yet complained about her seniors and her juniors.  In one case she had to act 
as mediator after a junior posted an offensive comment on the NGO’s intraweb 
                                                          
17
 Interview with the author on February 9, 2006. 
18
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
 115 
about a senior; she said that she could not understand either completely but 
was the only one who could talk with both of them about it. 
 
One team leader who had worked for four years in NGOs and non-profits 
sketched the problem for me one day over coffee.  He drew an upside down 
bell curve and labeled the lowest point those who had worked between three 
and five years.  These mid-level staffers, he continued, received the least 
support and had the most expected of them.  An increasing number of them 
were pursuing academic degrees or other professional development options 
funded by government and/or private industry scholarships.  The activist who 
drew the upside bell curve, for example, was about to begin a peace studies 
degree in Japan.  A secretary-general referenced this trend as part of the 
reason why he refused to write a recommendation for an activist who by all 
accounts he adored.  He worried that such an opportunity would make the 
activist’s return unlikely, which historical precedence backed up.  At least two 
other beloved activists at this NGO had undertaken overseas studies in the 
past and neither returned to full-time work.   
 
The overseas study opportunity that the activist tried to apply for in 2006 was a 
new program available to mid-level NGO and NPO workers in South Korea to 
get full funding to spend a year studying at one of five preeminent universities 
in North America.  This opportunity, as one of the program initiators admitted, 
was one of the few viable and respectable opportunities available to such 
workers to support their professional development and provide some much 
needed refreshment.  Only workers who had at least three years of experience 
were eligible for the fellowship.  These workers, it was widely acknowledged, 
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were the ones who needed the professional respite and development the most.  
Most organizations, as previously discussed, only permitted a similar 
sabbatical (ansingnyeon) after seven years of service if seniors also did so.  
 
Another common path of professional respite and development was to pursue 
a graduate degree inside Korea.  The growing field of NGO Studies provided a 
viable university path along with a handful of government-funded or private 
industry think tanks.  The activist who conducted the human resource study 
cited at the beginning of this chapter was on sabbatical pursuing a master’s 
degree at the largest government-funded economic think tank.  Another 
activist and graduate of the first NGO Studies program in Korea who stayed on 
as an administrative assistant in the program matter-of-factly said that most of 
her colleagues entered the program to take a break and gain some new 
perspective on their work.  She said that both the people and the work had 
become exhausted in many cases.  They needed “refreshment” and a way “to 
get new perspective on their work19.”  For her this came from the mental and 
physical exhaustion of “one working as one hundred (ildangbaek),” which I will 
take up later in this chapter.  Before doing so I wish to describe in more detail 
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Illustration 2.2: Green Korea’s Office  
 
A Weekend at the Office 
“You’re a general hospital (jonghap byeongwon),” was the quip tossed at 
Department Leader Lee (Lee Gukjangnim) by one of her closest friends and 
seniors (seonbae) at Green Korea.  She was blowing off steam to a couple of 
colleagues about neck pain and hair loss over some tea on a Saturday 
afternoon at the office.  Editor Kim, the main editor of Green Korea’s monthly 
magazine Small is Beautiful (Jageun geosi areumdapda), delivered the joke 
with a disdainful tone to elicit laughter while not betraying care.  I had heard 
the tone before when close friends would needle one another about gaining 
weight or looking tired.  The joke instantly diffused a heavy moment and 
effectively circumscribed the space of complaint.     
 
The four of us cleared off the table on the third floor of Green Korea’s cramped 
magazine office and environmental litigation center.  Department Leader 
Jeong (Jeong Gukjangnim), the head of Green Korea’s citizen participation 
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department, had folded herself comfortably between the wood table and a 
couple stacks of books.  She was using the books as a backrest while teasing 
Department Leader Lee about how she was the youngest among them, yet 
had the most health problems.  The three of them had shared a trip to a 
nearby Korean traditional doctor (hanuiwon) that morning and then returned to 
the office to work.   
 
We all sat down for some mid-afternoon tea after I fetched some fruit from the 
market down the street.  Green Korea’s office was empty except for the four of 
us, which was rare on a Saturday.  Editor Kim was working around the clock 
as she often did ahead of the magazine’s monthly deadline.  She had slept a 
couple hours the night before in a sleeping bag near her desk.  Since 
Department Leader Jeong and Lee both lived near the office, all three of them 
had decided to go to the doctor that morning.  They reasoned that it would be 
cheaper that way.   
 
Editor Kim suffered from chronic back pain and noticed a spike in her weight 
while Department Leader Jeong was concerned about recent irregularities with 
her digestion.  All three of them had severe vision problems and at one time or 
another suffered from neck or wrist pain.  They were all under the age of 35, 
unmarried at the time, and worked around 12 hours a day six days a week—
much of it in front of a computer.  This work schedule was typical among mid-
level leaders, particularly those who had worked for the same group for at 
least three years.   
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Department Leader Lee’s neck pain had gotten so bad recently that it affected 
her sleep and she had become increasingly self-conscious as she lost hair.  
She was peeling an apple and recounting this when she suddenly put the 
apple down mid-peel, lifted up her hair, and leaned into Department Leader 
Jeong asking if she could tell how thin her hair had become.  Both her and 
Editor Kim took a close look and agreed that it was bad, “especially for a 
woman your age.”  With this, Department Leader Lee picked up the powder 
and special shampoo she had bought from the doctor and pleaded, “You must 
work!”  Then she mumbled something about how much the shampoo cost and 
grunted in pain as she shifted her weight.  Editor Kim’s “general hospital” 
comment instantly lightened the mood. Department Leader Jeong mockingly 
consoled Department Leader Lee with the knowledge that she had the worst 
lot among them that day.  A few minutes later we cleaned up the table and got 
back to work.  
        
When Editor Kim was pushing to meet a deadline, Department Leaders Jeong 
and Lee would often stay late so they could all go out for drinks.  That 
Saturday, they did stay late, but only out of exhaustion.  We ordered dinner in 
and everyone ended up sleeping at the office.  Sleeping bags, mats, and 
blankets stored in Green Korea’s office for camping trips often doubled as 
sleeping accommodations.  These items were necessary work implements 
during the winter with very little heat and still necessary during long summer 
nights with open windows.  We made some breakfast in the office kitchen on 
Sunday, worked some more and went out for dinner and drinks early that 
evening.  As a couple packs of cigarettes and lighters made their way around 
the table, health problems seemed to vanish.  Conversation turned to co-
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workers, upcoming campaigns, and family stress as the drinks flowed and 
smoke danced around us.  Editor Kim returned to the office by 7 for another 
night of work.  Department Leaders Jeong and Lee went home to sleep.  By 8 
the next morning, we were all back at the office to start another week with the 
routine office cleaning and staff meeting.  Editor Kim reported meeting her 
deadline while Department Leader Jeong covered for a junior who had to 
travel out of town for a sudden family emergency. 
 
Green Korea’s office enabled staff to be better “models” of Green living, which 
entailed sacrificing the comforts of air-conditioning, central heat, and prime 
downtown location.  The home office also enabled staffers to be more 
comfortable while sacrificing by providing space for cooking, sleeping, and 
gathering.  During this time, Green Korea promoted wearing warm 
undergarments rather than using heat in the winter, opening windows and 
using handkerchiefs rather than air-conditioning in the summer, and using 
more energy-efficient lighting in addition to their long-standing support for 
organic farming.  Department Leader Lee added No Paper Day and Buy 
Nothing Day campaigns to Green Korea’s proliferating lifestyle campaigns 
(saenghwal kaempein). This indexed a wider shift in activist strategy and scale, 
which I take up in the next chapter, from ideological concerns with systems to 
discursive concerns with lifestyle (e.g. Cho 2005). 
 
One Working as if One Hundred 
Health problems were a ready topic, but they never consumed conversation.  
Conversation over dinner and drinks on Sunday, for example, was more about 
relationships with colleagues and family.  On occasions such as these, senior 
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staffers sized up the work of their juniors.  It was not uncommon to hear 
negative assessments about staffers who showed up late, left early, took a lot 
of days off, rarely participated in social gatherings, or took on part-time jobs 
just for money.  The refusal to do a small favor such as loaning a camera or 
proofing someone’s press release on time would raise hackles.  In one case 
an otherwise hard-working staffer was criticized for leaving the office exactly 
on time everyday and never coming in on weekends.   
 
Senior staffers often spoke of tremendous pressure to work harder and do 
more.  Once someone got comfortable and adept in their job, for example, 
they would often be reassigned to a different department.  This proved 
especially trying for young staffers, who often got no say in their assignments.  
Yet the strain lessened with seniority when staffers chose whether or not to 
stay in the same job from year-to-year or shift to a different position.  Typically, 
groupwide reorganization (gaepyeon) took place at the end of every calendar 
year to coincide with yearly evaluations and board meetings.   
 
At the end of 2006, for example, when Green Korea was going through a 
routine reorganization a well liked staffer who had been there just one year 
lobbied to keep her position, but was refused.  Activist Choi, the young staffer 
discussed in the previous chapter, found it impractical to expect staffers to 
adjust to and learn about a whole new job in only a month.  When she shared 
her concerns with seniors, they assured her that it is possible and would be 
good for her and Green Korea in the long run.  Over the next few months she 
put in extremely long hours and spent many nights at the office (see last 
section of this chapter).  As she gained more respect from seniors for her long 
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hours and good work, I asked her how she was doing.  She spoke of gaining 
more confidence in her work, but losing it at home.  She was the eldest of four 
children and both of her parents had worsening health problems.  While she 
spoke of tremendous guilt at not being able to contribute more to her family’s 
finances, she also said that her sister had recently shared her wish to marry.  
This put even more pressure on her as the eldest unmarried daughter so she 
often avoided going home.  The many nights she spent working in the home 
office were a reprieve from home.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
double bind of family and work carried the potential for anxiety and creativity. 
 
The double bind was particularly evident among mid-level staffers:  
 
Department Leader Kwon (Kwon Gukjangnim)20 had experience in 
both NGOs and NPOs because he followed the moves of his boss, 
Lawyer Park (see Chapter 4), in going from legal and economic reform 
advocacy to social welfare and philanthropy.  When we met in 2006 he 
was volunteering only a couple days each week at the Beautiful 
Foundation as he prepared to pursue graduate study.  Kwon was 
gathering information and weighing his options.  He just missed the 
work experience requirement for a fellowship in the U.S. and was 
searching for other government-sponsored scholarships to overseas 
universities.  In the end, he moved to Japan to pursue a degree in 
peace studies.  In the middle of his degree program he received terrible 
news that his mother suddenly died of a heart attack.  He returned 
home immediately and eventually dropped out of the program in order 
                                                          
20
 Interviews with author on October 12, 2006 and January 6, 2008. 
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to take care of his father full-time.  When we met the next year he had 
taken a temporary position at his boss’s new think tank so that he could 
stay close to his family.  Although he was not the eldest child or the only 
son, he often spoke of the obligation to earn more money and stay in 
Seoul.   
 
Activist Kim (Kim Undongga)21, a former student movement activist, 
had held several NGO positions and loved doing direct action 
campaigns.  She had passed on several overseas opportunities and 
personal relationships to stay close with her single mother.  When we 
met, she had been settled for a couple years as an administrative 
assistant in a NGO Studies program.  This job provided the stability and 
flexibility she needed in taking care of her mother while still being able 
to organize the kinds of activist campaigns she loved (see later this 
chapter).  On several occasions, however, she expressed 
dissatisfaction with her life and often questioned her decisions—in 
particular not being married.   
 
Department Leader Lee (Lee Gukjangnim)22, who I discussed in the 
last chapter and in this chapter as the “general hospital,” faced similar 
difficult decisions.  One decision in particular brought into stark relief the 
double bind of movement families and blood families.  After building an 
impressive portfolio at Green Korea and collaborating at UN and other 
Green Growth forums around the world with various government 
ministries, she was offered a lucrative mid-level government post 
                                                          
21
 Interview with author on March 31, 2007. 
22
 Personal conversations with author on March 5, 2007, April 17, 2007, and July 26, 2007. 
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managing her own team and advising various cabinet members on 
international climate change issues.  She was thrilled to share the news 
with her retired parents, particularly as the eldest child who up until then 
had provided little financial support to her parents.  This burden fell to 
her younger brother, who was excited about the prospect of having 
some of the burden lifted from him.  Lee’s parents refused to tell her 
what to do and insisted that she do what is best for her, but she could 
sense their excitement boiling over.  When she asked her senior Green 
Korea colleagues for advice, she was shocked to hear many of them 
urge her to refuse the job.  They pointed out that it was the end of Roh 
Moo Hyun’s term and that a conservative was likely to be elected, 
which may radically change her job.  One of Lee’s closest friends and 
seniors told her that if she took the government job that she should not 
bother to talk to her again.  Lee was surprised and repeated what her 
senior told her to me, “If you do it, we are not friends.”  She reached out 
to other former NGO workers who had taken government posts.  One of 
those people strongly urged her to refuse it saying that the timing 
almost between administrations made it too unstable.  In the end she 
refused the government job offer and continued working at Green 
Korea while pursuing her Ph.D. in environmental studies.  She later told 
me that her parents regretted her decision, particularly when the 
economy worsened, and that made her question it.  She did not rule out 
the possibility of taking a government post or running for office in the 




Lee’s former boss at Green Korea also flirted with political party work: 
 
Secretary-General Lim (Lim Samucheojangnim) was a devout 
Christian who prayed before every meal.  He was married to a relative 
of Chon Tae-il, the labor activist whose suicide protest is widely 
credited with sparking the modern labor movement in South Korea.  Yet 
Lim rarely volunteered this—mostly because he didn’t have to—as he 
was a leader of the environmental movement in his own regard.  Mr. 
Lim served as secretary-general of Green Korea for a short time before 
he decided to devote himself full-time to the effort of launching a Green 
Party in 2005.  He conceived of the local problem for environmentalists 
in Seoul to be that few residents regarded the city as their “hometown” 
(gohyang), which accounted for the troubling lack of stewardship and 
community.  At the moment he said this, Lim picked up some trash off 
the ground and shook his head.  He said there were better conditions in 
other countries where people made a home wherever they happened to 
be.  Lim lamented what he saw as the “limited” lineage-oriented view of 
hometown which still pervaded “Korean thinking23.”  Soon after the 
Green Party folded, he also lamented the regionalism (jibangjuui) rather 
than ideology (idiollogi) defining Korean political parties24.   
 
Mr. Lim’s critiques of the Korean conception of hometown and politics are 
emblematic of many I heard inside NGOs and NPOs.  There was a 
widespread critique, particularly among former student movement activists, of 
the narrow definition of family and home operating in mainstream South Korea.  
                                                          
23
 Personal conversation with author on July 13, 2001. 
24
 Personal conversation with author on June 1, 2002. 
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In fact, many friends inside these organizations were concerned I was getting 
a skewed view on these issues by only speaking with them.  Several staffers 
encouraged me to get a wider sample if I wanted to capture “common Korean 
attitudes.”  Ideology, a commitment to people and ideas outside of 
conventional filiation and affiliation, and sacrifice, the demonstration of that 
commitment, often worked as kinship by other means.   
 
One prominent civil leader chuckled as he recalled his mother warning him to 
never go in public where more than three people gathered.  This, he pointed 
out, was how little people trusted and associated with those outside their 
family.  He classified his activism as an effort to overcome this narrow 
definition of family.  The founder of a large NGO reminisced about how much 
his parents wanted him to be a lawyer.  He slyly smiled as he reflected how 
similar his current human rights activism is to practicing law, but maintained 
that law is too “specialized (jeonmunjeok)”.  Being an activist, he asserted, 
allows you to sustain many different interests if only through having to work at 
many different jobs within one group.  Activists had to be confident multi-
taskers—the kind of worker who could ably assume any job in the organization 
just as someone may announce that s/he can eat all of the various dishes set 
on a crowded table.  A colleague of his explained that activists are literally 
“one person doing the work of one hundred (ildangbaek)25,” which is part of 
why it was so difficult for family and friends to understand why they work so 
hard for such little pay.  She and another colleague joked one night as we 
were running late to one of their childhood friend’s birthday celebrations that 
                                                          
25
 Interview with author on March 31, 2007. 
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they wished there were an “NGO restaurant (NGO sikdang)” where staffers 
could arrive at any hour of the night with impunity.   
 
Gift-giving was a constant source of stress for many staffers, who often only 
survived on their low wages with considerable support from family and friends.  
I observed occasions when staffers would lie to a childhood friend about being 
sick in order to buy some time to scrounge money for a gift.  Many of them 
borrowed money, particularly toward the end of the month, from family 
members or more financially stable friends to make ends meet.  One civil 
leader recounted the compromise he made with his family to work as a 
pharmaceutical salesman in order to increase savings while his wife was 
pregnant.  Once their son was born, however, he went back to full-time work at 
a NGO.  The birth of a son assuaged family members for the most part, 
though he still heard insults about his job from time-to-time.  The senior 
planning leader at a NGO matter-of-factly asserted that the average length of 
employment for men in NGOs was two years.  The reason, he said, was that 
men face strong pressure to be the major breadwinners for their family and so 
most could not afford to work for very long unless their partners or families 
provided significant financial support (see also Yun 2003).  I observed the 
webmaster of one NGO begrudgingly quit when his wife lost her better-paying 
job.  Other staffers took on multiple part-time jobs (areubaiteu) to make ends 
meet and continue working.  This was another sense in which activists were 
“one doing the work of one hundred (ildangbaek).”   
 
The former student activist who used the term ildangbaek to describe the 
predicament of NGO and NPO workers delivered it as a tongue-in-cheek 
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judgment about why many of them get burned out and needed to take better 
care of their bodies.  She had just come from a four-day hunger strike to 
protest the free trade agreement being negotiated between South Korea and 
the U.S.  For her, ildangbaek highlighted how undersupported and 
underappreciated activists (hwaltongga) were despite their successes and 
skills (see Chapter 3 for discussion of job titles).  She mentioned the large 
protests that had taken place in Hong Kong a couple years before to protest 
trade laws as an example of a successful and skillful mobilization. Activists, 
she said, work “for little result” and often get “exhausted.”  Ildangbaek literally 
means “one versus one hundred” and implies one person overcoming an army, 
but it has come to be an analogy of “one doing the work of one hundred” in 
various situations where someone has to do many different things at once and 
do them quickly despite obvious constraints.  NGO and NPO workers, in other 
words, must be super-individual human resources overcoming physical, 
financial, and organizational constraints.  She likened it to being a doctor in an 
emergency room.    
 
Like a doctor in an emergency room, an activist feels compelled to act and to 
do so quickly despite her own limits of knowledge and resources.  Yet unlike 
doctors, activists often received little training, support, or reward for their work.  
Many described being “sandwiched” or “in the middle” of competing 
constituencies and demands not unlike women in patrilineal contexts (e.g., 
Strathern 1972).  Not coincidentally, many mid-level staffers were women.   
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One prominent social movement analyst matter-of-factly told me that activists 
and now NGO workers “mediate between theorists and citizens26.”  Their 
position is perhaps more akin to that of nurses who mediate between doctors, 
patients, and hospital administration in urgent, understaffed, and underfunded 
situations (Langwick 2008).  Like nurses, NGO workers were often called upon 
to work despite and because of the constraints.  “The challenge,” of activism in 
a double bind as Kim Fortun writes, “is to figure out how and when to respond, 
using whatever resources are available, however imperfect or insufficient” 
(2001:31).  Annual reorganization (gaepyeon) kept this challenge proximate 
for many activists as did the recurring aches and pains.   
 
The exemplary staffers were those who found ways to work and contribute to 
the organization despite the challenges; they resisted or warded off the 
pathologies of double binds (Bateson 1958; Traweek 1988).  Activist Choi, for 
example, who resisted changing jobs and felt increasing pressure from her 
family to marry excelled as she channeled anxieties from home into becoming 
the point person for a major wildlife protection project along with a trusted 
colleague in the office.  Department Leader Lee, the so-called “general 
hospital,” was voted best activist by her colleagues on more than one occasion 
for organizing innovative Buy Nothing Day and No Paper Day campaigns, 
starting an informal fundraising network to support like-minded NGOs in 
Southeast Asia, and starting an advanced degree in public policy while being 
the point person on U.S. military base issues.   
 
                                                          
26
 Interview with author on November 19, 2006. 
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Like individuals staffers, organizations as a whole worked on a wide variety of 
campaigns and issues.  There was a similarity in scale between workers and 
organizations in terms of the number of campaigns or projects they juggled at 
any one time.  Green Korea, for example, was explicitly environmental yet 
within this field had departments and/or campaigns devoted to wildlife 
conservation, cleanup of U.S. military bases, green transportation, anti-nuclear 
energy, anti-GMOs, and a variety of environmental litigation. One staffer later 
explained that “South Korea does not have the philanthropic foundations and 
social donation options that groups in other places have, so [NGOs] must 
appeal to more people through diverse campaigns.”  Another staffer added, 
“Maybe someone doesn’t care about stopping the Saemangeum reclamation, 
but they do care about U.S. bases…we would lose their donation if we did not 
do both27.”  The coordinator (gansa) of an NPO offering public interest lawyers 
similarly explained the approach in terms of pragmatic probabilities.  She said 
that working on a wide range of issues was necessary, especially for newly-
launched non-profits, because they had to appeal to the most number of 
potential donors.  Despite rhetoric to the contrary28, I encountered department 
store (baekhwajeomsik)-like organizational tendencies in NGOs and non-
profits in the mid-2000s. 
 
Green is Life 
At Green Korea’s annual fundraising event in 2005, some new staff put 
together a comical video to show the importance of getting out and enjoying a 
“green” (noksaek) life.  Green Korea’s theme that year was “green is life 
                                                          
27
 Personal conversation on September 16, 2005. 
28
 Activists at various levels said that NGOs were moving away from the department store 
style (baekhwajeomsik) of the 1990s; interviews on November 22, 2005, March 31, 2007. 
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(noksaegeun saenghwalida).”  Green was often portrayed as a lifestyle 
(saenghwal)—how people lived everyday through their work and leisure 
practices as well as their consumption habits rather than being a movement, 
political party, or ideology.  The acknowledged architect of the video was 
Activist Choi.  She and a handful of other young staffers got together late one 
night in the office to make the video.  Like many nights, she said, they were 
having trouble sleeping and so stayed up late joking around and writing a 
script.  Activist Choi said she wished they could have gone outside to shoot, 
but there was no time.  The video’s plot and its circumstances of production 
provide a gentle critique of the silent sacrifices many activists undertake and 
what else may count in living a “green life.” 
 
The video opens with a staffer working diligently at her desk.  Captions 
appeared alerting the audience to the passage of time:   
 
That night…  
Early the next morning… 
Next day… 
Next night… 
Two days later… 
Three days later…   
 
The only other mark of time is how the staffer appeared.  At first she looks 
calm and rested sipping tea.  Her hair is neat and her posture is tall.  By early 
the next morning, she is slouching with droopy eyes and messy hair.  The next 
day she has exaggerated dark circles under her eyes.  Three days later she 
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looks like a strung out addict and is shown picking fights with her colleagues.  
The video ends with her grabbing a large backpack from the office and telling 
people she needs to go hiking for a couple days.  Many of the staffers 
standing in the back of the crowded auditorium were smiling and some even 
applauded at the end.   
 
The video highlighted a frequently overlooked aspect of what makes a “green 
life:” leaving behind work when it is most stressful to get out and enjoy nature.  
This was particularly poignant for the environmental activists sacrificing for, yet 
rarely enjoying nature as a space in their everyday lives (saenghwal).  Similar 
to the activist leaving her own human rights at the door while advocating for 
others not to do so, this activist was sacrificing her own enjoyment of nature so 
that others could do so.  These activists, like the humanitarians Peter Redfield 
writes about, face the conundrum of “designating their own sacrifice, even 
while opposing the sacrifices of others” (2008:197). 
 
Just a month before this Green Korea fundraising event, I noticed how staffers 
were taking much less advantage of planned and socially-sanctioned group 
retreats generally known as “membership training (MT)” in South Korea (Lee 
2007; Ruhlen 2007).  Many staffers, particularly younger ones, used the 
opportunity to catch up on sleep rather than participate in outdoor activities.  
Activist Choi’s video suggested a more spontaneous enjoyment of nature.  As 
the lights came up after the video, the event emcee and secretary-general of 
Green Korea said “sometimes we all need to get back to nature (jayeon).”  
After more conversations with him, I came to see this statement as deeply 
personal.   
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During a rare quiet interview in his office, Secretary-General Choi (Choi  
Samucheojangnim) shared how stressed he had become since taking over 
secretary-general duties.  30 percent of the staff was new and half had been 
there less than two years. Fundraising was also tenuous in a slowed economy; 
Green Korea’s 2005 annual report pegged irregular membership donations the 
previous year to the sluggish economy.  Secretary-General Choi volunteered 
how he had lost four kilograms from stress and that he was the lowest weight 
he had been since he was a student.  This, Secretary-General Choi noted with 
a wry grin, means “I have been losing weight for 30 years29.”  
 
He shared some regrets about the sacrifices he had made with his family and 
some of the decisions he made as secretary-general (see also Lee 2002). Yet 
he remained “optimistic (nakgwanjeogin)” because nothing he faced at that 
moment was as difficult as going hungry as a child30.  He matter-of-factly 
shared this while turning away to look out the window. 
                                                          
29
 Interview with author on June 12, 2007. 
30
 Hunger, as Judith Farquhar writes about China, is often spoken of in the past tense in 
genres ranging from the historiography of Maoism to the consumerism and mass media of the 
1990s (2002:82).  In South Korea it is similarly recalled as a past condition of the colonial and 
Korean War periods (e.g. Kendall 1988) and often in contrast to the widespread consumption 
of the 1990s (Nelson 2000).  At the same time, South Koreans speak in the present tense 
about North Korea’s hunger and famine. So hunger and its widespread eradication in South 
Korea is an index of economic (capitalist) success at the same time it is nostalgia for a simpler, 
purer (past) South Korea often likened to (present) North Korea (Grinker 1998; Nelson 2000).  
Some former student activists, particularly those that subscribed to the National Liberation 
(NL) faction influenced by North Korea’s juche ideology during the 1980s, reported feelings of 
betrayal when the extent of North Korea’s famine came to light during the 1990s and 2000s.  
In personal conversations some activists cited this betrayal as the reason for some people’s 
dramatic shift to the conservative Hannara party and the growing strength of the “New Right” 
during the same period.  This sense of betrayal may help account for the embrace and 
complicity some 386 generation government bureaucrats and NGO workers, particularly 
during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, demonstrated toward neoliberal 
policies (Lee 2007; Song 2009). 
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Secretary-General Choi, like many other activist leaders I encountered, 
credited moments of extreme physical pain such as childhood hunger, military 
conscription, police torture, and prison terms with hope.  One leader, for 
example, would harken back to the nickname policemen gave him—“plastic 
man”—when he encountered financial or organizational constraints.  The 
nickname pointed to a tough yet flexible response to difficult times.  Other 
activist leaders would treat the lengths of their prison terms as expressions of 
their activist commitment.  On one occasion a young activist showed 
deference to an older one by pointing out how short and easy his few months 
in jail was compared to his senior’s ten-year term.  The same was true for 
military experiences.  Like their counterparts in business, activist leaders often 
shared painful memories and reminisced about common military experiences 
during late nights of drinking (Janelli 1993; Nelson 2000).  During one night of 
drinks, for example, several Green Korea staffers enjoyed introducing me to 
the “bomb cocktail (poktanju),” a drink said to originate in the military, which 
involves dropping a shot of whisky or soju (distilled alcohol made from sweet 
potatoes and other crops) into a glass of beer.  The shot is said to symbolize 
the exploder of a bomb (Kwon 2000:79).  They recalled songs they sang 
together and even the kinds of cigarettes they smoked while in the military. 
Secretary-General Choi  spoke of the extra punishment he endured as a 
known activist while carrying out his military duty—his books were routinely 
checked and confiscated and he was pulled away from duty every Sunday for 
questioning.  The masculinist and militaristic form of organizational life in 
South Korea has been well-documented (e.g. Jager 2003; Janelli 1993; Kwon 
2000; Moon 2005).  Jae Chung has referred to this as the “subjective space of 
the aggrieved Korean” (2009:53).  
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Secretary-General Choi worried that the sacrifices (huisaeng) former 
undonggwon and undongga (activists) like him became known and respected 
for had become nothing more than “symbols (sangjing)” used by politicians to 
advance their careers.  Secretary-General Choi was referring to the increasing 
numbers of former-student activists who were calling attention to their activist 
sacrifices as qualifications for parliamentary office.  Secretary-General Choi 
claimed that about half of the MPs serving in 2007 had spent some time in jail 
for pro-democracy activism.  He was concerned that many citizens would have 
trouble discerning political rhetoric about sacrifice from the sacrifices taking 
place inside NGOs.  Secretary-General Choi worried that if activists did not 
learn to change more quickly and comprehensively, then they risked becoming 
irrelevant.  He remarked, “If we don’t change then we will be replaced by 
politicians in ten years like what happened in Japan31.”     
 
Yet with donations decreasing in a strained economy, Secretary-General Choi 
resigned himself to “just being patient.”  He worried that many young hires 
“want to work for the environment, but are not willing to sacrifice a lot.”  They 
“want meaningful work and a better quality of life with more free time to enjoy 
it,” yet “do not know what must be sacrificed32” to achieve these things.  For 
him and many others, activism in general and environmentalism in particular 
required sustained sacrifice.  Sacrifice (huisaeng) in this view is what made life 
(saenghwal) green (noksaek).  
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 Interview with author on June 12, 2007. 
32
 All statements from an interview with author on June 12, 2007. 
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Department Leader Lee lamented the “childish” behavior of some new hires 
that showed up late and refused to work hard.  Yet she was committed to 
being a better senior (seonbae)—someone who she pointed out would 
sacrifice—for hard-working juniors (hubae).  In this spirit, she held several 
small study groups for staffers where they read and discussed books, posted 
encouraging messages on the group’s intrawebsite, and counseled staffers 
about work and personal problems.  She regularly dropped her own work if a 
colleague called for help no matter the time or circumstance.  “Being an 
activist (hwaldongga),” she reflected one day in the office, “means being a 
model of sacrifice (huisaengui mobeom)33.”  Sacrifice, as many stated and 
captured in dark humor, was a present reality and necessity for activists and 
NGO staff.  At the same time, it was an ambivalent inheritance from the past 




My intention in this chapter was to demonstrate that many NGO and NPO 
workers who struggled against the human and social sacrifices of the Park 
regime constituted a movement that necessitated many of the same sacrifices.  
Numerous staffers drew attention to the double binds of the past and the 
present.  Ideology, a commitment to people and ideas that are not related 
through blood, school, region or any other conventional linkage, and sacrifice, 
the demonstration of that commitment, often worked as kinship by other 
means, or affiliation, which at times conflicted with filiation.  Many NGO and 
NPO workers responded by working as “one doing the work of one hundred 
                                                          
33
 Personal conversation with the author on September 9, 2006. 
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(ildangbaek)” despite and because of the resource limits they faced.  The 
sacrifices they made with regard to family, wealth, and well-being were often 
quiet and unadorned.  Yet in times of crisis, as the mid-2000s were for many 
large NGOs and NPOs, mid-level and top staffers returned to crisis as an 






Chapter 3: Less than Theory, Smaller than Ideology 
 
Units and Scale of Analysis 
Studies of political processes have long been geographically-cum-morally 
spatialized between First World elite nationalism and Third World subaltern 
social movements.  Lila Abu-Lughod (1990) and Sherry Ortner (1995) have 
described what they term a posture of “romance” toward the latter while Iris 
Jean-Klein (2001) points up an inverse posture of “suspicion” where the former 
is concerned.  This “split posture” effectively deconstructs or takes apart First 
World elite nationalism while co-constructing or taking part in Third World 
subaltern movement nationalism (Jean-Klein 2001).   
 
Many Koreanists have described a similar dynamic whereby business and 
government elites are widely seen as perpetrating an oppressive nationalism 
while students, laborers, and the middle class participate in emancipatory 
social movements (e.g. Abelmann 1996; Eckert 1990; Grinker 1998).  
However, this dissertation has demonstrated the increasing number of critics 
who have revealed oppressive nationalist and colonialist practices inside 
social movements, which have disturbed this division over the last two 
decades (e.g. Cho 1994; Choi 1993; Kim 1997; Kwon 2000; Lee 2007).  
Michel Foucault‟s work has been a major catalyst in this critique. 
 
Moral privilege has given way to ambivalent complicity and self-recrimination 
such that Foucauldian examinations of the “fascism inside us” proliferated in 
major journals such as Dangdae Bipyeong (Contemporary Criticism) during 
the late 1990s.  Namhee Lee (2007) quotes Foucault in her description of how 
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the minjung movement replicated the power structures it aspired to overcome: 
“The major enemy, the strategic adversary,” Foucault writes of progressives, is 
“the fascism inside us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the 
fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates 
and exploits us” (1983:xiii quoted in Lee 2007:296).  Foucault‟s work helped 
reveal the impossibility of what Namhee Lee calls the “pure discourses of 
nonpower,” which is how many activists articulated their morally-privileged 
motivations, practices, and aspirations (2007:296).  At the same time, “the 
objects of dissent are more dispersed and the narratives and organization of 
the dissent are more fragmented” (Abelmann 1996:227).  Foucault‟s work, 
which has been earnestly consumed in South Korea since at least the 1990s, 
has inflected these shifting moral aesthetics of activism (Abelmann 1996; 
Lewis 2002; Oppenheim 2008; Song 2009).  His work has inflected the “social 
critique” which “has permeated the language of ordinary people” (Choi 
2009:215).  In this chapter, I approach the reception of Foucault‟s work in 
Korea as the starting point for an ethnography of damnon—a shared academic 
and activist artifact often translated as discourse.   
 
While in the field I was captured by damnon to such a degree that my advisor 
thought my field reports read more like discourse analysis than ethnography.  
This chapter is an attempt to ethnographically re-encounter damnon’s 
seductive pull.  Similar to how Annelise Riles (2000) recounts fieldwork in 
Fijian NGO offices channeling her attention to form, I found my attention drawn 
to discourse.  Damnon was not just a term of art or index of intellectual 
movement; rather, it was an everyday practical problem with an oftentimes 
insufficient solution.  While smaller in scope than ideology—often shaped to 
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reference everyday lifeworld and lifestyle (saenghwal) concerns rather than 
systemic concerns—it was also not quite theory.  In the words of one 
informant and friend, damnon is “less than theory, smaller than ideology1.” 
 
Nancy Abelmann (1996) situates her ethnography of a South Korean social 
movement in the new social movements (NSM) literature that had emerged in 
conversation with Foucault‟s work during the 1980s and 90s.  Foucault‟s 
approach to power has been central to this literature and many others that 
have responded to his work.  Abelmann interprets this approach to mean that 
power “operates not only by obvious repression or through visible institutions 
but also and even more effectively through the production of human 
subjectivities through the spaces and grammar of everyday life” (1996:3).  
Abelmann approaches social movements as discursive phenomena, which 
following Foucault‟s conception of discourses are “practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak” (1972:49 quoted in Abelmann 1996:3).  
To theorize social movements, therefore, is to theorize society.  Social 
movements, like popular media sources that have ascended in Korean Studies 
from the 1980s through the present, “tell us not so much what people do, but 
how they understand, articulate, and argue about social practice” (Kendall 
2002:5).  They insinuate a sense of subjectivity, in other words, which Laurel 
Kendall defines as “a condition whereby personal agency is both constituted 
and constrained by prior power relations, some of them global in scope, and is 
realized through social practice” (2002:15).   
 
                                                          
1
 Personal conversation with author on July 8, 2006. 
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Foucault‟s work introduced not only a conceptual vocabulary, but also affected 
an analytical scale change.  Just as subjectivity broadened the scope of 
personal agency, governmentality broadened the scope of state agency such 
that power operates at every level of scale.   
 
Jesook Song‟s recent study of (neo)liberal welfare policy during the Kim Dae 
Jung administration draws upon Foucauldian scholarship to argue for a broad 
and encompassing sense of power, governmentality and social engineering 
“which challenges the presumption of a solid line between the state and the 
society” (2009:13).  Her work is an effort “to explore the links between 
neoliberalism as a process of subjectification in daily practice and thinking and 
neoliberalism as a political-economic institutional regulation” (2009:138).  
Song presents this view from the inside out of GO and NGO social 
engineering projects, which is where she locates the negotiation of activist 
subjectivities.  Song shares a Foucauldian-inflected mourning of activist 
complicity and its fascism as the foundations of liberalism become every bit as 
contentious as those of neoliberalism.  Song, following Chungmoo Choi (1993), 
Cho Hae-joang (2000), Seungsook Moon (2002), and Namhee Lee (2007), 
continues an ongoing inside out feminist grappling with the successes and 
failures of intellectual-cum-activist resistance movements.  Foucault‟s work 
has been integral in these scholars‟ articulations of the changing and vexed 
self, group, movement, and national subjectivities emerging in the compressed 
shift from liberalism to neoliberalism taking place in South Korea.   
 
As discussed in the first chapter, Nancy Abelmann (1996, 1997a, 2003) has 
captured activists‟ changing subject positions and contingent life trajectories in 
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a sophisticated narrative-driven life history approach.  Her work demonstrates 
a less systematic, yet no less consequential practice than discourse—what 
she leaves at the level of narrative—to theorize these negotiations.  Robert 
Oppenheim (2003) draws upon Bruno Latour‟s and Anna Tsing‟s respective 
work to specify this sense of practice as a project that is subject to ongoing 
translations rather than a systematic discourse.  Oppenheim demonstrates the 
contingent processes of translation occurring at multiple levels of scale, which 
effectively captures the dynamic movement of projects “from asphalt to text” 
(2003:43).  While Oppenheim focuses on a paradigmatic “place of projects” in 
the Korean imaginary—Gyeongju—and argues for the necessity of going 
outside Seoul to observe how governance and activism unfold, I will attempt to 
demonstrate how these exceptional places are more mundane just as crisis is 
more mundane (e.g. Riles 2000; Yarrow 2005).   
 
Drawing ostensibly on Anna Tsing‟s (1997) work and implicitly on a great deal 
of science studies (e.g. Haraway 1997; Latour 1993), Timothy Choy defines 
project as a “unit of analysis smaller than discourse” which specifies “relatively 
coherent bundles of practices, rhetoric, and expressive forms in everyday life 
that in concert can become discourse” (2003:107).  The temporality of projects 
mirrors this relatively small and inchoate spatiality insofar as it is limited to a 
specific problem and moment (Riles 2010a). In this chapter I will juxtapose a 
government-led land reclamation project with a NGO-led Green Life project in 
an attempt to not only reveal a familiar entanglement between GO and NGO 
projects, but also to capture damnon in movement.  Before addressing either 
of these projects, however, I first attempt to capture another project shared by 
many activists across several groups who were trying to reassess job titles 
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and with that what it meant to call someone an activist (hwaldongga) 
compared to a coordinator (gansa). 
 
The space for what Iris Jean-Klein (2001) calls practice and Annmarie Mol 
(2002) calls enactment is often bookended as system and lifeworld following 
Habermas.  Alternatively, it has been reduced to representation, discourse, 
and ideology with little attention to how people relate to these concepts or how 
the concepts themselves are connected and separated.  In other words, there 
is a conceptual jump from “processes of knowing” to “objective reality” 
(Bateson 1958:281) at the same time there is an abdication of the analytical 
work to define key terms.  In particular, Iris Jean-Klein flags how ideology and 
discourse have become interchangeable—particularly in studies of 
nationalism— such that “neither concept is usually defined” (2001:116).  The 
aim of this chapter is to open up this space of definition as an experience of 
scale.  In particular, this chapter and the movement of the dissertation to this 
point attempts to enact how one key informant and friend tellingly described 
discourse (damnon) as “less than theory (iron), smaller than ideology 
(idieollogi).”  This description was a key ethnographic insight, which I attempt 
to unfold as part of a research design process (Faubion and Marcus 2009). 
 
Job Title Project 
One student and part-time research assistant who had never worked for 
NGOs or NPOs observed how people associated with such organizations 
often use language such as discourse (damnon) to “sound smart2.”  Another 
long-time staffer, Department Leader Lee, who frequently worried about the 
                                                          
2
 Personal conversation with author on September 17, 2005. 
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future of NGOs, said they had become “obsessed with damnon3.”  She said 
this at the time her boss, Secretary-General Choi, was attempting to launch 
his Green Life project, which coincided with NGOs‟ struggle over the 
government-led Saemangeum reclamation project.  Before discussing these 
two projects, however, it is necessary to discuss one of Department Leader 
Lee‟s projects.  I came to appreciate it as exemplary of many projects women 
activists were undertaking in an attempt to destabilize the everyday discursive 
space of NGOs (e.g. Ruhlen 2007; Song 2009).  Like many of her women 
colleagues, Lee conducted this project on her own time and during work time 
in an informal manner and on an ad hoc basis.  These projects often engaged 
problems that for one reason or another were not a priority for the organization, 
yet which were seen to define the moment (Riles 2010a).   
 
Department Leader Lee graduated from one of the most prestigious 
economics departments in Korea while writing for her university 
newspaper and traveling abroad to study English.  She found her way 
to Green Korea through seniors (seonbae) and quickly gained respect 
because of her hard work and big vision.  Lee envisioned combining 
economic and environmental studies in innovative ways to address 
eventual unification between North and South Korea. She pursued 
post-graduate studies in public policy and environmental studies at 
prestigious universities while maintaining at least a part-time position at 
Green Korea.  She was critical of her predecessors who left Green 
Korea after completing advanced degrees and turned down research 
opportunities abroad and mid-level government posts in order to 
                                                          
3
 Personal conversation with author on May 10, 2006. 
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continue her activist work.  While increasingly critical of NGO leadership 
and burned out by the long hours, she was also compelled to forego 
more lucrative opportunities because of her commitment to the issues 
and to her colleagues.  Some of her closest friends at Green Korea told 
her they would not talk to her again if she took a government job.  
Department Leader Lee cared deeply about her large network of friends, 
which enabled her to undertake projects such as Buy Nothing Day, No 
Paper Day, U.S. military base cleanup, green energy, and fundraising 
campaigns for other Asian NGOs. 
 
I first became aware of her job title project in 2001 when she was solely 
responsible for all of Green Korea‟s “international cooperation (gukje 
yeondae)” work.  One day during a routine email exchange with a colleague at 
an overseas NGO, she began wondering aloud if “coordinator (gansa)” 
sounded like an appropriate job title4.  During the bus ride home that night she 
continued sharing her concerns about the “inactive (bijeokgeukjeok)” 
implications of the gansa title.  The conventional English translation among 
those I worked with—coordinator5—bothered her more than the Korean did.  
She asked several questions trying to ascertain the precise uses of 
coordinator and kept coming back to activist (hwaldongga) as a preferable 
alternative.  She shared these concerns with colleagues over lunches and late 
night drinks.  Several of her closest friends shared similar concerns.  One 
colleague at another NGO who had worked for many years inside NGOs told 
me that she divides activists into two categories: sincere (jinsim) and career 
                                                          
4
 Personal conversation with author on July 6, 2001. 
5
 Gansa is also translated as administrator, manager, executive secretary, and managing 
treasurer in other academic, religious, and non-profit organizations. 
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(jigeop)6.  She hastened to add that Department Leader Lee was a sincere 
activist.  Different versions of this conversation were happening inside many 
citizens‟ groups during the time of my fieldwork.  When I circulated a 
preliminary version of a survey to several friends working in these groups, 
many of them encouraged me to add coordinator (gansa) to my list of activist 
(undongga/hwaldongga7), scholar (hakja), and specialist (jeonmunga).  They 
also thought I should ask people to identify themselves and were keenly 
interested in the results. 
 
The written survey I developed in close consultation with a handful of 
informants and friends was one of the few times many of them paused 
suspicions about my research methods.  Like many ethnographers working in 
quasi-research and research settings, I often received incredulous responses 
about my methodology or apparent lack thereof (e.g. Faubion and Marcus 
2009).  During one particularly failed exchange, a human rights lawyer and 
researcher politely asked, “How is that research8?”  Many of my informants 
were more experienced in social science research than I was.  Several had 
even done qualitative and quantitative kinds of fieldwork (hyeonjang josa) as 
part of their job duties.  One veteran activist who had just completed a 
master‟s degree in NGO Studies wondered what an American anthropologist 
could possibly do that Korean sociologists had not already done9.  Effectively 
explaining anthropological theories and methods is akin to pitching one‟s tent 
in such research-rich environments (Riles personal communication).  Thus, 
                                                          
6
 Interview with author on 
7
 While both terms are broadly conceived as activist, undongga typically carries more 
historical gravitas as cousin to undonggwon and has been translated as “committed activist” 
whereas hwaltongga has been translated as “activist” (Abelmann 1996; Ruhlen 2007). 
8
 Personal conversation with author on October 18, 2006. 
9
 Personal conversation with author on May 17, 2006. 
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the process of developing a survey was as much an ethnographic exercise as 
any results it yielded; it was the equivalent of pitching my tent.  I include the 
final version of the survey along with a series of drafts in Appendix A.  
 
The most common concern I heard from people who gave comments on my 
survey and completed it was the amount of time it took to answer some of the 
questions.  Several friends urged me to cut open-ended questions because 
they thought that I would never get a significant response rate if people had to 
spend so much time writing.  I conceded this point.  My aim was never to get a 
significant response rate; rather, it was to get significant responses from them.  
This would often elicit disclaimers about them not being “representative of 
common Korean attitudes” or even “common attitudes in the citizens‟ 
movement10.”  The purpose of a survey, I was repeatedly told, was to get a 
large response pool and analyze the results.  While I tried to redirect this view 
to something more limited and personal in quality, many informants tentatively 
humored me.  At the end of my research period, those who originally 
suggested I focus on the job title issue requested a brief research summary of 
my results.  The only comment I received was a request to circulate it among 
staff. 
 
My response pool was modest at only 18, but each survey provided a great 
deal of material.  The majority of respondents, or 6 out of 9 who completed 
that portion of the survey, identified as activists (hwaldongga).  Only one 
person unequivocally identified herself as a coordinator (gansa).  A couple 
others qualified the title by identifying as “coordinator (gansa) or specialized 
                                                          
10
 Personal conversations with author on February 12, 2007 and March 5, 2007. 
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activist (jeonmun hwaldongga)” and “coordinator (gansa)>teacher 
(seonsaeng).”  Responses fell into three major categories: 1) those who saw 
the distinction between activist and coordinator as purely semantic such that 
gansa is a word “designating citizens‟ group activist (hwaldongga)” or “an 
activist working inside NGOs”, 2) those who saw activists as doing the abstract 
work of “making and presenting a direction for society apart from 
state/society/market” while coordinators do the personal and concrete work of 
“building bridges (gagyo) between citizens‟ groups” and “planning and linking 
with kind-hearted will (seonhan uijireul gajin)”, and 3) the majority of 
respondents who saw coordinators as the necessary workers taking care of 
“practical organizational (jojik) and business duties (samu eommu)” while 
activists “act to realize their values for society (sahoee daehan jasinui 
gachireul silhyeonhagi wihae)” and “do movements based on belief in an 
alternative society (daeansahoee daehan sinnyeome).”  In conversations and 
in survey responses, there was a persistent theory and practice distinction 
between activists and coordinators respectively.  Activists, not unlike 
undonggwon in the 1980s, were concerned with the big picture—the 
ideological system of how state, society, and market interact and how to go 
about coming up with alternatives to the status quo.  Coordinators, on the 
other hand, were concerned with getting things done—fostering good 
relationships, planning, and carrying out the daily tasks necessary for any 
system.  This division is resonant with the sentimental-practical division in 
unification discourses (Grinker 1998) the affect-instrumental division in gender 
discourses (Cho 1988; Yi 1993), and what I argue is the ideological-pragmatic 
division in NGOs and non-profits. 
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Many of those who embraced the coordinator title (gansa), if only partially, 
were practicing Christians and pointed out how devoted and hard-working 
gansa were in their churches.  Some recalled how ministers or pastors first got 
them thinking about social issues and how working for NGOs and social 
welfare groups was a continuation of earlier religious teachings.  In churches 
and other non-profit organizations, gansa were readily described as 
overworked and underappreciated.  In such varied office settings, gansa 
assisted higher-ups and took care of day-to-day operations.  They were 
accustomed to helping others realize their visions.  In any given NGO or non-
profit office, they were the ones answering the phones who could also tell you 
where to find things.  Not coincidentally, they were also mostly women.  These 
entry-level all-purpose coordinators managed the office not unlike a home in 
pragmatically taking care of the day-to-day organizational tasks freeing up 
others to work on broader strategy and conceptual questions (Kendall 2002; 
Kim 1992; Kim 1993; Yi 1993). 
 
One accountant who identified as a gansa admitted that many of her 
colleagues “had no idea” what she did everyday and often “did not care” about 
her work11.  Other gansa shared stories of overt hostilities between them and 
some of their activist colleagues.  Several coordinators were frustrated by 
activists‟ lack of organization and ignorance of basic record-keeping.  One 
long-time accountant compared NGOs to “petty retail merchants” who “would 
be destroyed tomorrow if they were properly audited12.” He audited several 
NGOs and said that the problem with most organizations is that they “only 
have a brain with no one working on the bottom (siljero miteseo ilhaneun 
                                                          
11
 Interview with author on December 7, 2005. 
12
 Interview with author on October 12, 2006. 
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sarameun eopda)13.”  Gansa, he explained, are those working on the bottom.  
They are akin to those who often work invisibly in the financial sector papering 
deals or the clerks working behind the scenes in courts (Barrera 2009; Riles 
2010a). 
Activists, particularly those who identified as undongga more than hwaldongga, 
were suspicious of coordinators‟ (gansa) commitment.  Many coordinators‟ 
disinterest or distaste for taking part in late night political discussions or 
weekend cram sessions where activists engaged in the work of making 
alternative visions was treated as a cause for concern and suspicion.  If gansa 
did not care to participate in these kinds of activities then some hwaldongga 
were never sure if their colleagues actually shared the same commitments and 
were willing to sacrifice for them.  While commitment to ideology was no 
longer overt, many of ideology‟s hard edges persisted. The “rules, lack of 
charity, and hard edges” still reigned for many activists where personal 
decisions were routinely judged and people were made to feel bad for “selfish 
(igijeogin)” actions (Abelmann 1997a:272).  Veteran activists such as the three 
women discussed in the previous chapter often sized up their juniors: those 
who worked hard, but did not show any initiative or willingness to engage in 
social activities where sincere and critical discussions occurred were regularly 
questioned or mocked.  Yet they would cover for a hard-working and sincere 
junior.  A gansa, like a bureaucrat, could just be going through the motions—
biding time as a “professional activist (jigeop simin undongga)” till something 
better came along—while a “sincere (jinsim)” activist was in the movement for 
the long run.  New staff had to prove their activist commitment and willingness 
                                                          
13
 Interview with author on October 12, 2006. 
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to sacrifice through late nights, weekends at the office, and flexible response 
to reorganizations (gaepyeon). 
Undongga and hwaldongga were preoccupied with uncovering and living truth 
while gansa were much more ambivalent, ironic, or uninterested in truth.  
Activists frequently spoke of truthfulness and sincerity (jinsim) when evaluating 
the work of other activists and the “selfish (igijeogin)” and “careerist 
(jigeopjeogin)” aspirations of some colleagues.  The relation between activists 
and coordinators was not unlike the one Alexei Yurchak (2005) describes 
between activists (as well as dissidents) and “normal” people in late socialist 
Russia.  Both activists and dissidents read official state discourse “as a 
description of reality” and evaluated that description for truth whereas “normal 
people” deterritorialized truth from official state discourse (Yurchak 2005:104).  
Yurchak describes how “normal people” performed an internal, relatively 
invisible shift on authoritative discourse that appeared to reproduce it while 
subtly shifting, building upon, and adding new meanings to it.  However, in the 
case of NGOs and NPOs, activists were the “normal” people.  They 
constituted the aging leadership and their history of critique to reveal the truth 
of authoritarianism served as the default position for NGOs vis-à-vis 
government and business interests.  The Saemangeum reclamation project 
discussed later in this chapter provides a stark reminder of this history. 
Coordinators (gansa), on the other hand, conformed to admittedly 
authoritarian conventions such as job title and rank while quietly redefining 
NGO and NPO work away from activism and toward financial accounting, legal 
advocacy, and social welfare.  These were the staff calling for legal, budgetary, 
and policy-making training rather than general movement history and social 
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theory training (Jeong 2006).  Coordinator Mo (Mo Gansanim) exemplified this 
kind of staffer. 
Coordinator Mo graduated from a highly respected law school in the 
United States and returned to Korea to be close to his family and begin 
to return the investment they had made in him.  Like many new hires, 
he was stifled by Korea‟s highly competitive job market and confessed 
to only taking the Green Korea job because nothing better was 
available at the time.  He bought a book about NGO law anticipating 
work in this area, but was surprised to find that he was assigned to the 
green transportation department where he said he never used his legal 
training.  Coordinator Mo made several friends inside Green Korea 
during his first few months as he eagerly learned, participated in after 
work gatherings, and joined the group of veteran activists who took 
smoke breaks several times a day in the office garden.  He described 
“doing his own thing14” while he got along well with colleagues.  Yet 
when several colleagues including the secretary-general began 
questioning his work style and making it difficult for him to take vacation, 
he became more openly critical, pulled back, and accepted outside 
part-time jobs. These jobs took him away from most informal Green 
Korea gatherings.  One of his part-time jobs teaching English raised the 
hackles of several activists because it was said to reveal compromised 
commitment.  Coordinator Mo openly disagreed with several colleagues 
including Secretary-General Choi and Department Leader Lee.  He 
questioned Choi about his opposition strategy to the Saemangeum 
                                                          
14
 Personal conversation with author on January 11, 2006. 
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reclamation project and his tendency to use “damnon language15” 
instead of simpler and clearer language.  I noticed Coordinator Mo sigh 
and pull away from strategy discussions as many Green Korea 
colleagues ignored his calls to reform lobbying laws rather than 
organizing protests. At the same time, he disagreed with Department 
Leader Lee by supporting gansa rather than hwaldongga.  He thought 
gansa should be translated as “program officer” rather than 
“coordinator.”  In the end, he left Green Korea after less than three 
years and was widely seen as a career (jigeop) rather than sincere 
(jungsim) staffer. 
Coordinator Mo was neither religious nor socially conservative, but he 
continued to support gansa because of its “practical (siryongjeogin)16” 
connotations.  Activists such as Department Leader Lee, who expressed 
concerns about the gansa title, did not overtly have a problem with the 
practical, gendered, or hierarchical connotations of the term.  She did however 
repeatedly share concerns about those who exhibited zealous religious 
behavior.  Raised in a non-practicing Buddhist household, Department Leader 
Lee was sensitive to what she would point out as “scary” Christian 
evangelicals and the increasing power they exercised in South Korea.  She 
worried that South Korea was following the United States with its ascendant 
religious right (e.g. Jones 2003).  She was horrified to discover that one of the 
new hires in Green Korea whom she respected was exhibiting worrying 
religious tendencies.  Department Leader Lee recalled this colleague 
repeatedly inviting her to attend church and when she finally did agree out of 
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 Interview with author on July 29, 2006. 
16
 Personal conversation on August 6, 2006. 
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curiosity, was frightened to see how it worked and never resumed quite the 
same level of friendship with this colleague after that experience17.  Other 
activists, particularly those that had worked for feminist groups, overtly 
critiqued the gansa title on human rights and patriarchal grounds.  Some 
feminist groups and academic associations had effectively done away with 
language conventions such as title and rank altogether.  In one group, for 
example, everyone went by first names only instead of the conventional name 
plus job title.  In this case, the secretary-general was known by simply her first 
name instead of “Kim Samucheojangnim.”   
 
Most NGOs, however, conformed to language conventions even if they 
acknowledged the authoritarian roots of such practices.  Green Korea was one 
such group.  Yet even within these ostensibly conventional groups, people 
such as Department Leader Lee were undertaking disparate projects.  By 
2005, the gansa title was nearly absent on formal business cards and in 
everyday terms of address inside Green Korea.  Even if higher level titles were 
retained such as department leader (gukjang) or team leader (timjang)—not to 
mention secretary-general (samucheojang)—gansa was mostly phased out in 
favor of activist (hwaldongga) or responsible person (damdang).  In 2007, 
Department Leader Jeong stopped me after lunch one day to inquire if 
“community organizer18” in the Saul Alinsky tradition would be a viable 
replacement for both coordinator and activist.  At the same time, I learned of 
another activist who was undertaking her own project to remake job titles.  She 
disagreed with the hierarchy of most titles and advocated that every staffer go 
by the title the executive director had coined: social designer (sosyeol dijaineo).  
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 Personal conversations with author on December 19, 2004 and September 22, 2005. 
18
 Personal conversation with author on April 7, 2007.  
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This was the title printed on everyone‟s business card above their name.  Yet 
below their name was the conventional job title, which was how colleagues 
often referred to one another.  Several hwaldongga and undongga expressed 
concern or disappointment with their groups‟ continued adherence to such 
patriarchal and authoritarian conventions while I rarely if ever heard gansa 












Illustration 3.1: Scanned image of the think tank‟s executive director‟s 
business card. 
 
Land Reclamation Project 
Laura Nelson (2000) begins her ethnography of South Korean consumer 
nationalism with an ordinary retelling of the nation‟s economic miracle story 
and its social costs.  Yet she ends with an extraordinary argument.  Nelson 
begins by detailing South Korea‟s meteoric rise from one of the world‟s 
poorest nations in the early 1960s to one of its exemplary economic 
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successes by the early 1990s.  Drawing on a great deal of seminal scholarship, 
she draws attention to the illicit history of governmental and large 
conglomerate relations constituting the developmental state, ghastly labor 
conditions, and authoritarian governance propelling the miracle (e.g., Cumings 
1997; Lie 1998; Woo-Cumings 1991, 1999).  Nelson concludes by writing, “the 
people were asked to make great sacrifices, to work long hours for poor pay 
for unelected governments that offered rich rewards to large corporations 
owned by a small number of opulently wealthy families, and to expect little for 
themselves” (2000:18).  She briefly rehearses the conventional Foucauldian 
argument vis-à-vis Anthony Giddens.  Giddens (1987) draws attention to direct 
state violence as well as the disciplinary power of surveillance.  Nelson 
acknowledges the “well-articulated structure of surveillance and more subtle 
forms of Foucauldian discipline” yet goes on to write: 
 
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to argue that the many millions of 
hours of labor that lifted the South Korean economy to its position of 
prominence and comfort were motivated by fear alone, even propped 
up by an industrial habitus.  I will argue that in fact in large part the 
accomplishments of [the 1960s through the 1990s] were motivated by a 
potent elixir of nationalism and hope that was widely held throughout 
the population (2000:18). 
 
Nelson pivots from previous scholarly preoccupations with the nexus between 
history and nationalism to the relatively understudied nexus between the future 
and nationalism.  With a nod to Benedict Anderson‟s seminal work, Nelson 
writes that “the idea of the future shares with the idea of the past the potential 
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to join people in an imagined community…” (2000:186). “The past,” however, 
“situates [this potential for an imagined community] in experience and 
authenticity, while the future bonds people in hope and hopeful action” (Nelson 
2000:186).  Nelson theorizes a future-oriented “national utopian imagination” 
which “had helped to secure two generations‟ cooperation in the project of 
building a nation” at its retrospective moment of crisis during the 1990s 
(2000:188).  The period before consumption is inherently future-oriented and 
even “utopian.”  Nelson describes a temporality of consumption taking its 
place in the 90s in which “each act of consumption is the end of a period of 
anticipation” (2000:185).  Under Park Chung Hee‟s dictatorship, state projects 
evoking images of collective prosperity insisted that people not judge their 
policies in the present, but rather at some future point.   
People sacrificed present enjoyment—the moment of consumption—for future 
enjoyment.  This was a “modernist future” predicated on sacrifice socially 
reproduced through at least two generations, which was foundering in the 
1990s when Laura Nelson conducted her fieldwork.   
 
Hiro Miyazaki (2004) theorizes a similar hopeful moment in Fijian gift-giving 
practices during which time the gift-giver has just presented a gift and waits for 
the receiver‟s response.  This moment, as with the moment before 
consumption, is future-oriented and hopeful.  At the same time, both moments 
are also uncertain and anxious.  The future, unlike the past, is open and 
unguaranteed (Butler 2004; Grosz 2000; Wiegman 2000).  
 
Timothy Choy (2003) opens his dissertation with an example of some of the 
broader concerns emerging from this post-foundational uncertainty.  Choy 
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describes environmental NGOs in Hong Kong mobilizing against a 
development company‟s plan to build a golf course, country club, and low-
density housing on protected park land in the New Territories.  The NGO 
mobilization occurred in 1990 and won important concessions from the Hong 
Kong Environmental Protection department, which effectively delayed 
construction because the existing environmental impact assessment was 
found to be inadequate.  While a new assessment was conducted, scientists 
found the land to be home to more than 65 percent of Hong Kong‟s dragonfly 
species—two of which were unique to Hong Kong—and so the Town Planning 
Board designated the land a site of special scientific interest.  In turn, 
construction was delayed.  However, the development company had secured 
local residents‟ permission to build on the land over a decade before.  Long 
before the proposal was submitted to the government for approval and thus 
subject to NGO scrutiny, the development company had approached and 
received the approval of a handful of men who were recognized landowners 
under colonial law by virtue of their status as indigenous inhabitants.  When 
environmental NGOs won their important delay, these residents protested in 
turn.  As indigenous residents, they argued, they had a right to develop the 
land as they wished.  Their frustration came to a head in 1997 when some of 
the residents manned bulldozers and purposefully leveled a tract of land that 
environmentalists were trying to protect.  The questions that emerge from this 
situation—for example, who does one side with when the conventional 
equation between indigenous land stewardship and environmental 
conservation is disturbed—exemplify “the more abstractly framed concerns 
that have emerged in recent political theory about the viability of post-
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foundational politics” (Choy 2003:3).  Specifically, what do politics look like 
without absolute moral imperatives? 
 
Environmental groups in Korea have practically and analytically grappled with 
these questions as the “moral aesthetics of activism” shifted during the 1990s 
and 2000s (Abelmann 1996; Lewis 2002; Oppenheim 2003). Grand 
ideological narratives built on self-righteous and sacrificial defiance such as 
the “three mins” of common people (minjung), nationalism (minjok), and 
democracy (minju), have fragmented and receded as victims of their own 
apparent success (Abelmann 1999; Kendall 2002; Lewis 2002).  The 
ideological struggles which animated the undonggwon of the 1980s came to 
seem “pedantic, divisive, and debilitating” (Lee 2007:255).  In their place there 
is no one replacement; rather there are many possibilities “marked by a 
widespread growth of the middle class, the celebration of consumer capitalism 
epitomized by increasingly visible upper-class enclaves, and the extension of 
personal and political freedoms” (Abelmann 1997a:251).  Nancy Abelmann 
describes the widespread post-80s fatigue with military authoritarianism and 
anti-state activism (1997a:250).  With this fatigue and the apparent success of 
democracy, the “national utopian imagination” has also become “more difficult 
to sustain” (Nelson 2000:186).  Many activists recounted distressing 
encounters with cab drivers, which they took to be an index of these changes.  
Several activists shared variations of a similar story: where cab drivers used to 
offer free or reduced fares when they found out they were activists, they now 
wondered what NGOs were doing after democracy had been achieved.  Like 
the Hong Kong residents that Choy (2003) describes, some local residents 
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saw environmental activists working against the poor and marginalized—the 
same people (minjung) that these activists were supposed to represent.   
 
The Saemangeum land reclamation project has been a touchstone of these 
shifting moral aesthetics of activism in South Korea over the last two decades.  
Saemangeum is a carryover of the large-scale government-led development 
projects of the 1960s through the 80s.  One key difference, however, is that 
the project is located about 270 kilometers southwest of Seoul in North Jeolla 
province.  This is the same province where Nancy Abelmann (1996, 1999) 
conducted her fieldwork of the Koch‟ang Tenant Farmer‟s movement during 
the 80s and 90s.  Tellingly, when she returned to the area in 1993 one of the 
local activists chuckled about the ironic fortune of the region: “although the 
northwestern coast was impoverished because it missed out on state 
development programs, it was spared the environmental destruction of the rest 
of South Korea—„How lucky we are to have been excluded19” (Abelmann 
1999a:271).  Environmental activists expected to encounter this sentiment 
among local residents as they mobilized against Saemangeum during the 
1990s and 2000s.  They were right to a certain degree—local groups with ties 
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 The Gyeongsang (southeastern) region was disproportionately industrialized during the 
colonial period given its proximity to Japan while the Jeolla (southwestern) region remained 
relatively agrarian.  The disparity and enmity between the regions grew during military dictator 
Park Chung Hee‟s rule between 1961 and 1979.  Park‟s development policies consistently 
favored his home Gyeongsang region over the Jeolla region.  Jeolla had one large-scale 
industrial complex to Gyeongsang‟s eight, more than half of the largest conglomerates 
(jaebeol) were owned by people born in the Gyeongsang region; and corporations with at least 
1,000 employees owned by people born in Gyeongsang region accounted for 61.3 percent of 
total sales in South Korea while a string of presidents hailed from the region up until Kim Dae 
Jung‟s election in 1997 (Lee 2007:49).  At the same time, a number of stereotypes disparaging 
the dialect and intelligence of people from the Jeolla region were fostered and evident in 
various popular media (e.g. Abelmann 1996, 2003).  However, Jeolla people are widely seen 
as superior cultural practitioners of various traditional arts, music, culinary, and medicinal 
forms as well as modern literature.  The Jeolla region, in other words, carries many of the 
same attributes within South Korea that Euro-Americans have long associated with indigenous 
people, e.g. cultural and environmental stewardship. 
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going back to the minjung movements such as the Catholic Farmers‟ Union 
(Abelmann 1996) supported the activists—yet there was also local opposition. 
 
During my first trip to Korea in 2001 I had the opportunity to go near the 
construction site of the seawall dyke and surrounding estuarine tidal flats.  
Once completed, the seawall dyke would stand as the longest of its kind in the 
world and the reclamation would be the largest in Asia after Hong Kong‟s 
airport opened in 1998.  The 33-kilometer seawall was initially conceived to 
add about 400 square kilometers of land for rice production along with a 
freshwater reservoir for irrigation.  The multi-billion dollar project broke ground 
in 1991 amid growing concerns about surging rice prices and an agricultural 
sector left behind inside a region long left behind during the nation‟s 
compressed development (e.g. Abelmann 2003; Chang 1999).  Saemangeum 
was a rare fixed and slowed process during a time of compression.  The 
estuary near the mouths of the Mankyeong and Geum rivers was not only 
prime fishing grounds for people, but also for hundreds of thousands of birds20.  
Many species of birds, including the endangered Nordmann‟s Greenshank, 
Great Knot, and Spoon-billed Sandpiper, were counted and photographed in 
the area during their annual migration routes between Northeast Asia and 
Australia.  Birders from the UK worked with NGOs to document the waterfowl 
and their deterioration as construction progressed during the 1990s.  The 
project was put on hold for two significant periods of time to conduct additional 
environmental and economic impact assessments.  A number of NGO workers 
and experts presented damning recommendations, which in the end were put 
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 Environmental groups substituted “bird (sae)” for “new (sae)” in the Saemangeum name.  
This move underscored the environmental commitment to reclaiming a prior “natural” resource 
such as birds while government planners ostensibly spoke of reclamation as transforming the 
land into something “new.” 
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aside by the Ministries of Agriculture, Maritime Fisheries, and ultimately the 
president.  In 1999, for example, Kim Dae Jung had put a hold on construction 
and invited many citizens‟ group representatives to serve on the newly-formed 
Presidential Commission for Sustainable Development (PCSD).  Once on the 
commission, civil leaders, economists, and scientists alike recommended an 
immediate stop to seawall construction so that the initial plan could be 
significantly revised, if not scrapped completely.  There was a growing list of 
grievances with more data to back-up them up as time went on: the initial plan 
for more rice paddy fields appeared anachronistic against the backdrop of 
South Korea‟s trade policy changes (Nelson 2000), local fishing outcomes 
were already seriously depressed as water quality indicators plummeted, and 
a number of flora and fauna species were showing signs of disappearance.  
Environmentalists and the experts they mobilized consistently argued that the 
estuarine tidal flats were already more of an economic and environmental 
resource than the newly projected farmland ever could be. 
 
When I accompanied a group of Green Korea staffers to the area for a typical 
fieldwork (hyeonjang josa) trip in 2001, they were shaking their heads in 
disbelief at the environmental changes already afoot—water levels were 
permanently receding, water quality showed signs of long-term toxicity, and 
waterfowl counts were plummeting.  When Kim Dae Jung announced his 
decision to go forward with the project in May 2001 with only “complementary 
measures” to improve water quality, citizens‟ groups were up in arms.  Green 
Korea and other environmental groups closed their offices for a week to 
organize a number of protest events while 54 PCSD commissioners resigned 
in solidarity.  Mr. Lim, Green Korea‟s secretary-general at the time, was 
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among those resigning.  He said, “We civil organizations joined the research 
process as the government promised to respect our opinions, but they totally 
reneged on their promise.”  A coalition of citizens‟ groups issued a statement 
calling Saemangeum “the most environmentally destructive project in the 
world” and vowed that “if the government does not stop the plan immediately, 
we will launch an anti-government movement to drive the Kim Dae Jung 
administration out of power21.”  Three months later, Green Korea and other 
NGOs filed suit with the Seoul Administrative Court demanding immediate 
project nullification.  The suit would go through a series of delays and 
reversals over the next few years as NGOs leveraged international pressure.  
In 2003, for example, Catholic priest Moon Gyu Hyun, Buddhist monk Soo 
Gyoung, and Christian and Won-Buddhist clerics organized the “Three Steps, 
One Big Bow (Samboilbae)” campaign, which attracted strong statements of 
solidarity from international NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and the World 
Wildlife Fund.  Their dramatic trek lasted 65 days with those opposing the 
reclamation walking and bowing head to the road every third step from 
Saemangeum to Seoul.  The campaign asked for atonement on behalf of all 
people for their destructive acts toward nature and appeared to bear fruit as 
the Seoul Administrative Court ordered a temporary suspension on 
construction in July of that year.  Seven months later, however, the Court 
ordered the project to continue as planned.  Environmental lawyers pressed 
on with an appeal and in 2005 the Court reached another decision.  The Court 
rejected the plaintiffs` petition for an immediate halt to the project, but ordered 
the government to reconsider the project. The Court‟s ruling forced the 
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 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from my first assignment as volunteer at Green 
Korean United—research and reporting for their English newsletter, e.g. Levine, Amy.  2001. 
“Saemangeum Project Opposition Movement Responds Powerfully to Government‟s May 25 
Decision,” Green Korea Report #8, July 11.  
 164 
Ministry of Agriculture to consider three options: discard the project, alter the 
project‟s aim of creating farmland and a reservoir, or appeal to a higher court. 
The Court wrote, “The project inevitably needs to either cancel or change the 
authorization for development, as it has no economic accountability and a high 
possibility of wreaking havoc on the environment” (Na 2005). Government 
lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court citing the nearness of the projected 
















































Illustration 3.2: Online satellite images of the Saemangeum area. 
 
Relations between environmental activists and Jeolla residents grew strained 
in the mean time.  There were several instances of vandalism and 
counterprotests at activist-organized “Save Our Saemangeum (SOS)” events.  
Opinion polls showed majority local support for the reclamation, particularly 
during the 1990s.  Jeolla residents had witnessed Gyeongsang provinces and 
areas around Seoul prosper for decades; Saemangeum was one of their few 
chances to enjoy the nation‟s growing wealth after decades of hard work and 
thrift.  Many residents saw Saemangeum as a fragile opportunity to cash-in 
after decades of deferred gratification and anticipated prosperity (Nelson 
2000).  Democracy was achieved, residents would say, so why were these 
activists from Seoul standing in the way of their long-denied piece of the pie?   
 
Kristin Peterson writes of the transition from military to civilian rule in Nigeria 
that “the hope and hype of „democracy” was “interchangeable with „civilian 
rule” in everyday discourse (2009:47).  Many people have said the same thing 
in the ongoing transition between military and civilian rule in South Korea (e.g. 
Kwon 2000; Lee 2007).  Yet as Peterson writes, “democracy was also about 
social redemption,” or “…the hopeful means to alleviate suffering and to 
retroactively cash in on a social contract…” (2009:47).  This sense of 
democracy as social redemption was evident in local residents‟ support of 
Saemangeum.  The first president who hailed from the Jeolla region, Kim Dae 
Jung, ran on a platform calling for more “balanced development” and 
Saemangeum was part of this vision.  More importantly, even if some of the 
environmental points were conceded about the initial ill-advised aims of the 
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project, it was nearly complete.  The reclamation was a stepping stone to 
further development of the Yellow Sea coast, which was widely seen as a key 
site for South Korea‟s economic future.  In 2005, for example, South Korea 
was well on its way to becoming China‟s single largest trading partner as 
Yellow Sea shipping routes between the two nations steadily increased 
(Chung 2009).  Saemangeum propelled a familiar “national utopian 
imagination” about securing the nation‟s future through massive development 
at the same time it revealed the potential exhaustion of that imagination in a 
region long known for its sacrifices rather than its development or consumption 
(Nelson 2000).  Environmental groups demanding a nullification of the project 
without any alternative plan for existing development were seen as backward-
looking, ideological and impractical.  Unlike the high-speed rail dispute in 
Gyeongju, no coherent alternative plan emerged (Oppenheim 2003).  In the 
words of Scholar Lee from the first chapter, “activist “belief in only what is right 
and wrong” failed to “breakthrough the complex real world and present 
concrete alternatives.”   
 
Green Korea and many other leaders of the SOS movement remained 
focused on what was lost with the reclamation and how they could go about 
recovering that prior natural state.  Several activists drew parallels between 
Saemangeum and Shihwa Lake, a government-led tidal power plant project 
undertaken outside of Seoul largely regarded as a failure, while treating 
Saemangeum as a larger scale and outmoded manifestation of the 
government-led “development first (gaebaljisangjuui)” strategy.  For 
environmentalists, the reclamation did not promise any future resources—
economic or otherwise—where China was concerned; rather, it reclaimed a 
 168 
familiar past of developmentalism and destroyed natural resources.  That the 
project took place in North Jeolla province, an area known for its relatively 
undeveloped landscape, was all the more emboldening to both sides.  The 
Jeolla provinces were largely a “blank page in a crammed notebook” (Choy 
2003)—a rare natural resource amid runaway development for environmental 
activists and an equally rare untapped economic resource for developers.  
Secretary-General Choi, Green Korea‟s leader through the final stages of 
seawall construction and court fights, emphatically claimed that NGOs could 
not “give up any more land22” where Saemangeum was concerned.  They had 
effectively staked their reputations on stopping the project through their 
participation in and resignation from the PCSD.   
 
Saemangeum exemplified a sense of crisis where conflict-resolution is 
concerned: project supporters pushed rapid construction and extreme 
development targets while project opponents dug in their heels as equally 
extreme and uncompromising protectors of nature (e.g., Abelmann 1996; 
Grinker 1998; Snyder 1997).  Roy Richard Grinker (1998) describes the 
precipitation of crisis as a common pattern of conflict-resolution “in a place 
such as south Korea, where communication across hierarchical boundaries is 
constrained by linguistic markers for respect and status…” (191).  Relations 
between landlords and peasants, parents and children, and students and the 
government reveal a pattern of moralistic conflict-resolution whereby 
communication often only follows from an extreme and urgent crisis.  Grinker 
argues that the violent clashes that sometimes ensue between these groups 
around a crisis are “to some extent necessary for communication” (1998:191).  
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 Interview with author on March 6, 2006. 
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In many ways, Saemangeum was this crisis for environmental groups and the 
government during Kim Dae Jung‟s and Roh Moo Hyun‟s terms from 1998 to 
2008.   
 
Green Korea and other NGOs frequently spoke of the long history of enmity 
and distrust toward the government.  Kim Dae Jung‟s decision to go forward 
with the project in 2001 despite the findings of the PCSD was a confirmation of 
activists‟ worst suspicions: in the end, even the nation‟s first undisputed 
democratically-elected president with widely respected dissident credentials 
and ties to the Jeolla region sided with the status quo economic development-
first strategy.  Environmental leaders did not hide their disillusionment and 
sense of betrayal in resigning from the PCSD and vowing to drive the Kim 
administration from power.  Kim Je-nam, a founding member and secretary-
general of Green Korea during a critical time in the Saemangeum struggle, 
reflected that NGOs “need to be patient because the government has been 
pursuing a development-centered strategy for a long time23.”  She, like many 
of her colleagues, was deeply disappointed at the environmental policy-
making of the Kim and Roh administrations.  In 2003, for example, a coalition 
of environmental groups proclaimed Roh‟s environmental policy to be “dead 
(jukeotda)” and in “crisis (wigi)” (Levine 2004a).  While Kim Dae Jung 
envisioned the PCSD as a “neutral arbiter” and Roh attempted to continue this 
policy, environmental groups effectively withdrew from the commission or tried 
to push the PCSD to assume a more critical role vis-à-vis government 
development plans (Lee 2007).  When Roh appointed a marine biology 
professor with pre-existing opposition to Saemangeum as secretary-general of 
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 Interview quoted in Yujin Lee‟s 2007 report. 
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PCSD, many environmental groups expected this to bring an end to the 
Saemangeum project.  However once in office, the professor pointed out how 
he was obliged to be “neutral.”  Several activists openly questioned how the 
PCSD could call itself “neutral” when it continued to fight the Saemangeum 
lawsuit while others wondered if the PCSD could ever be a fair “umpire” in 
such conflicts (e.g. Lee Y.J. 2007).  Many other activists privately and publicly 
balked at government officials‟ sincerity (jinsim) in listening to NGOs (e.g. 
Song 2009). 
 
One self-described scholar (hakja) exemplified the shifts occurring in NGOs 
and in government commissions like the PCSD.  Scholar Lee (introduced in 
chapter 1) thrived on contradictions: he was a widely respected “sincere 
(jinsim)” senior activist who also leveled unrivaled criticism on activist failures.  
He worked for several years in small environmental groups before completing 
a PhD in environmental studies from Seoul National University.  He focused 
on the Shihwa Lake case in his dissertation and sought a more “practical24” 
application for the lessons from that case to the Saemangeum case.  He 
appeared to find this application in 2004 while serving as a policy director on 
the PCSD, but left the job a couple years later disenchanted with Roh Moo 
Hyun‟s “incompetence (neungnyeogi eopda)25.”  When we met the night 
before the presidential election in 2007 he had just come from the PCSD office.  
He said it was the third such trip he had made in recent weeks ahead of the 
administration change.  Several colleagues were preparing “white papers” at 
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 Interview with author on September 20, 2005. 
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 Interview with author on September 20, 2005. 
 171 
the request of their former boss to “document what they had tried, even if 
higher-ups stopped them26.”  
 
Back in 2004, however, Scholar Lee could not wait to tell me he was working 
on the “new frontline” for citizens‟ groups (simin danche) when we caught up 
over dinner.  For him, the “new frontline” was the PCSD.  Scholar Lee said he 
had grown “cynical” while working for environmental groups and completing 
his doctorate.  He became animated as he described the difficult, yet satisfying 
impact he was having on policy while working at the PCSD.  He extended the 
military metaphor into a “battle line” between government officials and non-
governmental people such as himself.  Scholar Lee described government 
commissioners inviting non-governmental representatives to serve on the 
PCSD not out of respect, but because they could appear cooperative while 
being able to “predict” their recommendations.  With obvious anxiety, Scholar 
Lee said these commissioners would praise NGOs “front stage” while laughing 
at them “backstage27.”   
 
Yet he reserved his strongest criticism for so-called “professional citizen 
activists” (jigeop simin undongga).  These activists emerged as his main object 
of critique for putting personal career ahead of public advocacy.  An activist at 
another NGO used the same term to distinguish dubious activism from what 
she termed authentic, sincere, and devoted (jungsim) activism.  Scholar Lee 
suggested that “professional activists” only worked for NGOs as a means 
toward a government job—a common critique of the 386 generation—and that 
some would go so far as to use government project funds toward personal 
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 Interview with author on December 18, 2007. 
27
 All statements in this paragraph from interview with author on July 28, 2004. 
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salary.  This charge had been repeated so many times that some activists 
were preemptively defensive about it.  Scholar Lee, like many others in NGOs, 
worried that these “professional activists” were giving all activists a bad name.  
In particular, they were endangering activists‟ moral authority.  Local 
opposition to the Save Our Saemangeum activist coalition was also 
threatening this authority.   While these public erosions of moral authority 
occurred, NGOs were engaged in internal moral discussions about job titles, 
activists (hwaldongga/undongga), and coordinators (gansa).  
 
Green Life Project 
In the weeks leading up to the Supreme Court‟s decision on Saemangeum in 
2006, Green Korea‟s office went into crisis mode.  They closed regular office 
operations and held candlelight vigils in solidarity with five other cities for ten 
straight days ahead of the court ruling.  Green Korea‟s secretary-general was 
leading the uncompromisingly optimistic campaign to keep the two small 
openings in the seawall open.  The wall stood over 30-kilometers, yet 
Secretary-General Choi was interested in the two openings amounting to 
about two kilometers.  He took out a pen and piece of paper to illustrate the 
seawall with a line and drew circles to indicate the two openings28.  He 
continued to retrace the circles in order to emphasize them as he explained 
that the case was now in the Supreme Court‟s hands.  Those two openings 
could stay open, Choi continued, if the Supreme Court ruled in their favor or 
they could delay a decision for a few more weeks.  Choi reasoned that a small 
delay could buy them even more time given weather and construction 
conditions. 
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Illustration 3.3: Saemangeum seawall in April 2005 (Photo by Nial Moores) 
 
Choi did not even want to entertain the possibility of compromise.  He insisted 
that NGOs “could not give up any more land” and that the phrase sustainable 
development was an oxymoron.  While he conceded that the activist strategies 
(jeollyak) to protest, issue press releases, hold press conferences, and file 
lawsuits were failing29, he insisted that activists could not change beliefs 
(sinnyeom).  Activists, Choi matter-of-factly said, “feed on belief (sinnyeomeul 
meogno)” while scholars “feed on knowledge (jisikeul meogno)30.”  He used 
the example of nuclear energy.  If Green Korea decided to reverse its position 
on the government‟s plan to expand its nuclear energy program, he argued, 
they would certainly have it easier.  Government and private sector money to 
fund nuclear energy would come their way, but the moral costs would be too 
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 At one exasperating point, Choi said that Green Korea would have been more effective 
fighting Saemangeum if they had just closed their offices during the last couple years rather 
than doing any of the activities they had done. 
30
 Interview with author on November 22, 2005. 
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high.  Without belief, Choi argued, what would be the point of life?  I read this 
as an explication of commitment outside any strategic or pragmatic calculation 
of effects (e.g. Riles 2000; Snellinger 2007).   
 
Secretary-General Choi had begun to formulate his own project—the “Green 
Life Theory Project” (Noksaek Saengmyeong Iron Peurojekteu)—when he 
became the sole secretary-general of Green Korea in 2006.  Choi saw NGOs 
losing the Saemangeum battle because they failed to offer a “grand theory31” 
anywhere near as complete or convincing as capitalism or neoliberalism.  Choi 
saw capitalism using people as “means (sudan)” for the “goal (mokjeok)” of 
money32.  He thought NGOs needed more theorists who could write position 
papers on their behalf and begin to put forward a coherent alternative to 
capitalism and neoliberalism (e.g. Song 2009).  They did not need a specific 
alternative to Saemangeum, but to all such projects. Choi was thinking on the 
order of ideology—a system large and coherent enough to counter the logic of 
development.  He referenced a much talked about debate between an 
eminent professor and the mayor of Seoul about another high-profile 
reclamation project on the MBC television program 100 Minutes.  Lee Myung-
bak, who was mayor of Seoul at the time, began to solidify his reputation and 
his successful run for the presidency in 2007 with the success of the 
Cheonggye stream reclamation project.  Lee came across as a plain-spoken, 
straightforward businessman who knew how to appeal to people‟s pocketbook 
interests while the professor appeared vague and unimaginative by merely 
criticizing Lee‟s vision without offering an alternative in its place.  One Green 
Korea staffer joked that the professor spoke ten words for every one that Lee 
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 Interview with author November 22, 2005. 
32
 Interview with author February 22, 2006. 
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spoke.  Most Green Korea staff agreed that the professor not only lost the 
debate, but unduly helped Lee in the process.  Secretary-General Choi did not 
disagree, but he saw the problem as bigger than either the professor or the 
mayor.  He thought citizens‟ groups were relying too much on a small group of 
scholars for the work of publicly debating and presenting alternatives to 
government and business development plans.  Secretary-General Choi 
thought activists could do more than just implement theory or mediate 
between theorists and citizens; he thought activists needed to get engaged in 
the work of making theory and presenting alternatives to the public.  The 
Green Life Theory Project was his way to begin this work.   
 
Choi personally footed the bill and prepared bimonthly informal meetings 
during which time a handful of leaders from about ten environmental groups in 
Seoul would get together and discuss recent academic and popular press 
books of interest.  They periodically met for about a year leading up to Green 
Korea‟s fifteenth anniversary commemoration events in June 2006.  This was 
to be the stage for the project launch to the broader NGO community.  At the 
same time, other members of this informal group associated with the largest 
environmental NGOs in the country, KFEM, were preparing to launch a new 
environmental think tank—the Eco-Horizon Institute (Saengtae Jipyeong 
Yeonguso)— “where field and theory meet (hyeonjanggwa ironi mannaneun).”  
I gathered from Choi‟s off-handed comments that he was highly aware of and 
competitive with his KFEM colleagues.   
 
When I shared a bus or cab ride with Secretary-General Choi during the 
months leading up to the launch, he would recount all the emergencies and 
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distractions he had to deal with that week which took him away from what he 
really wanted to do—work on the project.  The conversations we would have in 
the office kitchen and stolen in transit between events seemed to return him to 
his days as a university student activist (undonggwon).  He would fondly recall 
reading certain books and being on “study break” (hyuhak), which afforded 
him the time and the space to imagine things as big as ideology33.  Yet he did 
not wish to return to those days of ideological struggle and torture in the 
military.  Instead, he wished to recapture the imagination that time and space 
as a student afforded him. Choi longed for the version of theory he first 
imagined as a student in jail, yet did not wish to go back to ideology in a 
similar way that Adam Reed (2004) describes released prisoners in Papua 
New Guinea longing for the version of freedom they first imagined in captivity, 
but not wishing to return to prison.  Damnon was something “less than theory, 
smaller than ideology.”  Choi offered this definition of damnon during a 
conversation with Coordinator Mo, who had become increasingly vocal in his 
criticism of Green Korea‟s strategies.  Before getting to this conversation, 
however, it is necessary to review what became of Secretary-General Choi‟s 
Green Life Theory project. 
 
The informal reading group of civil leaders and professors Choi had 
assembled to discuss environmental theories and strategies in 2005 and early 
2006 became the more formal Green Life Committee (Noksaek Saengmyeong 
Wiwonhoe) ahead of Green Korea‟s 15th anniversary events in June 2006.  
They met to discuss ways to bring humans and nature together, both of which 
share life (saengmyeong).  Notably, this term for life differs from the term 
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 Interview with author on May 8, 2006. 
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Green Korea used in its theme during the same time: “green is life 
(noksaegeun saenghwarida).”  Saenghwal is a conception of life akin to 
lifestyle as in ilsang saenghwal.  It connotes everyday routine and 
consumption habits, which is what Green Korea had long been targeting with 
its Buy Nothing Day, Let‟s Wear Warm Undergarments, and organic food 
campaigns. Saengmyeong, on the other hand, is a conception of life which all 
living things share—it is not only human lifestyles, but the critical survival of all 
living things at stake.   Choi‟s decision to shift from saenghwal to 
saengmyeong pointed up the heightened urgency of environmental discourses 
with the Saemangeum reclamation project and more generally with climate 
change.  Saengmyeong cast environmentalism in the stark register of life and 
death where previous Green Korea campaigns appealed to lifestyle 
(saenghwal) changes. 
 
Choi attracted some of the biggest names in the NGO sphere to launch the 
commission and its large scale alternative to development at all costs: 
Greenism (Noksaekjuui34).  One of these big names was the same professor 
who told me that activists “mediate between theorists and citizens.”  He 
presented a Foucauldian-inflected history of “Korean resistance discourses 
(Hanguk jeohang damnon),” analyzed classism in Western Europe, and 
offered a few recommendations on what Green discourse must include. Choi‟s 
Greenism placed “humanity (ingan)” and the “value of life” (saengmyeongui 
gachi) at the center of economy and development.  Echoing Kim Dae Jung‟s 
discourse (Song 2003), the committee‟s press release (GKU 2006) argued for 
                                                          
34
 The shift from Green Life (Noksaek Saengmyeong) to Greenism (Noksaekjuui) is significant 
for removing the urgent notion of life.  In addition, Green Life carries the charge of a campaign 
slogan or project whereas Greenism conforms to the familiar form of ideologies such as 
socialism (sahoejuui) and regionalism (jibangjuui). 
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“quality of life” as an alternative to South Korea‟s historical development first 
approach (gaebaljisangjuui).  It went on to proclaim Greenism as “the new 
damnon necessary for making this society,” which would “make direction and 
content together” and embrace “contention” (GKU 2006).  Choi‟s alternative 
synthesized many of the pillars of post-minjung Leftist thought in South 
Korea—particularly in trying to combine the “form (hyeongsik)” and “content 
(naeyong)” of democracy—so as to foster a more humane, tolerant, and 
socially-minded development. 
  
The public launch was advertised as a discussion panel (toronhoe), which is 
exactly what Secretary-General Choi treated as a mundane aspect of his job 
at the beginning of the chapter.  In the end, Choi‟s big launch to get activists 
engaged in the work of theory and alternative-making did not meet 
expectations.  It resembled an academic conference more than an 
experimental space inviting activists, academics, and coordinators to work 
together toward refining Greenism‟s broad precepts. 
 
Coordinator Mo joked that he and several new staffers stayed up late the night 
before trying to understand just the first dense sentence of one professor‟s 
paper35.  Two of the panelists were university professors and the other was 
director of a research institute.  Coordinator Mo and several other staffers 
sitting in the outer circle of tables surrounding the panel spent much of their 
time texting, passing notes to each other, and yawning.  While nearly all of 
Green Korea‟s staff made an obligatory appearance at the event, few spoke 
and no outsiders attended.  Choi picked a small centrally located conference 
                                                          
35
 Personal conversations with author June 27, 2006. 
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room for the event and strongly encouraged all Green Korea staff and 
supporters to attend.  He took special care to rearrange the tables and chairs 
into concentric circles36 so as to encourage more intimate discussion.  
However, when staff members did speak it was often only to clarify panelist 
terms.  The one notable secretary-general from another citizens‟ group that 
Choi invited as a discussant was very critical of the decision to propose 
Greenism as separate from existing alternative simin (citizen) damnon. 
 
When I asked Choi how he thought the event went a few days later, he said 
that he had a lot to think about and changed the subject.  This was a marked 
contrast to Choi‟s excitement in the previous months.  His optimism turned into 
defensiveness as stacks of Green Life Commission materials collected dust 
under the office stairs.  A couple weeks later, Secretary-General Choi and 
Coordinator Mo ended up in a testy exchange as they helped me understand 
damnon.  Choi promised before the launch to help me understand some of the 
difficult language from the event and so he began our weekly class asking me 
to share questions.  When I brought up damnon, Coordinator Mo said that he 
did not know its meaning because he hardly used the word.  However, he 
paused and wrote out the traditional Chinese characters (hanja) for damnon 
on a piece of paper and asked Choi to confirm if it was correct.  Choi 
confirmed it as Coordinator Mo parsed the Chinese characters (談論) to mean 
“discuss theory.”  Choi then matter-of-factly defined damnon as “less than 
theory, smaller than ideology37.”  He referred me to one of the papers from the 
panel which documented the changes in Green damnon over the last three 
                                                          
36
 “Circles,” a term borrowed from English, were common modes of gathering among 
undonggwon during the 1980s (Lee 2007).  Students would often attend these “circles” in lieu 
of classes during which time they circulated texts and debated ideological strategies. 
37
 Interview with author on July 7, 2006. 
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decades (Koo 2006).  Choi agreed that the term had shifted from referencing 
ideologies such as socialism in the 1970s and 80s to referencing a variety of 
talk (iyagi) in the 2000s.  University students poured over cultural theory 
(munhwa iron) as Foucault became the most translated author into Korean 
during the 1990s and damnon was widely translated as discourse.  By the 
2000s, however, damnon became a term that meant little more than the 
person using it wished to “sound smart.”  When I mentioned this description of 
damnon, both Choi and Mo agreed.  Sensing the irony, Choi half-jokingly 
added that he did not use the term more than ten times per month.  Mo did not 
miss the chance to make the irony explicit by reminding Choi of the Green Life 
Commission event.  Choi quickly amended his statement with “except for this 
month.”  Mo seized on the opening to recount his frustration with another 
recent workshop he attended where “it was all damnon language.”  This, he 
implied, is why he had left early and did not participate in Secretary-General 
Choi‟s Green Life project.  The normally placid Choi surprised us both by 
immediately shooting back, “but it‟s important!” 
 
Even a fellow activist (hwaldongga), Department Leader Lee, had grown 
weary of damnon.  At the height of Secretary-General Choi‟s Green Life 
project, she sighed during one late night at the office and said that NGOs had 
become “obsessed” with damnon.  It was not only Green Korea, she insisted; 
rather, it was a widespread problem plaguing many groups.  They had come to 
“sound more like professors than citizens,” she continued.  Department Leader 
Lee frequently spoke of the need for “real (siljero)” and “practical 
(siryongjeok)38” approaches with straightforward language.  She did not see 
                                                          
38
 All statements in this paragraph from personal conversations on May 16, 2006 and June 30, 
2006. 
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the utility, for example, of a professor‟s long and complicated explanations 
during the aforementioned TV debate about the Cheonggye stream 
reclamation project.  She also did not see the use of Choi‟s Green Life project.  
In these instances damnon manifested the worst aspects of ideology 
(idieollogi)—abstract and rigid thought systems holding people back.  However, 
Department Leader Lee‟s damnon project to quietly and informally reexamine 
the everyday (saenghwal) conventions of job titles proved to have more 
traction.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the multiple entanglements of activists and 
academics.  Foucault‟s scholarship has provided a conceptual vocabulary for 
these entanglements, fallen sense of moral authority, dispersed power, hidden 
complicity, and multiple fragmentations.  Discourse (damnon) has worked as a 
placeholder (Riles 2010a); it is in the words of Secretary-General Choi “less 
than theory, smaller than ideology.”  Yet what his project accomplished, in the 
words of one of his staffers, was another discourse without use.  The job title 
project she conducted, on the other hand, was smaller in scope and more 
pragmatic.  This job title project was an example of a discourse inside many 
NGOs and NPOs during the time of my fieldwork.  Both Department Leader 
Lee and Secretary-General Choi were social movement analysts engaged in 
the way “language convinces” (Riles 2000:66) through discursive projects.  In 
juxtaposing these projects against the larger government-led Saemangeum 
reclamation project, I demonstrated the ascent of pragmatism at various levels 
of scale.  
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Chapter 4: Designing the Agenda with Hope 
 
Good design tells us that, though the world at large may be challenging and 
dangerous, there are solid means of engaging it.  And beyond this, good 
design speaks to us of the quality and joy of the engagement. 
--- Robert Grudin, Design and Truth 
 
Introduction 
―We cannot just criticize,‖ one department leader noted.  She said NGOs and 
NPOs had to ―propose alternatives (daean) and recommendations (chujang)‖ 
to be taken seriously by government and business colleagues in the post-
1990s era of increasingly cynical neoliberal governance in South Korea.  This 
was particularly true during the Roh Moo Hyun administration, which sought 
alternatives and solutions rather than critique.  While some critiqued this 
pragmatic demand, others took it as an invitation to pragmatically change.  
Lawyer Park (Pak Byeonhosanim) is an exemplary figure of the latter.  He 
necessitates a chapter rather than a short history because of the scaled up 
figure he cuts in Korean law and politics.   
 
Lawyer Park is a prominent ―first generation1‖ civil leader who elicited deep 
passions and large aspirations among the NGO, NPO, academic, 
                                                 
1
 Some of his staff referred to him and founders of other major NGOs and non-profits in this 
fashion.  One scholar said that Lawyer Park is part of the ―6.3 generation (yuk sam sedae),‖ 
which protested normalized relations with Japan in 1965.  Park himself identified in 2006 with 
the ―386 generation (sam bal yuk sedae),‖ a much sullied term during the mid-2000s referring 
to people who were in their 30s during the 1990s, went to university and identified as 
undonggwon during the 1980s, and who were born in the 1960s.  In 2010, however, Park 
much more finely specified his generation as ―emergency decree (gingeupjochi)‖ referring to 
the period between 1974 and 1979 when Park Chung Hee issued nine emergency decrees.  
Namhee Lee (2009), following other mass dictatorship scholars, has called Park‘s regime 
during this time a ―crisis‘ government.‖  These decrees kept an emergency or crisis mode 
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governmental, and semi-governmental circles in Seoul.  There was an ever-
present buzz about whether he would accept the latest cabinet offer or run for 
president in the next election.  Lawyer Park was at the center of nearly all 
discussions about Korean politics during the time of major fieldwork from 2005 
to 2007.  He was sometimes cast as a radical from the past and other times as 
a pioneering social entrepreneur of the future.  Among his own staff, Park 
razed stark disagreements about whether he was an audacious reformer, a 
moderate appeaser, or both.  According to his staff, he ―inspired‖ and ―used‖ 
people, particularly activists to achieve his vision2.  Lawyer Park attempted to 
personify and objectify hope, both with his record of legal and legislative 
successes and with his latest venture, the Hope Institute (Huimang Jejakso).  
His career trajectory was treated by many colleagues as if it were the 
trajectory of South Korean civil society more broadly.  He channeled resources 
as well as attention and upholds the linear and progressive temporality of the 
nation-state (Escobar 1995; Greenhouse 1996; Yarrow 2005).  Lawyer Park 
was at the center of human rights advocacy in the 1970s and 80s, anti-
corruption and transparency campaigns in the 90s, and had turned to social 
welfare and community-building along with what he calls social design in the 
Hope Institute in the 2000s.  
 
Lawyer Park has attempted to ―set the agenda,‖ in his own words, with the 
NGOs and non-profits he has led over the past couple decades.  The agenda, 
I argue, is an artifact of pragmatism (Riles 2003; Riles 2004a).  Lawyer Park is 
                                                                                                                                            
constant during most of the 1970s when the Vietnam War was escalating (Lee 2007, 2009).  
The decrees made it illegal for citizens to criticize Park‘s regime, opened universities to 
military occupation, and in some cases closed universities after large anti-government 
demonstrations.  See Janelli and Janelli (1982) and Nancy Abelmann (1996, 2003) for more 
on generational dynamics in South Korea. 
2
 Interviews with author on June 12, 2007 and January 11, 2008. 
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pragmatic in his efforts to constructively hope in the wake of the destructive 
effects of some of his previous work.  Park has tried to selectively mobilize the 
―near past‖ of dictator Park‘s ―nation design‖ with the ―near future‖ of his ―social 
design‖ (Guyer 2007).  In this chapter, I put pragmatism and hope on the 
research agenda as shared legal and anthropological artifacts ripe for critical 
and post-critical ethnography (e.g. Faubion and Marcus 2009; Miyazaki 2004; 
Riles 2003).  
 
Anthropologists (e.g. Geertz 2000; Latour 1999; Rabinow 2003; Rosen 1999) 
and socio-legal scholars (e.g. Silbey and Sarat 1987; Trubek 1984; Unger 
2007; Valverde 2003) alike share commitments to pragmatism.  Following the 
PoLAR symposium on pragmatism (Riles 2003), this paper aims to treat 
pragmatism ethnographically.  In particular, it examines means-ends 
reasoning through time, which brings transparency and social design into view 
as part of an agenda.  As socio-legal scholars and anthropologists put 
pragmatism on their respective research agendas, does hope in another kind 
of motion appear as we turn out faith in linear progress inside out (e.g. Deneen 
2003; Kennedy 2004)?  The question becomes how to maintain an agenda 
and hope.  In other words, how can we keep the future open while planning 
and designing it?  The answer, this chapter suggests following the work of Hiro 
Miyazaki (2004, 2005) and Annelise Riles (2004a), is to imagine a means to 
another means rather than any end. 
 
Approaching Pragmatism 
Annelise Riles (2003) has highlighted the widely shared ―pragmatic grounds‖ 
from law to science studies and anthropology.  She suggests that William 
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James‘s deambulatory theory of truth, which ―is to try to interpret each notion 
by tracing its respective practical consequences,‖ as uniting at least the 
political left and right in the legal academy (James 2000:194 quoted in Riles 
2003:1).  Riles describes how ―thinking pragmatically‘ is what American 
lawyers self-consciously export under the guise of American-style rule of law,‖ 
which is taken up by lawyers, regulators, and activists alike around the world 
(2003:2).  This notion of ―thinking pragmatically‖ or ―being practical‖ is 
emblematic of the United States more generally (Desautels-Stein 2007).   
 
Yang Sung-hee (2007) wrote in the editorial that I discussed in the introduction, 
―There is a close correlation between pragmatism and contemporary America. 
Pragmatism is nearly the only philosophy that the United States follows.‖  Yet 
pragmatism has also been ―the philosophy that the Korean people have 
pursued all of the last century‖ as ―the nation experienced industrialization and 
democratization during the last six decades‖ (Tak quoted in Yang 2007).  
Many informants and friends reiterated this view over the course of my 
fieldwork.  They frequently said ―practically doing (siljero hada)‖ was the only 
way to negotiate the demands of the work and that many of the crises their 
organizations faced were the result of not enough pragmatism (see Chapter 1). 
 
Practical Roots of the Hope Institute 
Lawyer Park‘s latest venture, the Hope Institute (Huimang Jejakso), sought to 
harness this pragmatic spirit and ―democratize knowledge production3‖ so that 
any person could act as a ―social designer (sosyeol dijaneo).‖  The Hope 
                                                 
3
 Statements from an article posted on the Hope Institute‘s website entitled ―The 
Democratization of Knowledge Production is ‗Hope Production (Jisik saengsanui minjuhwaga 
got ‘huimang jejak’),‖ posted April 7, 2006. 
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Institute (2006) set as one of its tasks ―to change the huge intellectual energy 
in Korean civil society into collective wisdom for the whole community.‖  In 
order to do this, they could not ―limit ‗tank‘ in think tank to a few elite classes;‖ 
rather, they had to ―expand it to all citizens who have specialized experience 
and knowledge4.‖  Lawyer Park gave a press interview in 2005 in which he 
said, ―We need to discover wisdom in the life of the general public that 
scholars or theorists do not have in their mind and connect it to policy.  I think 
that will be the driving force of social development5.‖   
 
The Hope Institute aimed to get citizens involved in policy-making by 
conceiving of them as ―social designers‖ who had ―social inventions‖ to 
cultivate.  The Institute‘s Social Invention Center (Sahoe Changan Senteo) 
has already implemented: small badges expectant mothers can use to access 
priority seating on public transportation and varying handle heights on the 
subway, both of which had been implemented in Japan, a discount system so 
women do not pay for certain days they cannot use swimming pools each 
month, and a confectionary mark that contains the production date along with 
the expiration date. 
 
Lawyer Park and the Hope Institute staff conceived of themselves as the 21st 
century version of the ―practical study movement (sirhak undong).‖  Like these 
scholars, Park and his staff sought to systematize ―wisdom and experience 
from the bottom by listening to the voice of marginalized places6…‖  The Hope 
                                                 
4
 See supra 3. 
5
 Quotations from a December 12, 2005 OhMyNews article entitled ―Can We Say the Roh 
Administration is Progressive (No Muhyun jeonbureul jinborago hal su itnayo)?‖ 
6
 Quotation from August 5, 2008 Hankook Ilbo article, ―Lawyer Park Won Soon, ‗It is 
‗Experience from the Bottom‘ that Captures the Voices of Marginalized Places (Pak Wonsoon 
byeonhosa ‘sooehyeonjang moksori dameun ‘araerobuteo gyeongheom’ ijo).‖ 
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Institute has published a large number of books addressing a wide range of 
issues from local energy to education reform.  They do so from a practical 
study (sirhak) and praxiological (hyeonjang) perspective.   
 
Big words (godamjunron)are still prevailing.  Korean government 
employees are working at their desks, reporters are reporting in 
pressrooms. Members of the National Assembly should take a bus or 
taxi instead of their cars. It is the same story for the civic group 
(simindanche).  The actual place (hyeonjang) is important. When you 
go to the place (hyeonjang), you will know the problem (munje) as well 
as the alternative (daean)7. 
 
Practical use (siryong) and on-site experience (hyeonjang) are two of the 
Institute‘s founding principles as they aim to ―actualize small change and 
possible ideas more than comprehensive discourse (damnon)8.‖  Lawyer Park 
and his organizations differed from other NGOs and non-profits in this regard.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, other civil leaders sought ―grand theory‖ 
and ―discourses (damnon).‖ 
     
Lawyer Park worked hard during the launch of the Hope Institute to ally his 
work with practical study scholars.  Park said in a 2008 press interview that 
every time he goes abroad he reads books by sirhak scholars such as Dasan 
Jeong Yak-yeong, Seongho Yi Ik, and Yunam Park Ji-won9.  The Hope 
                                                 
7
 Quotation from August 11, 2008 INews article, ―When We Dream of Hope and Put it into 
Practice, there will be Hope‘…Lawyer Park Won Soon (Huimangeil ggumggugo silcheonhae 
nagal ddae, huimangeun saengginda’…Pak Wonsoon byeonhosa).‖ 
8
 Quotation from the Hope Institute‘s website at their founding in 2006. 
9
 See supra 7. 
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Institute (2006) cites the Confucian and sirhak axioms of giving practical 
benefit to the world, improving people‘s lives by conveniently using what‘s at 
hand, and seeking truth based on facts.  According to the Hope Institute 
website in 2006: 
 
[Practical study scholars] have practical (siljejeok) and realistic 
(hyeonsiljeok) life problems (gwaje) and clear goals (mokpyo) instead of 
being ideological (inyeomjeok) and abstract (chusangjeok). The spirit of 
pragmatism does not mean judging objects by their appearance. 
Pragmatism means being devoted to detailed problematic situations 
(guchejeok munje sanghwang) that makes us ‗compelled to think‘ of 
something. Pragmatism is therefore a practical sense of purpose 
(silcheonjeok mokjeokuisik)10.  
 
In my first interview with Lawyer Park, he used an anecdote squibbed11 from 
history to explain how he approached the Hope Institute‘s role in Korean 
society.  He said there was a ―serious debate‖ among Korean Confucianists in 
the 17th and 18th century about how many years the king should wear a robe 
for his dead mother.  Some said one year and others said three, he continued, 
so as to point out how ―silly‖ and ―abstract‖ the debate was.  Practical study 
scholars (sirhakpa) set aside this debate, Park explained, by going to China 
and ―practically learning how to change society.‖ ―[The Hope Institute],‖ Park 
continued, ―should be another silhakpa by changing and designing society12.‖  
                                                 
10
 See supra 3. 
11
 Annelise Riles describes squibbing as ―the standard practice of excerpting, summarizing, or 
restating the facts of a case or the point of an academic article so as to render these relevant 
to another analytical problem‖ (2004a:791).  She demonstrates how squibbing conventionally 
occurs in American law schools. 
12
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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The Hope Institute‘s founding declaration proclaims that it will ―change despair 
into hope‖ in the 21st century just as practical study scholars did in the 18th 
century when aristocrats (yangban) were captured by ―moral obligations and 
stereotypes‖ and the Joseon dynasty was an ―abstract country‘ sticking to 
empty formalities and causes13.‖     
 
Lawyer Park fashioned himself as a practical scholar who would similarly set 
aside the ideological and abstract debates plaguing politicians and activists.  
Like the previous practical scholars, he traveled abroad to learn and practically 
apply lessons inside South Korea.  When he was a visiting professor at 
Harvard Law School in the early 1990s, he was said to have read all the books 
in the law library except those on business law.  According to a Hope Institute 
feature, Park ―collected and copied all the information needed to change the 
world.  He had spent a year like this14.‖  He scrapbooked what he learned from 
foreign countries and ―changed his life.‖  Park‘s ―head was full of ideas, ‗I 
would like to change South Korea like this,‘ ‗I would like to work for alternative 
things that would change Korean society instead of participating in a 
demonstration15.‖  Following Hiro Miyazaki (2004), I conceive of Lawyer Park‘s 
and by extension the Hope Institute‘s hope as a replication of inheritances 
from silhak pragmatism and Dictator Park Chung Hee‘s ―national utopian 
imagination‖ (Nelson 2000).  In order to appropriately capture Lawyer Park‘s 
dynamic aesthetic, which is foundational to his method of hope (Miyazaki 
                                                 
13
 Quotations from March 27, 2006 Yonhap News article, ―Private Think Tank ‗Hope Institute‘ 




 Quotation from Hope Institute website feature, ―Now Let‘s Change Our World (Ja ije uri, 
sesangeul hanbeon baggweoboja).‖ http://www.makehope.org/2414. 
15
 See supra 14. 
 190 
2004), I juxtapose it with that of Bruno Latour.  I see Latour‘s work as 
exemplary of what Miyazaki (2004) calls the ―aesthetic of emergence,‖ which 
is predicated on a kind of pragmatism as well. 
 
 
Aesthetic of Emergence 
Hiro Miyazaki describes Clifford Geertz‘s (2000) pragmatist rapprochement 
between philosophy and anthropology whereby the former came closer to the 
latter in its socially-based knowledge claims.  Geertz cited Wittgenstein and 
William James as forebears to his own efforts to relocate knowledge from the 
cerebral to the social practice of interpretation and ―thick description.‖  Geertz 
approached anthropology and philosophy as ―parallel efforts to understand the 
emergent world of which both forms of knowing are part‖ (Miyazaki 2004:133).  
Miyazaki (2004) also includes George Marcus‘s (1998) multi-sited world 
system approach as part of an ongoing American anthropological engagement 
with the pragmatist philosophical tradition (e.g. Riles 2003).   
 
One major effect of this engagement is what he names an ―aesthetic of 
emergence‖ pervasive in anthropology since the early to mid 1980s (Miyazaki 
2004).  This aesthetic is predicated on a rapidly changing world in which 
anthropologists are perpetually behind.  Korean Studies, particularly the 
anthropology of South Korea, has been an exemplary area of this aesthetic.  
As discussed in the introduction, ethnographers have long found themselves 
beset by ―emergences‖ (Janelli and Yim 2002) and perpetually behind 
compressed changes in the field (Abelmann 2003).   
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As an exemplary articulator of this aesthetic, George Marcus (1999) has 
diagnosed anthropology with chronic belatedness to the ―substantial changes‖ 
taking place in the world.  According to Miyazaki (2004), this belatedness or 
gap between anthropological knowledge and the emergent world has become 
a hopeful method for anthropologists.  At the same time, it has brought into 
view a ―shared ground‖ from which anthropologists, philosophers, and their 
subjects can explore the emergent world (Miyazaki 2004:136).  This ―renders 
not only the world but also its analysis provisional, indeterminate, and open-
ended‖ (Miyazaki 2004:137).   
 
Yet while ―pragmatist concepts of ‗emergence‘ enable a more dynamic, 
nondeterministic, complex understanding of social life‖ (Riles 2006b:18), they 
also determine knowledge in a particular way.  Miyazaki observes how the 
aesthetic of emergence forecloses any end point of analysis while embedding 
the failure to achieve temporal congruity between knowledge and the world 
within the shape of knowledge itself (2004:138).  Miyazaki writes: 
 
In the aesthetic of emergence, as currently practiced in anthropology, 
the world is rendered open-ended and indeterminate from beginning to 
end.  Yet by its very open-ended nature, the pull for knowledge comes 
from the emergent world and it does not leave room for hope and its 
method, that is, radical reorientation of knowledge.  What worries me 
most about the aesthetic of emergence, in other words, is the way this 
analytical strategy seems to have taken away the driving force of 
knowledge from hope by giving too much credit to the so-called 
emergent world.  Where knowledge does not seek its own radical 
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reorientation, hope ceases to be the engine of knowledge (Miyazaki 
2004:139). 
 
Miyazaki argues that keeping hope alive requires the ―inheritance of a past 
hope and its performative replication in the present (2004:139).‖  The aesthetic 
of emergence forecloses this replication because its prospective momentum 
comes from anthropologists‘ relative belatedness to the emergent world rather 
than any conscious effort to reorient knowledge to the future.  Miyazaki writes: 
 
The aesthetic of emergence would seem to enable anthropologists to 
maintain prospective momentum without changing the temporal 
orientation of their knowledge any more.  In this scheme, 
anthropologists‘ task becomes simply to trace or track the world as it 
emerges.  Here knowledge itself is rendered emergent in order to mirror 
an emergent world (2004:138). 
 
Although Miyazaki does not directly address Bruno Latour‘s work, it is 
exemplary of what he calls the aesthetic of emergence. For Latour, as for 
those Miyazaki (2003) describes, there is a pragmatist16 engine to the 
aesthetic of emergence. 
 
                                                 
16
 In a 2007 response paper the Social Studies of Science, Latour affirms John Dewey‘s view 
of politics as ―not some essence; it is something that moves; it is something that has a 
trajectory‖ (2007:814).  He proposes a pragmatist redistribution of politics in STS such that the 
political is not an adjective, a sphere, activity, calling, or procedure, but ―what qualifies a type 
of situation‖ such that ―we focus on the objects of concern and then, so as to handle them, 
produce the instruments and equipment necessary to grasp the questions they have raised 
and in which we are hopelessly entangled‖ (original emphasis, 2007:814). 
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In 1999, Latour described his work as an empirical version of William James‘s 
―deambulatory theory of truth.‖  In the course of a debate with David Bloor 
published in Studies of History, Philosophy and Science, Latour (1999a) allies 
himself with James‘s playful response to epistemologists ―who, after having 
cut an abyss between words and world, imagined no other way to relate them 
than a ‗salto mortale‘ above the yawning gap.‖  Just as James did to the 
epistemologists of his day, Latour playfully responds to Bloor as an 
accomplished, but obsolete scholar.  Following James, Latour seeks a 
pragmatist-inspired dynamic accounting of each movement between ―words 
and world.‖  Latour writes: 
 
…I am probably the one in the discipline who has proposed most terms 
to make this transition, this deambulation, observable, realistic and 
documentable: inscription, visualisation, translation, trials, mediation, 
names of action, black-boxing, historicity of things, etc, and I am of 
course not the only one: the whole field is about making the transition 
visible (1999:115). 
 
Latour‘s pragmatist impetus to reveal empirically each transition in the 
deambulation of truth became the oeuvre for science studies.  Documents, for 
example, are one way Latour reveals each deambulatory step, or network, by 
replacing ―the distance between documentary practices in the world and 
critical analysis of those practices that some social scientists take for 
granted…‖ with ―a series of chains of artifacts—our documents, their 
documents, each capable of being manipulated into ever further forms of one 
another‖ (Riles 2006b:13).  Latour expanded upon this vision in his 1999 
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collection of essays entitled Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science 
Studies: 
 
…reference is not something that is added to words, but that it is a 
circulating phenomenon, whose deambulation—to borrow, once again, 
William James‘s term—should not be interrupted by any saltation if we 
want words to refer to the things progressively packed into them.  
Instead of the vertical abyss between words and world, above which the 
perilous footbridge of correspondence would hang, we now have a 
sturdy and thick layering of transverse paths through which masses of 
transformations circulate (original emphasis; 113). 
 
Instead of vertical movement, or scale, in other words, ANT aims to trace 
networks or ―transverse paths‖ of persons, things, and practices to reveal each 
movement between knowledge and the emergent world.  Latour‘s (1999b) 
meticulous study of the Boa Vista is illustrative of this body of work, which 
―does not focus on making claims about the state of the world, but instead on 
documenting the process, networks, and actors through which the world is 
constantly being assembled‖ (Levi and Valverde 2008:808).  The world, in 
other words, is not a static object of knowledge; rather, it is a dynamic process 
which requires dynamic analysis.   Like the aesthetic of emergence, ANT 
―renders not only the world but also its analysis provisional, indeterminate, and 
open-ended‖ (Miyazaki 2004:137).  For the purposes of this dissertation, I take 
the aesthetic of emergence and ANT as exemplary forms of pragmatism as 
transition (Koopman 2009) and assembly (Oppenheim 2008)..   
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In my view, Miyazaki (2004) brings into view the limits of pragmatism vis-à-vis 
―the aesthetic of emergence‖ when considering how to keep hope alive.  This 
insight is central to my effort in this chapter to ethnographically approach how 
Lawyer Park and the Hope Institute attempt to pragmatically make hope.  
Before addressing how I encountered this in the field, however, it is necessary 
to return to Bruno Latour‘s effort to achieve a more hopeful practice.  
Considering Latour‘s pragmatically-conceived personal and analytical 
aesthetic of emergence will bring into focus a similar aesthetic I encountered 
in the field. 
 
Latour sets and keeps analytical categories—such as subject and object, 
nature and culture, global and local, and person and thing—in perpetual 
motion because the world is in perpetual motion.  Like both analysis and world, 
he sets himself in perpetual motion.  In the aforementioned debate with David 
Bloor, Latour writes: 
 
I have changed continuously my topics, my field sites, my style, my 
concepts and my vocabulary –and indulged in too many Macintosh 
doodles! David has not moved an inch and his paper reiterates word for 
word, what was already so forcefully written in his first book. On the one 
hand, this simplifies my task, since I can take his article against me as 
perfectly representative of his own thought, but, on the other hand, it 
renders my defense more difficult since I would be at great pains to say 
which paper, chapter or book is representative of my position. I would 
be tempted to say that the only sources to quote and to dispute are the 
articles or books I am presently working on, but that would be, I agree, 
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a poor answer! Compared to David, I feel very much like a fly dancing 
ceaselessy on top of the Edinburgh Rock…Empirical work has this 
unsettling quality of forcing you to move heaven and earth in order to try 
to follow what happens in practice. It makes me a moving target 
(1999:127). 
 
Latour maintains an empirically-driven emergent aesthetic.  This aesthetic is 
both personal and analytical as he repeatedly demonstrates ―politics by other 
means‖ (Latour 1988:229).  Lawyer Park maintains a similar aesthetic.   
.   
Lawyer Park‘s Emergence 
Unlike many other activists in his generation, Lawyer Park was known for his 
ability to adapt to the changing times and reinvent himself.  One friend and 
colleague described it as Park‘s ability ―to taste the shift beneath society17.‖  
Rather than appearing ideological or dogmatic, Park appeared committed, yet 
practical.  One staffer who had worked for him at PSPD and who continued to 
work for him at the Beautiful Foundation marveled at Park‘s ability to change.  
He said Park was known for being a ―hard-nosed workaholic‖ at PSPD, but 
that inside the Foundation and the Hope Institute he is ―more understanding 
and flexible18.‖   
 
Lawyer Park (Park Byeonhosanim) asked that I call him that even though he 
had not practiced law in several years.  He could have gone by executive 
director or social designer, both titles on his current business card (Chapter 3), 
but he preferred lawyer.  Park leaned forward over his black leather day 
                                                 
17
 Interview with author on July 24, 2006. 
18
 Interview with author on January 11, 2008. 
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planner and grew animated as he recounted his legal background during our 
first formal meeting in 2006.  He was instrumental in the founding of Lawyers 
for a Democratic Society (Minbyeon) and People‘s Solidarity for a Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD, Chamyeoyeondae) (e.g. Kim 2008; Rho 2007).  Both of 
these organizations are iconic in the citizens‘ movement (simin undong) and 
civil society more generally in South Korea (e.g. Armstrong 2002; Dezalay and 
Garth 2007; Kim J.W. 2007).  Park treated the ―Great Democratic Uprising‖ in 
1987—the crowning success of the movement— as an accomplishment, but 
hastened to add that ―democratic change could be realized in one day while 
the legal system remained unchanged19.‖  He explained that ―under a 
dictatorship, law is a weapon of dictators but in a democratic society [law] is 
the weapon of activists20.‖  PSPD sought to turn law from a tool of dictators 
into a tool for citizens (Rho 2007).  Law‘s open potential—being a means 
toward any number of ends (Riles 2004a; 2006a)—was what he and other 
activists treated as their starting point for democratic reform inside South 
Korea.  From the beginning, Park (Hope Institute 2009) dreamed of ―an 
alternative movement not a demonstration21.‖  As a lawyer, he ―dreamed of 
‗changing the world from one event22.‖ 
 
Soon after Park took the secretary-general job in 1994, he modeled PSPD 
after Ralph Nader‘s Public Citizen in the United States (Rho 2007).  The 
Citizens‘ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections (CAGE, Nakseonnakcheon 
undong), was one of the most controversial actions undertaken by NGOs in 
                                                 
19
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
20
 See supra 18. 
21
 See supra 14. 
22
 See supra 14. 
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the post-minjung era.  Lawyer Park is closely associated with the movement 
for better and for worse.   
 
CAGE 
Soon after Park became secretary-general, PSPD began collecting and 
uploading comprehensive information about the National Assembly on the 
internet.  PSPD frequently updated information about representatives‘ 
attendance rates, property holdings, and the bills they supported and opposed.  
CAGE consisted of an unprecedented coalition of around 500 NGOs and non-
profits taking up Lawyer Park‘s agenda to publicly shame politicians by 
investigating corruption charges and publicizing them through blacklists posted 
on an internet site during both the nomination and general election phases 
(Choi J.J. 2000).  When the media publicized the lists, there was a large 
outpouring of voter discontent and cynicism (e.g. Kim H.R. 2004). 
   
CAGE is widely credited with reforming election laws and stopping almost 70 
percent of targeted candidates from winning seats in the 2000 parliamentary 
elections (e.g. Choi J.J. 2000).  59 out of 86 blacklisted candidates were 
defeated while overall, 94 out of 207 incumbent representatives were not re-
elected (Shin 2006).  The most dramatic effects were evident in the Seoul 
metropolitan area where 10 out of the 11 blacklisted candidates were defeated 
while 5 out of 6 blacklisted candidates at the provincial level were also 
defeated (Shin 2006).  Seoul and Gyeonggi province ―were relatively free from 
voting behavior based on regionalism‖ whereas 45.5 percent, or 19 out of 35 
blacklisted candidates, won election in the Gyeongsang region (Shin 2006:20).  
This relatively low percentage reflects the success of CAGE on its own terms. 
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CAGE is an index of the ongoing zero-sum contention between ―political 
society (jeongchi sahoe)‖ and ―civil society (simin sahoe)‖ in Korean Studies.  
Koreanists have approached political society as not only elected politicians 
and the media, but also members of ―elite cartels‖ going back to military-
industrial patronage during Park‘s dictatorship (e.g., Choi J.J. 2000).  ―Civil 
society,‖ on the other hand, includes not only NGOs and NPOs from the 
minjung tradition, but also those who cite only a citizens‘ (simin) tradition and a 
vast array of state-sponsored (GONGOs), quasi-state (QUANGOs), and 
religious organizations.  CAGE effectively mobilized many of these disparate 
factions with the formation of a Buddhists‘ Alliance, Christians‘ Alliance, and 
Catholics‘ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections along with Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society (Minbyeon) after the movement led election law reforms 
(Choi J.J. 2000).  CAGE was the largest, most effective, and most 
controversial example of civil society ―politics by other means‖ (Latour 1988).   
 
Choi Jang Jip, a prominent scholar and activist who constitutes an exemplary 
social movement analyst, has articulated the gap between military 
authoritarian reality and liberal democratic ideals in the ―multi-level‖ terms of 
―democratic transition‖ and ―consolidation.‖  Choi (2000) cites Wolfgang 
Merkel‘s (1999) ―The Consolidation of Post-Autocratic Regimes: A Multilevel 
Model‖ in his analysis of ―levels‖ of democratization from institutional 
consolidation of democratic elections and constitution to the 
internationalization of democratic behavior norms.  According to Choi, South 
Korea ―has not yet reached the second level of democratization, the 
consolidation of the representative system,‖ which is precisely what CAGE 
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exposed (2000:31-32).  Choi argues that there is still an autonomous political 
society, a vestige of ―elite cartels‖ from the dictatorship period, who ―seeks its 
own power and interests‖ while ―ignoring demands for changes‖ both from the 
state and civil society (2000:29).  It is largely the persistent ―hegemony‖ of this 
political society that explains the relative weaknesses in terms of party 
organization, human resources, and ―immature‖ state management in the Kim 
Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations (Choi J.J. 2000; Kang 2008).  
The intransigence of this political society has produced a ―gap‖ between 
political and civil society to replace the historical ―clash‖ between the state and 
civil society (Choi J.J. 2000:27). 
 
Cho Hee-Yeon, another prominent activist and social movement analyst, 
describes this ―gap‖ as a ―huge discrepancy‖ (2005:12).  He calls the ―gap‖ 
and ―discrepancy‖ a ―special situation of political lag‖ because ―people 
demanded a driving force and momentum from social movements for a strong 
democratic reform of politics‖ even though they ―distrusted‖ political parties 
(2005:12).  In this characteristic double bind, civil movement organizations 
filled the vacuum by undertaking ―the role of not only watchdog, but also that 
of a kind of proxy-party‖ (2005:12).  CAGE was the ―climax‖ of this ―proxy 
representation,‖ or ―politics by other means‖ (Cho H.Y. 2005:12; Latour 1988).  
In Choi Jang Jip‘s words: 
 
The political reform advocated by the CAGE movement was initially 
included within the government‘s agenda for reform.  However, the 
government failed to achieve this goal not only because the 
government was incapable of implementing political reform but also 
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political society refused to accept it.  The CAGE movement held the 
government accountable for what it did not do, and thus performed the 
function of political reform in its place (2000:55). 
 
CAGE, in other words, marked a moment in the ongoing ―clash‖ and ―gap‖ 
between civil and political society over the democratic reform agenda.  ―The 
success of the citizens‘ movement and the failure of institutional politics were 
two sides of the same coin of Korean democratization in the 1990s‖ (Shin 
2006:20).  CAGE was blamed for jump-starting a precipitous decrease in 
national voter turnout and for cementing the growing criticism of NGOs and 
NPOs as backward-looking and negative (Choi 2000; Kim 2004).  One veteran 
activist argued that CAGE is the cause of another widely lamented NGO 
problem: declining media coverage.  CAGE‘s corruption allegations created a 
media firestorm, which subjected the media to closer examination and more 
criticism, which in turn changed the relationship between NGOs and the media.  
Several activists claimed that newspapers do not even respond to many press 
releases anymore, let alone devote a full page to NGOs as they previously did.  
One activist said that many media organizations were doing better 
investigative work than most NGOs and as a result were attracting more 
talented college graduates, which contributed to the ―citizen movement 
reproduction crisis (simin undong jaesaengsan wigi)23.‖ 
 
Lawyer Park and several other human rights lawyers had been conducting 
research into the blacklisting strategies of previous Korean authoritarian 
regimes since at least the 1970s (e.g. Kim and Choi 1998).  CAGE effectively 
                                                 
23
 Personal conversation with author on August 8, 2006. 
 202 
turned an authoritarian tool of suppression—the blacklist—into a democratic 
tool of accountability and transparency.  Politicians were unprecedentedly 
called out and punished for a multitude of indiscretions.  CAGE was so 
successful that the following year a group of feminists released a blacklist of 
labor and civil activists accused of sexual harassment or assault and similarly 
announced their names on the internet.  Nicola Anne Jones (2003) quotes 
Cho Hyo-je, a prominent social movement scholar and colleague of Lawyer 
Park, on the blacklisting approach: 
 
…Sometimes people do not change voluntarily, and something must be 
done to change their behavior forcefully if necessary…the creation of 
some atmosphere of fear is necessary sometimes: ‗if you don‘t change, 
we will change you‘--…a kind of proactive stance… (149). 
 
In a related development, one of the founders and former secretary-general of 
Green Korea United was accused by a woman volunteer of sexual harassment 
around this same time.  The man stepped down from several posts and 
ostensibly cut all ties with Green Korea.  I only heard about this the following 
year when one of Green Korea‘s members told me about it and seriously 
suggested that it may have been retaliation by a group of candidates who lost 
in the general election because of CAGE24.  These were the kinds of ripple 
effects that NGOs faced, or imagined they faced, in the wake of CAGE‘s 
success. 
 
                                                 
24
 Personal conversation with author on June 30, 2001. 
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Lawyer Park became synonymous with this tough blacklisting approach, which 
PSPD employed under his leadership.  One of his friends and business 
associates joked that Park became a ―[mafia] don25‖ after the movement 
because government and business leaders suddenly realized how powerful 
NGOs had become.  He practically turned an authoritarian tool, the blacklist, 
into a democratic accountability tool.  Counter to David Kennedy‘s (2004) 
critique26, this was a case of a humanitarian embracing pragmatic means and 
fashioning a position of power out of it.  He faced many critiques-- some 
Foucauldian of the progressive-turned-fascist discussed in the previous 
chapter and some pragmatic that CAGE effectively increased cynicism and 
depressed voter turnout while stunting future media coverage of NGO 
campaigns (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
Lawyer Park did not explicitly dispute many of these critiques.  In an article 
posted on the Hope Institute‘s website, Park reflects: 
 
Looking back on it now, I doubt whether the anti-campaign was the right 
way to completely change politics. But I believe that it gave us an 
opportunity to see the hope for change that voters can bring down the 
members of the National Assembly when they gather together27. 
 
                                                 
25
 Personal conversation with author on July 30, 2006. 
26
 Kennedy writes, ―It is as if [humanitarian] commitments can only be articulated—must, in 
some sense, remain rebukes to those in power, external measures of their legitimacy, rather 
than guides for action.  Or as if pragmatism must remain something humanitarians can only 
hope to achieve in the future—in the meantime, we will have to settle for being savvy about 
the power of others‖ (2004:332).   
27
 See supra 14. 
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Park and his staff at the Hope Institute were skillful at turning past ―negative‖ 
campaigns into ―positive‖ analogs of hope for the present and future.  I will 
discuss this reorientation from past to future and negative to positive which 
was so prevalent for Lawyer Park and Hope Institute staff.  Before getting to 
that, however, it is important to see CAGE and blacklisting as a means to 
another end.   
 
Park has sought to reform the Korean legal system by applying relevant 
lessons from his studies abroad.  Park recalled his decision to study abroad at 
the London School of Economics and Harvard Law School during the early 
1990s as a way to go about refreshing himself and gathering ideas about how 
to change the Korean legal system.  He mentioned interning at the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) as a time of intense learning when he began to 
formulate ―a way of thinking to establish another civil group [in South 
Korea]28.‖  PSPD became this other group, which ―from its beginning…had 
decided to pursue tangible solutions to specific problems rather than chase 
grand, unachievable ideals‖ (Rho 2007:14).  Park described PSPD‘s approach 
as a ―concrete way to change society based on legal means29.‖ Han Kyun Rho 
(2007) concludes that a ―pragmatic disposition‖ united the group‘s disparate 
constituencies of practicing lawyers, leftwing social theorists, and young social 
activists.  Many early supporters spoke of the need to be a part of a ―winning 
social movement‖ (Rho 2007).  Park was insistent that PSPD ―focused on anti-
corruption through legal means‖ as they achieved ―hundreds of legal changes 
in one decade during Korea‘s transition from a dictatorship to a diverse civil 
society (Beautiful Foundation 2006).‖  CAGE and blacklisting were legal and 
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 Interview with author on June 12, 2007. 
29
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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political battles that elevated Park and PSPD to another level of public 
prominence.  Lawyer Park said the notoriety he enjoyed as a result of CAGE‘s 
success enabled him to implement another vision for a civil organization he 
had begun to formulate while at Harvard Law School. 
 
As an Eisenhower Fellow in the early 1990s, Park visited the Council on 
Foundations, The Make a Wish Foundation, and the Triangle Community 
Foundation.  He also recalled being impressed by Oxfam and other non-profit 
organizations while studying in London.  Yet it was at Harvard in 1992 that 
Park began to conceptualize what would later become the largest community 
foundation and second-hand stores in South Korea—the Beautiful Foundation 
(Areumdaun Jaedan) and Beautiful Stores (Areumdaun Gage) respectively. 
Park recalled reading an article in the university newspaper one day: ―the most 
beautiful words are ‗check enclosed‖ (Hope Institute N.d.).  This sense of the 
beauty of donation lingered in his mind because ―in Korea it is impossible to 
work for changing the world without making money separately, which requires 
double work‖ (Hope Institute N.d.).  Park wanted to support ―one doing the 
work of one hundred (ildangbaek)‖ by raising money for people so that they 
could carry out their dreams of changing Korean society without worrying 
about money (see also chapter 2).  However, he put those plans on hold while 
working at PSPD.  In an interview published in Alliance Magazine Park said: 
 
In 1994 I was only 38 and [PSPD] was heavily criticized for attacking 
business groups and the government, so fundraising was difficult.  But 
when I started the Beautiful Foundation, I was in my late forties and my 
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friends had been promoted to high positions in government and 
business30… Also, I was already well-known by then (2006:20). 
 
Lawyer Park made a name for himself through campaigns such as CAGE.  He 
also effectively managed and capitalized on his elite connections.  Yet as an 
activist, Park also had to manage and forego these connections and privileges 
like other student activists during the 1970s and 80s (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
 
Lawyer Park‘s Emergence Continued  
Like many other former student activists, Lawyer Park often drew attention to 
the sacrifices and struggles of his university days as well as the challenges in 
the early years of democratic reform.  He recalled being expelled from Seoul 
National University and jailed for four months in 1975 for activist organizing.  
Park fondly recalled his time in jail as a time of ―suffering, but also a good 
opportunity to think.  The talk inside and outside prison was motivation to think 
about what should be next for Korean society31.‖  When he was barred from 
returning to university after prison, Park said it was a ―good time to read books 
and travel around the country.‖  Park went on to complete a degree in history 
from another university and self-studied to pass the bar exam in 1980.  He 
worked as a public prosecutor for one year before resigning to practice human 
rights law.  Park was part of a small, but increasingly powerful activist group of 
former Seoul National University Law School students who went on to found 
                                                 
30
 Park was born in South Gyeongsang province, graduated from Gyeonggi High School, and 
attended Seoul National University law school.  At the time he attended, Gyeonggi High 
School and SNU law school were the two most exclusive schools in the country (Dezalay and 
Garth 2007; Kim and Yu 1996).  Lawyer Park said that high school memories and friends had 
drawn him to open the Beautiful Foundation and Hope Institute offices in the downtown Insa-
dong area of Seoul during the early 2000s. 
31
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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Lawyers for a Democratic Society (e.g. Kim 2007).  During this time he served 
as one of a group of human rights lawyers who represented Insook Kwon in 
her landmark sexual harassment lawsuit (see Chapter 1).  He spearheaded 
human rights research into Korea‘s sordid history during the 1980s and 1990s.  
For example, Park argued in 1995 that the government was trying to pay off 
victims of the 1980 Gwangju Massacre rather than acknowledge that the 
government had acted illegally (Lewis 2002:172).  He told me that he had 
―dedicated‖ himself to the organization for seven years, but that ―seven years 
is too long in one organization32.‖  Not long after CAGE, Park began to 
reinvent himself with the founding of the Beautiful Foundation. 
 
One Beautiful Foundation staffer recalled Park‘s confession in a taxi one day 
not long after becoming the full-time executive director that ―he could 
understand the mind of a CEO33.‖  This was a stark contrast to PSPD‘s 
various investigations into CEO misconduct during the 1990s.  During this time, 
PSPD adapted strategies from Ralph Nader and Saul Alinsky to introduce 
minority shareholder activism to several large Korean business conglomerates 
(Rho 2007).  The result was a series of high-profile scandals during the 1990s.  
Park named the financial crisis and the election of Kim Dae Jung in the late 
part of the decade as major catalysts for PSPD‘s anti-corruption investigations, 
particularly the CAGE movement in 2000.  He said it was a ―good chance‖ to 
push for transparency, but that the current moment—2006—was no longer a 
―fresh‖ or ―interesting‖ time for transparency34.  Park shared an anecdote to 
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 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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 Interview with author on September 22, 2006. 
34
 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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explain what he meant by this, which was when the agenda first came into 
view as an artifact of the pragmatic effort for liberal-democratic reform.. 
 
The Agenda 
Lawyer Park recalled a case during the 90s when he was secretary-general of 
PSPD.  At that time, PSPD requested that the Seoul mayor disclose the extra-
salary expenditures of his staff.  According to Park, the mayor agreed to reveal 
the amounts but refused to disclose any names.  Unsatisfied with this offer, 
PSPD took the mayor to district court and won.  However, the mayor appealed 
to a higher court where he won.  During the time between the initial suit and 
the appeal decision, the mayor became Kim Dae Jung‘s prime minister and 
helped introduce legislation that called for the very disclosure PSPD requested 
in the first place.  This was the height of the financial crisis and the new prime 
minister went on to become one of the most visible supporters for 
transparency reforms by allying with organizations such as Transparency 
International (TI).  PSPD, on the other hand, rejected TI‘s initial queries about 
the group becoming a local chapter.  Lawyer Park and a couple others 
involved in the discussions at the time cited TI‘s foreign status and charter 
restriction on blacklisting as reasons for PSPD‘s decision to not serve as the 
Korean chapter35.  
 
Lawyer Park offered this anecdote not to criticize how the former prime 
minister used transparency to advance his own career, as many activists did; 
rather he used it to explain why transparency was no longer as ―fresh‖ or 
―interesting‖ an agenda for NGOs and NPOs in the mid-2000s as it was during 
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 Personal conversations on March 17, 2006 and August 18, 2006. 
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the late-90s36.  Park went out of his way to point out how he maintained good 
relations with both TI and the former prime minister through their cooperative 
work on integrity pacts.  Lawyer Park, like the former prime minister, was using 
transparency for his own ends.  Some accused Lawyer Park of being no 
different than the prime minister given the higher profile and increased 
fundraising capacity his organizations enjoyed after movements such as 
CAGE.  Park was accumulating the kind of power he used to criticize others 
for wielding.  For some activists, Park‘s status as a ―don‖ was not a joke; 
rather, it was an example of the progressive-turned-fascist Foucault (1983) 
had identified ―inside us all‖ that came to be emblematic of many former 
activists who acquired positions of power (Lee 2007; Song 2009).  In the 
interest of being part of a ―winning social movement‖ (Rho 2007),  some 
appeared to value ―results‖ over ―process,‖ or ends over means, which was 
precisely the critique of the military authoritarian regime (see Chapter 2). 
 
Lawyer Park was acutely aware of these critiques.  He resisted numerous 
lucrative job offers both in government and business.  One of the reasons his 
name was often raised at election time was to see if he was going to go the 
way of many other ―first generation‖ civil leaders to join political society, or if he 
was going to continue ―politics by other means‖ (Cho 2000; Cho 2005; Latour 
1988). 
   
Park joked how he left behind a comfortable life practicing law to work for a 
fraction of the salary most of his friends enjoyed.  He matter-of-factly said that 
if someone‘s salary was too high, then it was impossible to ―have pride in the 
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 Interview with author on February 5, 2007. 
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work37.‖  In 2003 he gave a lecture at the Judicial Research and Training 
Institute (JRTI), the elite and mandatory training institute for all lawyers in 
South Korea, in which he ―tempted‖ the students to start public interest 
careers38.  He (2009) said, ―there are lots of things to do when ridding oneself 
of money and honor39.‖  One law student took Park‘s message and a few 
years later established Gonggam, a public interest law group supported 
partially by Beautiful Foundation funds.  The group has grown to seven full-
time lawyers with numerous volunteers and interns.   
 
Lawyer Park‘s Transparency 
Park maintained a personal commitment to certain kinds of transparency.  He 
made his personal schedule available to staff in his organizations and like all 
Beautiful Foundation staff, published his personal salary online.  Park did not 
have his own car or driver; rather he used taxis and proudly pointed out how 
many taxi drivers refused to charge him full fare once they found out who he 
was40.  Several activists said that taxi drivers often did this for activists a few 
years before, but that now they often wondered what these people were doing 
after democracy had been achieved.  Park was visibly doing many things that 
had ―no direct relationship with politics or other socially sensitive issues‖ 
(2006:20).  As one of his staffers explained, he now attracted donors and 
supporters based on ―culture‖ rather than ―the shared ideology of the past41.‖ 
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 Interview with author on June 12, 2007. 
41
 Interview with author on September 26, 2006. 
 211 
Park fashioned himself as a ―social designer‖ charged with ―regaining the 
hegemony in initiating the social agenda42.‖  He saw his task as ―setting the 
agenda‖ to the next ―fresh and interesting‖ thing rather than raising socially or 
politically sensitive issues43.  When I asked him about charges from some 
NGO workers that the Hope Institute was copying their campaigns and agenda, 
Park responded: 
 
There may be some ideas which are similar with items dealt by other 
civic groups. However, I make it a rule not to deal with any idea or 
project which others are doing similarly or are doing well.  The Hope 
Institute is not another civic group. It is a think tank which is inventing 
new agendas to distribute to others44. 
 
Civil leaders had long conceived of their role as leading government and 
business organizations while approaching government and business officials 
as obstinate adversaries to this task.  Lawyer Park‘s anecdote illustrates how 
his view of the GO-NGO relationship had changed.  He tells the story to 
highlight how the former prime minister reinvented politics before many NGOs 
even recognized it. Park claimed that media, government, and business 
organizations had come to accept many of the issues activists had 
championed in previous decades such as transparency.  For Park, this meant 
that NGOs and non-profits had to become more ―practical‖ and ―precise‖ in the 
future if they wanted to regain their ability to set the agenda45.  When I 
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arranged my first meeting with someone from the Hope Institute, I received a 
visual sketch of Park‘s career and agenda. 
 
Park‘s Career as Civil Society Agenda 
Vice President Yoon, one of two such vice-presidents at the Hope Institute, 
had known Park since their days of writing for Korea‘s largest Left-leaning 
daily, The Hankyoreh, during the late 1980s.  When I asked about Lawyer 
Park‘s ―vision‖ (bijeon) for the Institute, Yoon began to draw as well as talk46.  
He began by writing ―86‖ and then drawing a horizontal line almost to the other 
end of the paper and writing ―2006,‖ the year it was at the time of the interview 
which was also when the Institute was founded.  ―86‖ became ―history 
(yeoksa)‖ on the paper as Yoon explained Park‘s research into Korea‘s 
colonial and authoritarian history.  Yoon next drew an arrow from ―history‖ and 
wrote ―PSPD (Chamyeoyeondae),‖ the group Park helped found and served 
as secretary-general of for seven years.  He explained how PSPD was a 
watchdog that criticized corrupt government and business practices.  Yoon 
then drew an arrow from PSPD and wrote ―areum (beauty)‖ for Beautiful 
Foundation (Areumdaun Jaedan).  Before describing the Foundation‘s work, 
Yoon drew another arrow from PSPD and wrote livelihood cooperation 
(saenghyeop), which he wrote in parantheses just above Beautiful Foundation.   
 
Yoon filled in the last gap between Beautiful Foundation and 2006 with an 
arrow and wrote ―huimang (hope)‖ for Hope Institute (Huimang Jejakso).  After 
doing this, he wrote ―positive‖ underneath Hope Institute and went back to 
write ―negative‖ underneath PSPD.  Yoon then complemented the ―history‖ 
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written under ―86‖ with ―future (mirae),‖ which he wrote under the ―positive‖ he 
had just written under Hope Institute (which were all written under 2006).  With 
this last addition, Yoon emphasized the significance of the progression.  These 
generic bookends—history and future— along with the one-way arrows 










Illustration 4.1: Yoon Suk-in‘s sketch with my notes added in subsequent 
discussion (Note: Yoon‘s sketch appears lighter and often with shapes) 
 
Yoon took evident care and pleasure in demarcating each box, and particularly 
each forward-pointing arrow.  What was remarkable about Yoon‘s aesthetic 
choices were how measured, incremental, and linear they appeared.  He 
described Park‘s ―vision‖ as a trajectory of organizations moving forward from 
―negative‖ to ―positive‖ and from ―history‖ to ―future‖ ―not with a network of 
words but with words in linear series‖ (Bateson 1958:3).  The Hope Institute 
was the latest, positive, and future-oriented movement in Lawyer Park‘s 
progressive career and the history of South Korea‘s civil society.  Lawyer Park 
appears as a representative figure for South Korean civil society not unlike 
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how Im Kwon-Taek has appeared vis-a-vis South Korean cinema (e.g. James 
and Kim 2002).  Both men‘s careers come to stand in for compressed and 
dynamic national(ist) progress in political and cultural spheres similar to the 
kind of rapid progress long praised in the economic sphere.  The progressive 
temporality of Park mirrors that of the nation-state (Greenhouse 1996).  The 
temporality of Park‘s career dictated the temporality of NGO and NPO work in 
South Korea (Traweek 1988). Thomas Yarrow writes of Ghanaian activists‘: 
 
own sense of agency—of their capacity to act on the world and bring 
about social and political change—was defined not in opposition to 
historical ‗structure,‘ but through and in relation to it.  To tell of their 
‗lives‘ was to tell of historical developments in the country and political 
movements they were part of (2005:72). 
 
Lawyer Park was self-consciously a student of history having majored in it and 
having taught a course on South Korean civil society history while working as 
a visiting professor at Stanford University.  He spoke as much of being acted 
upon by the movement of history as he acted upon it.  Lawyer Park often self-
consciously appeared not as an individual agent, but as a movement agent—
legal, political, social, national, and international.  In speeches to social 
designer audiences, Park frequently reviewed his own biography as evidence 
of how one person can ―change the world‖ and demonstrate that ―another 
world is possible.‖  At the Fourth Annual Social Designer‘s School in Seoul, for 
example, Park told the crowd: 
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There is an empty place in everything and a way where no one has 
gone.  If you have a dream and passion, so that you have power to 
withstand long periods of time, you can develop your ability to look at 
good ideas in the world.  You can become a social designer who makes 
a better world (Hope Institute N.d.).  
 
Lawyer Park (Hope Institute N.d.) ―described the process he experienced from 
a self-styled ‗prominent lawyer,‘ to People‘s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy, to the Beautiful Foundation, to the Beautiful Shop, to an attorney 
with public interest, and to a ‗social designer‘ who founded the Hope Institute 
one after another…47‖  The Hope Institute website said, ―His life story was 
unfolded this time in the lecture hall‖ (Hope Institute N.d.).  Lawyer Park 
happily engaged in self-promotion and the collapse of his own narrative into 
South Korea‘s civil society narrative when addressing ―social designers who 
have a dream of changing the world‖ (Hope Institute N.d.).  Park self-
consciously instrumentalized his own story as a means for social design. 
 
Even Park‘s critics conceded his importance in shaping the direction of the 
movement and civil society.  One New Right scholar and former advisor to Kim 
Dae Jung challenged Park‘s patriotism in one breath and then admitted his 
deep interest in the outcome of his current venture in the next48.  An activist 
who questioned his commitment to small NGOs when the Beautiful 
Foundation first started, began to praise Park and the Foundation for raising 
operational awareness inside NGOs and NPOs when they offered capacity-
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building and fundraising workshops49.  A well-known civil leader unequivocally 
called Park an ―asset to any movement50.‖  Another civil leader likened Park to 
a bird who could ―see the big picture‖ and ―set the course,‖ but who often 
―already changed course by the time everyone else caught up with him51.‖ 
 
Lawyer Park told me matter-of-factly and without a bit of regret when I asked 
permission to take a picture of his office, ―I have no privacy52.‖  As a person, 
Park was transparent insofar as he appeared as an organization or movement 
(John 2010).  Park sought to make his life into his career, which in turn 
became the movement and agenda of South Korean civil society. 
 
Leader Park 
The Hope Institute claims that Park is the first person in South Korea to use 
the term ―social designer (sosyeol dijaineo).‖  Park claims inspiration from 
Japan where Rikkyo University has a department of social design and Italy 
where Ezio Manzini, Professor of Industrial Design at Milan Polytechnic, has 
expanded the limits of design.  Park and other Hope Institute staff often gave 
me the example of the light bulb being an invention, but that lighting a whole 
street or neighborhood is a social invention.    
 
Just as the effects of social design are broad, the possibilities of who is one 
are similarly broad.  Lawyer Park and all Hope Institute staff called themselves 
social designers and had it printed on their business cards.  They similarly 
encouraged others to take on the title.  The argument was that the 
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―democratization (minjuhwa) of knowledge production is ‗hope production 
(huimang jejak)‖ (Hope Institute 2006). During my fieldwork period, a group of 
staffers tried to apply this ―democratization‖ to everyone who worked at the 
Institute.  In their own job title project (chapter 3), they formulated an Excel 
spreadsheet with everyone‘s title in order to update the website.  The project 
was ostensibly fueled by the need to translate job titles into English.  One 
staffer suggested using all lower case letters to ―equalize‖ titles in English53.  
Many others thought it would look strange or like an unintentional mistake.  In 
the end, the Institute decided on conventional titles, but unconventionally 
visualized the relations between departments or centers as the roots and 
stems of plants. 
 
The Hope Institute (2006) imagined its role as facilitator and collaborator with 
citizens: 
 
In Korea, many private or government-led ‗think tanks‘ were introduced 
during the past 10 years. They certainly gave vital support to improve 
Korean society, but many of them put their energy into analyzing the 
past and the present and identifying the problems. In fact, it was the 
government, the political world, and political intellectuals who had to 
find the ideas to solve the problems. At this point, the original purpose 
to solve problems took a back seat, and social issues became the 
subjects of partisan power struggle between parties and of political 
intellectuals ‗making arguments‘… Although it is no longer possible to 
ignore the problems, it is still hard to encourage and collect creative 
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ideas to solve the problems while Korean society only focuses on 
figuring out the cause and responsibility for the problem.  What lacks in 
Korean society is an active design, creative plan for the future, and 
‗bilateral benchmarking (ssangbangjeok benchimaking)‘ that creates co-
production by drawing reasonable elements from everyone‘s 
experience and opinions. 
 
Manager Yoo (Hope Institute 2009) goes on to distinguish social design from 
revolution: 
 
Why did we come across the term, social design, not revolution nor 
reform?  Among the several characteristics of the attempts being made 
in front of the term ‗social design‘, isn‘t it the fusion of imagination, 
active utilization of social media, commercial, nonprofit, government, 
business, civil society, or activities that transcend the boundaries that 
looked irrelevant or hostile, rather than get angry or lament? 
 
This ―fusion‖ and ―transcendence‖ of boundaries in the face of anger or lament 
speaks of a post-utopian hope (e.g., Tanuma 2007). In a 2007 email exchange, 
Park likened the NPO responsibility to not accept funds that present a conflict 
of interest to that of the government.  He wrote: 
 
I think it's up to nature or character of the each NGO. For example, my 
former organization, PSPD, had never accepted any money from the 
conglomerates because PSPD is a strong advocacy group which is 
always criticizing and monitoring such business groups.   However, the 
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Beautiful Foundation or Hope Institute do no work with which it has 
sensitive relations with the business community. On the other hand, 
they should explore alternative relations with businesses for 
partnerships. I think it is the same for government bodies54. 
 
The Hope Institute (2009) asks: 
 
Is Park a government employee, or is he not? According to the 
Japanese Nikkei, company and NPO are united, and NPO is becoming 
progressively commercialized. Since the executive director is working 
for the public interest, isn‘t the executive director both a government 
employee and CEO?  He worked in the Beautiful Foundation and the 
Beautiful shops, crossing borders of different areas, and through such 
experience, he was said to have his identity as social designer. 
 
Lawyer Park (Hope Institute 2009) has put forward ―Ten Commandments 
(Gyemyeong) of World-Changing People.‖  This short, self-help form 
compresses his leadership philosophy: 
 
1. Give up everything.  Then you will be given everything. (Leadership of 
Sacrifice (Huisaeng)) 
2. Get ideas even in hell.  And crisscross the site (hyeonjang). (Vision, 
On- Site Experiencism (Hyeonjangjuui), Action) 
3. Get people.  Teamwork saves the world. (Main agent, People, 
Friendship) 
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4. Go knock.  And ask. Don‘t get hurt even though you get rejected. 
(Fundraising, Money) 
5. Copy (Kapi) changes the world. (Copy, Slogan) 
6. Study everyday and innovate yourself. (Creation and Innovation) 
7. Small things are beautiful. (Leadership of Delicacy) 
8. There is nothing you can do by yourself.  Gather people and embrace 
them. (Beauty of an Important Title) 
9. Nothing is easy.  Changing the world is Sisyphus‘ destiny. (Hardship-
Enjoying Heart) 
10. Life is endless wandering and traveling.  Always venture out. 
(Philosophy of Love and Farewell) 
 
Dictator Park 
One of the first jokes I heard about Lawyer Park from his staff was that he was 
a ―dictator (dokjaeja)‖ that ran a non-profit ―jaebeo55l‖ (a large, family-owned 
conglomerate like Hyundai or Samsung).  Nearly everyone who worked under 
him said that he demanded more of his staff than any other boss they ever 
knew and that ―no one works as hard as him56.‖  Many said that Park 
―inspired‖ and ―motivated‖ them more than anyone else, but that ―getting 
burned out was part of the job description57.‖  One former staffer even said of 
NGO and NPO workers in general that they ―leave their human rights at the 
door58.‖  Several staffers said no major decision was made without Park and 
that the organization would cease to run without him.  
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Lawyer Park had protested Park Chung Hee‘s regime as a student.  He came 
of age during one of the most nakedly brutal periods of Park‘s rule—the so-
called ―emergency decree (ginjo)‖ period from 1974 until Park‘s assassination 
in 1979—which was known as a ―crisis government‖ (Lee N.H. 2009).  Lawyer 
Park said of Park Chung Hee that he is ―fundamentally a dictator‖ but that 
―citizens still see him as a great leader because he built the economy59.‖  He 
went on to say that Park took and kept power by ―oppressing democracy and 
violating human rights.‖  Lawyer Park said that ―it is not good to sacrifice 
[democracy or human rights] for [economic growth]60.‖ 
 
During my last long interview with Park, he said that he had ―inherited Korea‘s 
tragedy‖ from his parents and that his own experience of Park Chung Hee‘s 
authoritarian policies during the 1960s and 70s had made him a ―critic61.‖  In 
the next breath, however, he said that he had also ―inherited Korea‘s 
optimism.‖  This optimism—what he later called hope (huimang)—has enabled 
him to see that ―through economic progress Korea became the 12th largest 
economy in the world‖ which made ―many things possible62.‖  Lawyer Park 
acknowledged the ―tragedy‖ of Korea‘s rapid development while also trying to 
recover the ―national utopian imagination‖ which sparked it (e.g. Nelson 2000).  
Lawyer Park sought to mobilize the scale of Park Chung Hee‘s design without 
repeating its social costs. 
 
Park self-consciously called upon South Korea‘s miraculous economic 
progress as inspiration for the kind of social progress he hoped to lead with 
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the Hope Institute.  He conceived of the Hope Institute as a Hope Factory.  
The Institute‘s Korean name jejakso connotes a factory, or place of 
manufacturing, which evokes a major site (hyeonjang) of national economic 
development (see Chapter 3).  One day over tea in his office he explained how 
the Institute‘s name combines ―abstract hope‖ with ―concrete factory‖ in a 
―fresh‖ and ―interesting‖ way while still being ―practical (siryongjeok)63.‖  Park 
chose the name so that people would want to ask about—which many did—
and so that it captured the imagination in a hopeful way.  Lawyer Park‘s 
previous venture, the Beautiful Foundation had done this with areumdaun.  He 
smiled as he recalled many people‘s assumption that the foundation had 
―something to do with cosmetics,‖ but that now it appears in everything from 
city tourism slogans to electronics advertisements.  Foundation literature talks 
about its work ―to rebuild a Korean giving culture which had been shaken by 
tragedies such as the Korean War and 40 years of colonization by Japan then 
left behind during the dizzying process of overnight industrialization (2008:6).‖ 
 
Park often gleaned hope from South Korea‘s rapid and compressed 
experience of development.  Secretary-General Choi, like many other activists 
and civil leaders, treated Japan‘s present as Korea‘s destined future unless 
major changes were made.  In particular, he foresaw the obsolescence of 
NGOs and NPOs in Korea like he observed in Japan.  Lawyer Park, on the 
other hand, borrowed many ideas from Japan and saw tremendous hope in 
Korea‘s relatively quick ability to change.  For example, Park took on the case 
of a Seoul National University teaching assistant suing her professor for 
sexual harassment in 1994.  He had previously served on the team of lawyers 
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that represented Insook Kwon, the student activist discussed in the first 
chapter who brought a lawsuit against a police detective for sexual 
harassment in 1986.  There were no laws against it and ―nobody knew how 
the law could solve this problem‖ (Hope Institute 2009).  Lawyer Park not only 
saw how to use law as a means for social change, but also how quickly such 
change happens in South Korea.  Park was successful in getting a new 
provision making sexual harassment a crime in 1999.  He recalled: 
 
When I visited a bar association in Japan before working on this case, 
there was a legal advice center for sexual harassment.  But there is no 
law against sexual harassment in Japan until now.  I am confident that 
there is hope in South Korea.  Korea has been dynamically changed 
compared to other countries and it will be changed.  One event 
changes the world (Hope Institute 2009). 
 
Park said that unlike intellectuals, activists, and social designers in other 
countries, South Koreans ―are optimistic64‖ about making change because 
they have experienced so much of it (e.g. Abelmann 2003).  He could dream 
of ―one event to change the world (sageon hanaga sesangeul baggumnida) ‖ 
because South Korea is a place where one event has changed the world 
(Hope Institute N.d.).  This was Lawyer Park‘s hope and social design, not his 
fear.  Like Dictator Park‘s nation design, Lawyer Park‘s social design 
confidently and hopefully draws upon the past to realize a better future.  
Lawyer Park‘s planned legacy, like that of Park Chung Hee‘s, is an ―ethical 
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injunction to South Korean citizens to look back in wonder, look inside 
themselves, and then realize the future‖ (Oppenheim 2008:28).   
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have demonstrated how the tragedy of one event changing 
the world, a historical reality for Korea that can refer to anything from national 
division to authoritarianism, has been turned into a pragmatic and hopeful 
means for one person changing the world.  As a student of history not 
opposed to borrowing ideas and assuming power, Lawyer Park has recovered 
a legacy going back to Confucianism and the practical study movement (silhak 
undong), the minjung movement, as well as Park Chung Hee‘s regime 
(Oppenheim 2008), on which he has built a NGO and non-profit network which 
some liken to business conglomerate (jaebeol) or empire.  Lawyer Park‘s 
career was presented by him and many colleagues as if the history of South 
Korean civil society (Greenhouse 1996; Yarrow 2005).  He has repeatedly 
rendered his life into his work and his work into a movement; he has been an 
instrument of legal reform, anti-corruption, transparency, community 
foundation, and social design.  Along the way he maintained commitment 
through sacrifice (huisaeng).  His work to ―set the agenda‖ and undertake 
―social design‖ invited my effort in this chapter to juxtapose Lawyer Park and 
Bruno Latour.   
 
I treat Latour as an appropriate analog to Lawyer Park insofar as both cultivate 
a personal aesthetic of dynamism, agenda-setting in their respective fields, 
and in the recent past have turned to progressive hope.  Most importantly for 
the purposes of this dissertation, however, is that both recover forms of 
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pragmatism in order to articulate their hopeful agendas.  Latour‘s ANT legacy 
in a wide variety of scholarship has been to empirically demonstrate, not unlike 
William James, each transition between knowledge and the world.  His chosen 
metaphor for this work of ―opening the black boxes of scientific facts,‖ has 
been opening Pandora‘s Box in order to find hope (Latour 1999:23). One of 
the arguments of this chapter has been that this science studies work can be 
read as an example of what Hiro Miyazaki (2004) has termed the ―aesthetic of 
emergence.‖  The legacy of Lawyer Park‘s work, though on a vastly different 
terrain, has been similar insofar as he opened up some of the dark corners of 
sexual harassment and high-level corruption.  Both Latour and Park have 
fashioned hope in their vision of an open, verging on better (progressive) 
future.  Latour writes of the postmodern ―paranthesis of progress‖ coming to a 
close and that ―in the forward movement of time‘s arrow… the future 
settlement can do better than the modernist one‖ (1999:298-299).  Lawyer 
Park speaks and writes of social development not unlike previous economic 
development where the modern Korean past guarantees great change such 
that ―one event changes the world.‖  While their views on the modern are 
different, their hopeful resolve to put forward agendas on the basis of an 
unknown and perhaps progressive future is similar.  Both Latour and Lawyer 
Park help move the dissertation toward the conclusion, in which I attempt to 
articulate a similarly hopeful role of ethnography as means to another means. 
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Conclusion: Hope is Figure, Crisis is Ground, Pragmatism is Placeholder 
 
Figure-Ground Reversal 
This final chapter reenacts the major findings of the dissertation and makes 
explicit some of the premises that have been floating in the background.  
Lastly, it takes up a concern I share with many colleagues in the field, which 
on my own terrain is to articulate a hopeful role for ethnography.  Many of my 
informants were engaged in the work of refiguring a hopeful role for advocacy. 
 
The overarching premise of this dissertation is a figure-ground reversal.    The 
figure-ground reversal is an artifact of Roy Wagner’s (1987) ethnographic 
engagement with the Barok of New Ireland.  When the Barok perform the 
kaba—their culminating mortuary feast—they reverse feast and tree, which 
Wagner shows are images of gender, moiety distinction, and all social 
categories in Barok culture (1987:61).  Whereas the tree typically contains the 
feast, during the kaba the feast contains the tree.  The kaba is therefore a 
figure-ground reversal. 
 
The figure-ground reversal is not just an inversion, but rather a methodical 
negation of (Barok) society (Strathern 1991, 1992; Wagner 1987).  The power 
of the figure-ground reversal is that it demonstrates that the reversal makes as 
much sense as the order it reverses and thus renders social and cultural 
categories arbitrary (Wagner 1987:61-62).  The figure-ground reversal 
respecifies the common anthropological trope of relativism.  The effect of the 
reversal is that the figure of sociality “moves” while people and relationships 
remain grounded (Strathern 1991:113-114).  This dissertation has attempted a 
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similar effect with history and ideas moving between ideology, field, sacrifice, 
discourse, project, agenda, and social design.  Ideas and imaginations about 
the past, present, and future have tremendous agency in my fieldsites. 
 
The figure-ground reversal works by privileging the “ground behind or 
underneath the more commonly, explicitly, powerfully, or otherwise more 
prominent figure in the foreground” (Jean-Klein 2003:559).  Crisis, as this 
dissertation has shown, is the conventional figure in my fieldsite, Korean 
Studies, and in anthropological and social theory more broadly.  However, I 
have approached crisis as the ground and pragmatism as the figure so as to 
refigure ethnographic analysis as an anticipatory process rather than a 
pragmatic response to an always already emergent world.  This reorientation 
(Miyazaki 2004) enables me to make more evident a hopeful role for 
ethnography by approaching pragmatism as placeholder (e.g., Riles 2010a), 
much as some informants did with discourse (damnon), which was a means to 
keep the future and scale of agency open. 
 
Rescaling Agency 
South Korea is an exemplary, at times literalizing, field for modern, 
postmodern, liberal, and neoliberal imaginaries (e.g. Abelmann 2003; Song 
2009).  In this dissertation I have embraced the compressions that often vex 
ethnographers in my own compressed writing style.  I have omitted 
conventional, often contextualizing, features of many dissertations as well as 
life histories in an effort to replicate the spatial and temporal movements of my 
fieldsites.  In another demonstration of compressed scale and movement, my 
ethnographic subject regularly moved between people of various title, 
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movement (undong), group (danche), organization (gigu), think tank, and civil 
society (simin sahoe).  At the same time, crisis regularly shifted scale between 
moral, epistemological, disciplinary and organizational.  I have replicated this 
movement in the scale of agency between ideology, field (hyeonjang), 
sacrifice, discourse (damnon), project, agenda, and social design.    
 
In the first chapter, ideology’s scale of commitment and imagination is 
systemic.  The pleasures associated with ideology around solidarity, system, 
and utopia foreground relational and structural agency rather than individual or 
personal agency.  Going to the field, or historical site of importance 
(hyeonjang), for many of my informants was about recovering historical and 
personal agency through a sense of praxis.  At the same time, it specifies time 
and place and puts limits on the scale of imagination and agency.  Many NGO 
and NPO workers, particularly former student movement activists, measured 
their own commitment and that of their colleagues according to sacrifice.  
Sacrifice was a necessary and potentially alternative demonstration of 
commitment because it rendered people into human resources (jawon) on a 
larger scale.  Chon, Tae-il and his sacrifice, for example, have been an active 
legacy rendering future generations of people into similar agents.  In the third 
chapter, discourse (damnon) was a middle ground or placeholder which did 
not achieve the goal of theory, but also did not fall back to ideology’s scale.  In 
the words of one informant, it is “less than theory, smaller than ideology.”  
Project and agenda are pragmatic artifacts of work with great flexibility in scale 
from Saemangeum to job titles.  They also foreground personal agency.  I will 
take up the openness of social design and its implications for agency a little 
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later.  Before doing so, I need to return to the double binds that often entangle 
agency. 
 
Many NGO and NPO workers, like pragmatists, have tremendous faith in 
human agency (Koopman 2009; Rorty 1999).  Yet the crisis many of them 
faced was a crisis of agency in determining who can be effective agents of 
social change amid so much social change.  I encountered this crisis of 
agency repeatedly in the field.  Green Korea’s staff often faced the limits of 
their agency against the growing scale of the Saemangeum reclamation.  
Secretary-General Choi wondered if Green Korea would have been better off 
closing their offices completely instead of doing any of the activities they had 
done to oppose Saeamangeum.  There was a constant self-doubt about the 
advocacy methods NGOs and NPOs could assume during the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration. 
 
One of the most basic and recurring lessons this project has taught me is that 
agency is not only about action or doing something; it is also about 
suspending or putting agency in abeyance (e.g., Battaglia 1997; Gell 1998; 
Miyazaki 2000).  This move is analogous to recent moves by anthropologists 
with respect to knowledge in positing “unknowledge” and foregrounding faith, 
hope, and affect (e.g., Coles 2006; Maurer 2005; Miyazaki 2000, 2004).  There 
is an increasing sensitivity in the anthropology literature to the limits, self-
imposed or otherwise, and attendant ambivalence of experts, semi-experts, 
and aspiring experts (e.g., Ballestero 2010; Barrera 2009; Elyachar 2005; 
Fortun 2001; Langwick 2008; Miyazaki 2006; Redfield 2006; Riles 2010a).   
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Many of my informants were acutely aware of the answers they did not have 
and the expertise they could not claim even as they felt compelled to act in 
response to one crisis or another.  This was a double bind that I often 
empathized with as an American working in Korea.  One informant wryly joked 
just before the official commemoration of the Gwangju massacre, which is a 
landmark event that negatively affected the views of many South Koreans 
toward the U.S. government (Lee N.H. 2007), “The United States gives 
[Korea] disease and sometimes cure1.”  The long history of colonization, 
division, war, dictatorship, and economic development that the United States 
has been involved in to varying degrees on the Korean Peninsula was 
implicitly and explicitly active in many interactions.  I have also tried to 
replicate the scale and agency of this past, along with its double binds, 
throughout the dissertation. 
 
Exhaustion, Design and Scale 
 The exhaustion I encountered in the field paralleled that which I encountered 
in anthropology.  My colleagues in the field had exhausted the single, 
totalizing minjung imaginary and needed to redefine their roles as people, 
movements, and organizations amid fragmenting, disciplined, and co-opted 
possibilities.  Jae Chung (2009) has theorized this condition as “ethnographic 
remnant,” which is predicated on the problem and possibility of number in 
which we can imagine more than one and less than many (Mol 2002; 
Oppenheim 2008; Strathern 1988). 
  
The parallel exhaustion I encountered in anthropology has been the legacy of 
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the reflexive turn (e.g., Clifford and Marcus 1986; Strathern 1991).  George 
Marcus (2009) reflects on anthropology feeding other disciplines and 
interdisciplinary projects to the detriment of its own discipline.  The return to 
this kind of discipline, unlike Foucauldian discipline, is what Iris Jean-Klein and 
Annelise Riles (2005) argue for and what elicited this dissertation in many 
ways.  Many anthropologists, especially Marcus (1999, 2003), have put 
forward projects and agendas to articulate a future hopeful role for 
ethnography.  As discussed in the last chapter, Bruno Latour and Lawyer Park 
do something similar for science studies and Korean civil movements 
respectively.   
 
Neither project nor agenda, however, is the most comprehensive way to 
describe the problem or the solution for the post-reflexive exhaustion in 
anthropology.  In a similar way, neither ideology nor theory is the most 
comprehensive way to describe what anthropologists need to anticipate or 
replicate from their subjects.  Are anthropologists confined to positing 
agendas, rearticulating discourses, and completing projects or can we hope 
for something in terms of scale (Bateson 1958; Strathern 1991)?  And can 
anthropologists do this without repeating the past costs and mistakes from 
functionalism to structuralism, structural-functionalism and Marxism?  This is 
analogous to the situation civil leaders such as Secretary-General Choi and 
Lawyer Park faced and the impetus for their work discussed in the third and 
fourth chapters. 
  
A restatement of this exhaustion or crisis came from a fellow Koreanist and 
anthropologist while I was doing fieldwork.  When I updated her on my 
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research she wondered if my subjects had found an “ethical alternative2” to the 
neoliberalism that she saw pervading South Korea.  There was a search for 
something imaginatively bigger, as with Choi's Green Life Theory and Lawyer 
Park's social design.  At the same time there was a growing appreciation of 
the past and its mistakes.  Green Life Theory became another unfinished 
project leaving behind another ideology (Greenism) in its wake.  However, the 
future of social design is as yet unknown.  Social design does not posit a 
revolutionary role.  In fact it explicitly resists that; rather, it is more akin to the 
facilitation or redirected agency coordinators (gansa) have inside NGOs and 
non-profits. 
  
Many anthropologists have similarly turned to design for inspiration in 
searching for their own refigured agency in the post-modernist and post-
reflexive moment (e.g., Faubion and Marcus 2009).  Both anthropologists and 
many of my colleagues in the field lamented their narrowed and irrelevant 
work in the present, which was evident in their postmodernist and movement 
reproduction crises respectively.  I approach my colleagues in Korea as well 
as in anthropology as trying to reimagine the scale of what is possible.  In our 
efforts to do this I have to answer my colleague: does social design, an artifact 
from the field and a model for how other anthropologists might find something 
analogous (Riles 2010a), constitute an alternative?  In a parallel way I hope I 
am answering the question from the human rights lawyer in the third chapter 
asking me how what I was doing constituted research as opposed to the work 
of the many other historians, sociologists and political scientists working in 
Korean Studies.  
                                                        
2 Email to author on November 7, 2006. 
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My response to the first question is no insofar as social design’s openness to 
the future and refigured agency resembles previous alternatives, in particular 
what Annelise Riles (2000) calls networking.  Networkers, like social 
designers, did not imagine themselves as activists so much as try to incite or 
facilitate others to act.  Social design is not something new or unknown just as 
networking was neither new nor unknown.  Instead social design and my effort 
in this dissertation are about making explicit what is already known.  The Hope 
Institute describes the present for NGOs and NPOs and looks back to the 
practical study movement (sirhak undong) as well as the authoritarian legacies 
of Park Chung Hee in order to rescale the future and to reimagine what is 
possible.  I similarly look back to the inspiring work in Korean Studies, 
particularly around movements, to capture the present of pragmatism and 
rescale the future for ethnography. 
  
My model for this hope is Marcel Mauss's (1967) essay The Gift.  Mauss 
(1983) did not conceive of his work as the search for something new or as yet 
unknown; rather he disdained the pretension of such a search and instead 
sought to make what is already known evident.  In The Gift, Mauss revealed 
the shared gift-giving practices of socialism and capitalism and at his best 
obviated the distinction between socialism and capitalism altogether.  Marilyn 
Strathern (1991) posits a similar starting point when she describes the 
endpoints of analysis as already known and the search for questions or means 
as the work of analysis. 
  
The Hope Institute reoriented from the past to the future and redrew the 
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boundaries between government, NGO and business.  In a similar fashion, 
Park moved between lawyer, social designer, dictator, leader, and CEO as he 
borrowed from movements in Japan and other places.  He also actively used 
his own biography as a hopeful means to inspire others to take on similar 
social design work and to demonstrate that one person can change the world 
just as one event can change the world.  Anthropology inherits a similar legacy 
from people such as Margaret Mead.  I was inspired as an undergrad, for 
example, by Mead's famous quote about a group of people changing the world 
and her own biography as well as that of Gregory Bateson and Ruth 
Benedict.  Mead’s biography continues to change and inspire anthropologists 
(Lutkehaus 2008; Newton 2000).  At the same time, Mauss's essay The Gift 
continues to be an example of how one work can change a discipline (e.g., 
Douglas 1990; Levi-Strauss 1987).  There are numerous analogs in other 
fields from the Gettysburg Address to The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.  All of these efforts turn to the past to reapproach the present and 
reimagine what is possible in the future. 
  
Hope and Ethnography 
So what is hopeful about ethnography?  I argue that it apprehends the present 
by making evident the “transparent matrix” (Bateson 1979).  In other words, 
ethnography makes what is so well known to be hidden from view evident 
through such devices as the figure-ground reversal.  As Hiro Miyazaki (2004) 
writes, we can only hope by reinheriting the past in order to more precisely 
apprehend the present and reimagine what is possible in the future.  Social 
design with its similarities to both the social engineering of neoliberalism (Song 
2009) and the progress of pragmatism and development may similarly reignite 
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the exhaustion of imaginaries.   
 
Hope, as Hiro Miyazaki (2004) theorizes, is predicated upon an open future. 
Miyazaki (2004, 2005) goes so far as to argue that a known future or defined 
end can “occlude” hope insofar as it renders hope into a problem, subject, or 
resource rather than keeping it an open and replicable means.  Richard Rorty 
articulates the pragmatist hope as “not that the future will conform to a plan, 
will fulfill an immanent teleology, but rather that the future will astonish and 
exhilarate” (1999:27-28).  Elizabeth Grosz locates a similar starting point in the 
French pragmatist tradition—in particular Henri Bergson’s conception of 
virtuality—which allows scholars “to think the radical openness of the future” 
(1998:52; 2000;214-234). Judith Butler, like Richard Rorty (1999), calls upon 
scholars to keep “our notion of the human open to some future articulation…” 
(2004:36).  Robyn Wiegman similarly approaches the future as “itself the 
excess of productive time: elusive, unmanageable, and ultimately unable to be 
guaranteed or owned” (2000:822). Annelise Riles has called this modality of 
the future, in particular Wiegman’s (2000) effort, an exploration of “alternatives 
to the heteronormative temporality of utopia” (2010b:21).  My own 
demonstration of kinship by other means—idea, ideology, sacrifice, discourse, 
agenda and many other affiliations—is a similar exploration.   
 
This dissertation suggests that sacrifice and (social) design, particularly in 
relation to the linearity of progress, development, utilitarianism, 
instrumentalism, and pragmatism, has served as an alternative temporality 
and basis of hope for many of my colleagues in South Korea and in 
anthropology. The transition between the utopia of ideology, the ambivalence 
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of sacrifice and discourse, and the pragmatism of agenda is often as recursive 
as it is linear.  The temporal incongruity between the recursivity of sacrifice as 
well as transition and the imagined linearity of progress, development, and 
pragmatism has helped sustain hope for many movement participants, 
analysts, and social designers (e.g., Miyazaki 2004).  In conclusion, it is not 
only that the future is unknown and open, but also that it is scalar and subject 
to reorientation and reversal in relation to the past, present, and transitions in-
between.  Hope is generated and sustained not only from reorientation or 
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1. What university, if any, did you attend? 
2. What year did you enter and what year did you graduate? 
3. What was your major? 




1. Did you receive any training for your current job?  If so, what kind (e.g., 
NGO or NPO Studies)? Describe your current job (daily tasks, planning, 
fundraising, etc.). How long have you held your current 
job?_____(months)/______(years) 
2. What previous jobs have you held and for how long?  
 
Reflections 










3. Define and approximate what percentage of the following your current 
work requires: 
1. ‘expertise’ (    %) 
2. ‘experience’ (     %) 
3. ‘knowledge’ (     %) 
4. ‘belief’ (     %) 
5. ‘intuition’ (     %) 
6. ‘other’ (     %) 
 
4. Do you have any opinion of the so-called ‘386 generation’?  If so, what 
is it?  
 
5. What is the current state of the ‘civil movement’ in Korea? 
  
6. What is the current state of ‘ethics’ in Korea?  
 
7. Do you think that the ‘civil movement’ needs to change in Korea? Why 
or why not?  
 
8. Do you think that ‘ethics’ need to change in Korea? Why or why not?  
 
9. Is change, or dynamism, a defining characteristic of Korea?  Why or 
why not? 
 
10.  What is your: 
Personal hope?  
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Hope for society?  
 








* *석사졸업자는 학사 전공에 대해서도 기술 바랍니다. 
 
1. (대학을 다니셨을 경우) 대학명:                               
2. 입학/졸업연도:_  ___(입학)  __(졸업) 
3. 전공: 
4. 학부 졸업 이후 학위가 있습니까? 어느 분야의 무슨 학위입니까?  
      
일  
 
1. 현재 활동하고 있는 분야에 대한 교육을 받은 경험이 있습니까? 있다면 
어떤 교육을 받았습니까? (예, NGO, NPO에 대한 교육) 
  
 
2. 현재 맡고 있는 업무에 대해서 간단히 기술해 주세요. (예, 일상 업무, 
기획, 기금 모금, 캠페인 등) 
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3.  언제부터 활동을 시작 하였습니까? (예, 월/년부터~현재까지) 
   
4.  현재 직업을 갖기 전에 다른 곳에서 근무하신 경험이 있습니까? 어떤 

















사람들이 당신을 어떻게 부르길 원합니까?  
 
3. 아래 용어에 대한 정의를 기술하고, 본인의 현재 활동이(업무가) 아래 각 
항목을 얼마나 필요로 하는지 %로 나타내 주세요. (0~100%, 단위 10%) 
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전문성 (expertise, %) 
경험 (experience, %) 
지식 (knowledge, %) 
신념 (belief, %) 
인간관계 (intuition, %)  
기타의견(위에 열거된 것 이외에 필요하다고 여겨지는것) 
 
4.  „386세대‟에 대해서 어떻게 생각하십니까?  
    
5. 한국 사회 „시민 운동‟의 현 주소(상태)는 어떻다고 생각하십니까? 
  
6. 한국 사회 „윤리 의식(도덕성)‟ 수준은 어느 정도라고 생각하십니까? 
 
7. 한국 사회 „시민 운동‟에 변화가 필요하다고 생각하십니까? 그렇다면 
(그렇지 않다면) 이유는 무엇입니까?  
  
8. 한국 사회 „윤리 의식‟에 대해 변화가 필요하다고 생각하십니까? 
그렇다면 (그렇지 않다면) 이유는 무엇입니까? 
 
9. 많은 사람들이 한국사회의 대표적인 특성으로 “역동성”을 제시합니다. 
이러한 의견에 동의하십니까? 동의 한다면(동의하지 않는다면) 그 
이유는 무엇입니까?  
 
10. 개인적인 희망은 무엇입나까? 당신이 사회에 바라는 희망은 무엇입니까? 
 
참여해주셔서 감사합니다. 답변한 내용에 대해 염려되는 부분이 있거나 질문이 
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있으면 에이미 레빈 Amy Levine에게 연락하시길 바랍니다.  
 
